' SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, J.--- These appeals with leave of the Court assail the judgment of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, dated 27-2-2003 in S.A.Os. Nos.76 to 79 of 1979. By the aforesaid judgment the appeals filed by the appellant under section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance") were dismissed on the ground that they were filed beyond the period of thirty days provided for filing of appeals.
2. We have heard the arguments of Mr. Zahid Hussain Khan learned counsel for the appellant.
Respondents have been called absent. Neither any request nor any application for adjournment or intimation of their absence has been received by this Court. Therefore, the appeals against the respondents are heard in their absence and are to be decided ex parte.
3. Mr. Zahid Hussain Khan, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court had erred in calculating the period of limitation of thirty days for filing the appeal under section 15 of the Ordinance and concluding that the thirty days expired on 1st of May, 1999 but as a matter of fact the 30th Day for filing of the appeal was 2nd of May, 1999. He, however, submitted that even if be assumed without conceding that the period of thirty days expired on 1st of May, the appeal could have been validly filed on 3rd of May as 1st of May was a holiday on account of the labour/May day and 2nd of May was Sunday and the appeal having been filed on 3rd of May being the first opening day of the Court after the expiry of thirty days, the same would be within time.
4. With the help of the learned counsel for the appellant we have calculated the period of thirty days and we are in agreement with him that the same would expire on 2nd of May. Even assuming that the period of 30 days expired on the 1st of May, the appeals filed in the High Court on the 3rd of May would be within time as both the 1st and B the 2nd of May were closed holidays and the appeals filed on the first opening day would not be hit by the statute of limitation. With regard to the issue of exact boundaries of the expression "time requisite" for filing appeal under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is observed that the same would be subject to and governed by provisions of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as under:--- "9(1) In any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "to".
(2) This section applies also to all (Central Acts) made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteen day of January, 1887)."
5. It appears that the above factual as well as legal position was never brought to the notice of the High Court as well as this Court while granting leave to appeal and had it been brought to the notice perhaps the order would have been different.
6. In view of the above discussion, these appeals are found to have merit and are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the cases are remanded to the High Court to be decided on merits after allowing opportunity of hearing, to both the parties.