HAFIZ TARIQ NASIM, J.--- Brief facts of this case, for the purpose of clarity, are that the petitioner was appointed as Driver against a regular post on 30-12-2003 against 20% quota of reserved seats for the children of working and retired Government servants, he joined the duty, performed the same for sometime but later on his services were dispensed with. The petitioner approached the Punjab Labour Court No,5, Sargodha, his petition was dismissed, however, he filed Labour Appeal No,316 of 2004 before this Court, which was allowed vide judgment, dated 26-11-2008 in the following terms:- -- "The termination order of the appellant as well as the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court are set aside and the appellant is reinstated into service. However, the intervening period from the date of termination to the date of this order, shall' be treated as extraordinary leave without pay. This appeal is allowed."
2. The petitioner has been forced to file the present writ petition due to his continuous grievance by way of non-implementation of the judgment of this Court. Learned counsel reiterates his submissions contained in the writ petition, whereas learned counsel for the respondents relying on a judgment reported as WAPDA and others v. Qari Muhammad Feroze and others 2009 SCM R 396, submits that as the judgment of this Court is challenged before the Honourable Supreme A Court and the matter is pending for final adjudication, so this Court should lay its hands off the matter.
3. Heard.
4. First of all, I have to advert to the judgment cited keeping in view the well-settled law that every case is to be decided on its own facts. In the case referred (supra), the matter in respect of seniority of two groups of WAPDA employees was taken up before the Honourable Supreme Court and the apex Court held:--- "Departments and authority, particularly in a service matter when the lis is pending in the Court relating to the terms and conditions of service, like the instant one, where the rights of the parties regarding seniority is under consideration and was still to be determined by the Court with a resultant consequence of effecting further promotion and other rights like the selection grade, the department should keep its hands off, unless there is specific order of the Court for further proceedings on the part of the department/authority, in order to avoid further complications and which ought to have been visualized by the department."
5. It is observed that the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents has no nexus with the present case, which revolves around a case of reinstatement, wherein the daily milk and bread of a family is involved, whereas in the cited judgment matter pertains to seniority, contesting parties are very much in service, getting salaries and only questioning the prospects of promotion etc. And not pressing for their livelihood.
6. Today, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents conveys a message that the direct effect of the ratio of the said judgment is that the orders of the High Court are no more than mere in papers, rather than actual directions or orders which are to be implemented in letter and spirit. In my view, if the High Court does lay its hands off the matter after a C.P.L.A. Has been filed, this would not only infringe the rights of an aggrieved party but would also open a door for willful abuse of the High Court's orders. An example to elucidate the way by which a High Court's order may be and often is abused since relying on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court is explained below.
7. As per law, a party has a time limit of 60 days to file a C.P.L.A. In the Honourable Supreme Court, therefore, the way in which the parties may and usually do abuse the process of law is through usually waiting for 59 days before filing the C.P.L.A. And on the 60th day they file the same thus delaying the, implementation of High Court's order by an initial 60 days and thereby further aggrieving a party in whose favour judgment has been passed by the High Court. Once such C.P.L.A. Has been filed, the party usually covers its mala fide, inaction or unwillingness to implement the judgment by relying on the judgment (supra). The grievance of the party, in whose favour the High Court dias passed the judgment continues after the initial 60 days period to a further period of at least one to two years because once C.P.L.A. Has been filed (even though no stay order has been passed by the apex Court), it takes a considerable time for the C.P.L.A. To be fixed and decided by the Honourable Supreme Court.
8. If the High Court, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, lays its hands off the matter, after the C.P.L.A. Has been filed (provided no stay has been granted) it would literally mean that the parties are now .Free to implement the order of the High Court at their own will and if they decide not to implement the order, they have an excuse in form of the judgment referred by the learned counsel for the respondents and according to the learned counsel it requires the High Court to lay its hands off the matter, when C.P.L.A. Has been filed.
9. This would not only further inflict injustice upon the party in whose favour High Court has passed the judgment but would also leave the High Court totally and practically incapacitated of its powers to require the implementation of its order. The final judgment/order of the High Court would virtually mean nothing in practicality if the High Court is restrained from taking measures to require implementation of its orders .On the basis of mere filing of C.P.L.A. In the Supreme Court.
10. As per law, even an interim order passed by the High Court is to be fully implemented and applicable on the parties concerned since the moment it is passed, however, if the High Court lays its hands off the matter after C.P.L.A. Has been filed then even a final judgment/order passed by the High Court would mean nothing more than a piece of paper and the parties in whose favour the High Court has passed the judgment is left totally at the mercy of the department. Therefore, if in effect, the High Court's judgment has no more value than a piece of paper then the exercise of coming before the High Court in writ jurisdiction is fruitless due to the fact that it cannot require implementation of its own judgment.
