SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).--The facts admitted before us in this appeal are that the appellant, Syed Talib Hussain, an employee of the Railway Department, was charge-sheeted under Railway Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1961, and was removed from service on 28th September, 1976. Iris departmental appeal was rejected on 22nd June, 1977, and he came up before us in appeal on 2nd December, 1977. During the pendency of appeal, however, the order of removal from service was withdrawn but the disciplinary proceedings had been started afresh when the respondent realised that the appellant could not have bean proceeded against under the Railway Servants (E. & D.) Rules. 1961, which had been repealed and replaced by the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973.
2. The appellant has contended that the order of the respondent withdrawing the order of removal from service has been passed mala fide in order to vex the appellant twice for-the same cause, and that he was neither allowed to join the service nor permitted to work in the Depart--ment, He contends that the order of re-instatement being conditional is mala fide ultra vires and against the cannons of justice, as it does not give any relief to the appellant, and that in these circumstances, this order could be ignored and he appeal heard on merits.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent did not go into tile merits of the stand taken by the appellant with regard to what happened after the filing of appeal but contended that the appeal itself being barred by time, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
4. We have already referred to the different dates on which the orders of removal and the order in appeal were passed. The order of appeal, as already stated, was passed on 22nd June, 1977, but the appellant came to the Tribunal on 12th December, 1977, i.e. More than five months after the right of appeal to the Tribunal accrued to him. The appellant was expected to file the appeal within thirty days of the order of rejection of his departmental appeal and that date falls on 22nd July, 1977. The appeal is thus barred by time.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the order of the punishing authority as well as the order of the appellate authority are prima facie void inasmuch as the appellant was proceeded against under rules which were not applicable to him. He contended that in case of void order, period of limitation has not to be considered and that the appeal should be entertained if it was filed within a reasonable time. In this context, he relied on the case of Syed Mohammad Alam v. Mehdi Hasan and 2 others (PLD 1970 Lah. 6) and the case of Hussain Bakhsh and others v. Chief Settlement and others (PLD 1969 Lah. 1039). We are afraid, neither of these cases is helpful to the appellant. Both the cases arose out of writ petition filed under the extra- ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court where no period oil limitation is provided, and the writ petitions are not entertained in case of laches. The ratio of the decision in these two cases in that where a void order is questioned in a writ petition, the question of laches becomes immaterial and the writ should not be refused merely on the ground that the same was filed after considerable delay. In fact, in the case reported in PLD 1969 Lah. 6 it was impliedly observed that the proposition of law would not be applicable where section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is applicable.
6. The cases relied upon by the appellant, as already observed do not apply to the circumstances of the appeal before us. For filing on appeal before the Tribunal, a specific period of limitation is provided for, and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is also applicable. The delay can be condoned only if reasonable cause for the delay is shown and every day of delay is explained to the satisfaction of the appellate Court or the Tribunal. In the present case, no plausible reason has been given for filing the appeal after the expiry of the limitation and taking over five months instead of thirty days only, as provided in the statute. The question of limitation was discussed in detail by this Tribunal in Appeal No. 289 (L) of 1975 entitled Said K. Huque v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others and similar objections raised on behalf of the appellant, were repelled. We are unable to distinguish the present case from that one.
7. On the grounds stated above, we dismiss this appeal. No order as to costs.
8. Parties to be informed.