1. ' TANZIL-UR-RAHMAN, J.-Respondent No,
1. Was married to the petitioner on 9-8-1973, on the deferred dower of Rs, 51,000. The parties lived together for about nine months. The behavior of the petitioner and his relatives was good with respondent No, 1, but the trouble started when her parents refused to marry the petitioner's sister with her elder brother. Relations between the two families got strained. The respondent No, 1, then, began to suffer at the hands of petitioner as well as his parents and sister. This, ultimately, led the respondent No, I, to leave the house of the petitioner and come to the house of her parents. On 19-11-1974, respondent No, 1, filed a suit against the petitioner for dissolution of marriage, which was registered as family Suit No, 2269 of 1974 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge and Family Court, Karachi.
2. ' Thereafter, the petitioner filed his suit for restitution of conjugal rights on or about 23rd December, 1974 which was registered as family Suit 2383 of 1974 in the same Court. Both the suits were disposed of by one judgment dated 29th September 1977, by the Judge of the Family Court No, 2 where by the suit for dissolution of marriage, filed by the respondent No, 1 was decreed and the suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Since no appeal is provided under the Family Courts Act, 1964, against the decree of the Family Court in the case of dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, as laid down in section 2(viii) (a), (b) and (c) of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 the petitioner has chosen to invoke the High Court's Constitutional jurisdiction by filing the above constitution petition.
3. ' It was enough on the part of Mr. Zaheeruddin Khan, the learned Advocate for the petitioner to state at the beginning of his arguments that he does not attack the impugned judgment as passed without jurisdiction. He, however, assails the impugned judgment on the ground that there was no evidence of cruelty meted out to respondent No, 1, at the hands of the petitioner and hence the suit should not have been decreed by the learned Judge of the Family Court. In order to ascertain the fact whether the impugned judgment is passed on evidence of cruelty or not, we not only read the judgment relating to the question of cruelty but also read with the learned counsel for the petitioner, the depositions of the respondent No, 1, in the suit and we have no hesitation to say that there is evidence on record to prove the cruelty meted out to the respondent No, 1 at the hands of the petitioner zs well as his relations, though not physical but, certainly, mental which by itself constitutes cruelty within the meaning of section 2(viii) (a) of the Dissolution of Muslim Merriagesi Act, 1939.
4. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner, wanted us to draw inferences and arrive at the conclusion contrary to what the learned Judge of Family Court has drawn and arrived at, but, in the writ jurisdiction, we are not obliged to weigh the evidence or draw an inference, if more than one inference is possible, which is contrary to the inference drawn by a Court or Tribunal of special jurisdiction. Of course, the High Court can interfere with the judgment of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction, if there is no evidence at all on record to substantiate the inference drawn by the said Tribunal, or that no reasonable man will draw such an inference, being patently wrong. For this view, we are supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court, Begum Wazir Ahmed v. Maz Begum (1), wherein it was observed:- "The finding of the Settlement Commissioner can by no stretch of imagination be said to be based on no evidence or vitiated by any disregard of the accepted principles governing the appreciation of evidence."
5. ' We would, therefore, not interfere with the findings of the learned Judge of the Family Court, on the same evidence, which has been produced before him even if a different view was possible. The judgment is perfectly within jurisdiction and it cannot be said that the Family Court acted illegally even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, that the inferences drawn are erroneous. The High Court will not substitute its own D finding to the findings recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction, such as in the given case. This view of ours finds further support from two other authorities of the Supreme Court, viz. Muhammad Hussain v Munir and others (2) and Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner off Pakistan and others (3).
6. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
7. ' Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that an appeal has been provided in the Family Courts Act, 1964, against the decision of the Family Court, in matters relating to the claim for dower exceeding Rs, 1,000 for maintenance allowance exceeding Rs, 25 or less per month, restitution of conjugal rights, custody of children and guardianship but no appeal lies from the decree passed by a Family Court for dissolution of marriage, except in the case of dissolution for reasons specified in clause (d) of item (viii) of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act, 1939. A decree passed for dissolution of marriage is, certainly, of much more importance than a decree for dower exceeding Rs, 1,000 particularly in the social conditions of our society. We, may, therefore, advise the Government concerned to consider this aspect of the matter and provide for an appeal from a decree passed by the Family Court in other cases of dissolution of marriages for reasons specified in other clauses of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Government of Sind, for information taking necessary steps in the light of this recommendation.
(1) PLD 1976 SC 214
(2) PLD 1974 SC 139
(3) PLD 1973 SC 24