' Regulation 32(2)(c) of NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973 by Mr. M.A.K. Azmati, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner with prayer to suspend the operation of retrenchment order, Annexure "P.3" and direct the respondents to allow and treat the petitioners in service till disposal of the case and to restrain the respondents from committing acts of unfair labour practice against the petitioners and not to harass, pressurize or take any adverse action against the petitioners till the disposal of main petition. On receipt of the notice the respondents filed their reply on these applications stating therein that the petitioners have themselves admitted that they have been terminated from employment vide letter, dated 2-1-2009. Such retrenchment letters have been produced by the petitioners along with the present applications. The respondents have given reasons of retrenchment of the petitioners in the letter, dated 2-1-2009. It is further stated that by service of retrenchment letter the petitioners, are ceased to be workmen as defined under Industrial Relations Act, 2008, as such the question of commission of unfair labour practice does not arise as the same can be committed against an employee and not outsider, therefore, in these circumstances the petitioners are not entitled for any interim relief in the present proceedings as granting of interim relief will amount to passing an order of status quo ante, which cannot be passed by this Commission, therefore, the instant applications have no merits and the same may be dismissed: It is further submitted that Regulation 32(2)(c) of NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973 speaks about prohibition of apprehended acts of unfair labour practice and not the acts which have already been committed. The applications are, therefore, misconceived and may be dismissed accordingly.
3. I have heard arguments of Mr. M.A.K. Azmati, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, learned counsel for the respondents.
4. While arguing his case Mr. M.A.K. Azmati, learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that all the.5 petitioners were seriously apprehending their removal from service, as such they rushed to this Bench of Commission and filed 5 separate petitions under section 25(8)(g) of I.R.A., 2008. Their petitions were admitted on 2-1-2009 and notice of main petitions as well as of stay applications was issued to the respondents. The bailiff of this Bench of Commission went to serve the notice on the respondents and according to the endorsement of the bailiff he went to the office of respondents Nos.1 and 2 on 2-1-2009 at about 2-55 p.m. And offered the notice to Personal Assistants of respondents Nos.1 and 2, on which he told him to approach Mr. Mansoor Qureshi as this type of job is being supervised by him and when he approached the office of Mr. Mansoor Qureshi, his Personal Assistant Mr. Javed told him that Mr. Mansoor Qureshi is not present and is out of Karachi, as such he has not received the notice. Thereafter he went to serve the notice to respondent No,4, where respondent No,4 was not available and Chowkidar disclosed that the respondent had gone to Head Office. On the basis of this endorsement of the bailiff of this Bench it has been agitated by Mr. M.A.K. Azmati, the learned counsel for the petitioners that after getting knowledge of filing of the petition before this Bench of Commission by the petitioners, the respondents have hurriedly issued retrenchment order against the petitioners, which also amounts to contempt of Court. He, therefore, has prayed for suspension of retrenchment orders, dated 2-1- 2009, as the same have been issued with mala fide intention.
5. On the other hand Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has argued that the present applications are filed under Regulation 32(2)(c) of NIRC (P&F)
Regulations, 1973, which deals with the situation when an act of unfair labour practice is likely to be committed but in the present case the above Regulation is not attracted as the respondents management has already issued retrenchment orders of the petitioners and the same have been received and implemented, because the petitioners themselves have produced the letter of retrenchment along with their applications. He has contended that the Legislature while framing the Regulation 32 has visualized two situations of Regulation 32, sub-regulation (1) deals with, the matters when an act of unfair labour practice stands committed and sub-regulation (2) deals with the matters when there is an apprehension and likelihood of commission of an unfair labour practice. In the present case as alleged the act of unfair labour practice, if any has already been committed, which has been admitted by the petitioners and therefore, the case of petitioners is now to be dealt under sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 32(2) of NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973 and admittedly the services of the petitioners have been retrenched and if it is believed then an act of unfair labour practice has been completed the Court has to consider the changed circumstances as held in PLD 1978 SC 220. While arguing further Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the respondents management had set up an AC Car Clinic Centre for supervision and maintenance of vehicles of management officers and that Workshop was being run at a rented premises and after closure of the said Workshop the premises has been handed over to the landlord. He submitted that there were 42 employees employed, out of them 37 being temporary and daily wage staff was retrenched from service. Besides there were three supervisors namely M. Naeem, M. Wasif and Shamshad Alam, who submitted, their resignations in November, 2008 and there remained only present 5 petitioners whose scheme of the Act and the Regulation there is no power to direct reinstatement either incidental or ancillary. Instead, it appears to be consequential and, therefore, it cannot be exercised ad interim. It is true that the Commission has vast powers under the law to prevent an occurrence of recurrence of unfair labour practice and as clause (g) of subsection (8) of section 25 of I.R.A., 2008 itself shows that Commission has been empowered to take an action in such manner as prescribed by Regulation under section 31 to prevent an employer or workman from committing an act of unfair labour practice. Clause (2) of Regulation 32 provides in details the preventive measures which can be taken. On the strength of such powers it is contended that the Commission could direct the reinstatement of the workers while seized with their complaints under section 72 of I.R.A., 2008 because it was a sort of continuing wrong.
11. In the present case the petitioners have filed applications under Regulation 32(2)(c) of NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973 which deals with the acts of unfair labour practice likely to be committed although they have produced the copy of retrenchment order meaning thereby that they have admitted that they have been removed by the respondents. Therefore, the act of unfair labour practice, if proved, has already been committed and completed for which they have remedy of filing of grievance petition before the concerned Labour Court as stated above. 'Accordingly these applications are misconceived and are not maintainable.
' In view of above facts and circumstances and also case-law referred above I am of the considered view that the petitioners have no case for interim relief. Accordingly, the applications filed by the petitioners are dismissed.