1. C.M. No,2202 OF 2009 ' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---The writ petitioner is an association of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (hereinafter referred to as "LPGAP") having its members all over the Pakistan with considerable membership in the Province of Punjab and its head office is situated at Lahore at the address given in the petition.
2. (This position is not controverted by the other side). The grievance propounded in the writ petition is that the Competition Ordinance, 2007 (the Ordinance) is no longer an existing law as on account of Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution), it stands repealed four month after its promulgation i,e, 2-10-2007; the provisions of the Ordinance especially 31 (a), 41 and 42 thereof, are ultra vires of the Constitution, void ab initio and of no legal effect and thus be, so declared; to declare the inquiry report and based thereupon the impugned show cause as also void and of no legal effect and finally it has been prayed that the Competition Commission of Pakistan and its officers may be restrained from taking any action against LPGAP or any of its members on the basis of the inquiry report or the impugned notice.
2. The noted writ petition came up for hearing on 18-5-2009, when it was admitted (to a regular hearing) and a notice on C.M.No,1-C of 2009 for the grant of interim relief (i,e, seeking suspension of the operation of the impugned show-cause notice) was issued. On 27-5-2009, Messrs Eh. Saeed- uz-Zafar and Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum, Advocates for the applicants/respondents Nos.3, 5 to 8, moved an application (C.M.No,2202 of 2009) under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. Asking for the return of the writ petition on the ground that under Article 199(1) (a) of the Constitution, Lahore High Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain it, primarily for the reason that all the respondents (except respondent No,9, a pro forma respondent) function at Islamabad, the impugned notice has also been issued there, and therefore, it is the Islamabad High Court, which alone has the territorial jurisdiction in the matter; notice was issued on this application to the writ petitioner (though on account of some typographical omission, it is not so recorded in the order sheet, but it was announced in the Court and also accordingly understood by the counsel for the parties) and as the vires of the law were under challenge and substantial questions to the interpretation of constitutional law were involved, thus a notice was also issued to the Attorney General of Pakistan in terms of Order XXVII-A, C.P.C. On the application i,e, C.M. No,2 of 2009 of the petitioner, an interim order was passed (on 27-5-2009). "In the meanwhile, the operation of the impugned notice is suspended". This order has been challenged by respondent No,3, before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in CPSLA No,1022 of 2009, which on account of an agreement between the parties has been disposed of vide order dated 25-6-2009, on the basis of which, this Court is required to first decide the question of its jurisdiction and if it is assumed, then to pass a speaking order on the application C. M. No,2 of 2009 moved by the petitioner. Pursuant to the above, the application C. M.
3. No,2202 of 2009 has been heard.
3. Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum, learned counsel for the applicants/respondents Nos.3, 5 and 8, has argued that the show-cause notice, which has been primarily challenged in the petition, was issued to LPGAP by respondent No,3 at Islamabad where it exclusively resides and functions, it has no office in any Province of the country, no action affecting the rights of the writ petitioner and/or its members has been taken in Punjab, therefore, the matter falls outside the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court and consequently vests in exclusive domain of Islamabad High Court. In this behalf, reference has been made to Article 199 (a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution. It is stated that for the purpose of jurisdiction, dominant purpose and object of the case is required to be looked into and in this petition, such purpose undoubtedly is to assail the show-cause notice, whereas the challenge to the vires of the law is only ancillary thereto. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has cited the cases, reported as Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) v. CBR PLD 1997 SC 334 (Paras.
4. Nos.5, 6 and 8), Mst. Shahida Maqsood v. President of Pakistan and another 2005 SCMR 1746 (para. No,5), Dr. Zahoor Ahmed Shah v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council through Secretary and another 2005 MLD 718 (para. No,10), Dr. Qaiser Rashid v. Federal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad PLD 2006 Lah. 789, and Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited Lahore v. The Copyright Board Karachi 1985 SCMR 758.
5. ' Mr. Basharat Qadir, Advocate appearing for respondent No,4 has substantially advanced the same arguments and has also placed reliance upon the judgment reported as Messrs Ibrahim Fibres Ltd. Through Secretary/Director Finance v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 3 others PLD 2009 Kar. 154 (para. Nos.25, 27 and 28) at pages 162, 167 and 168 to submit that on account of Article 199 of the Constitution, the writ in the nature of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition can be issued by such Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the respondents of the case function and the impugned order/action has been passed/taken; reference in this behalf has been made to the case reported as Abdul Ghaffar Lakhani v. Federal Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1986 Kar. 525 (para No,20) @ 538.
6. ' Mr. Asjad Saeed learned counsel for the applicants/ respondents Nos.3, 5 and 8 has referred to an unreported order of this Court which was passed in a writ petition (objection case/Diary No,37388 of 2009) and has argued that it has been held therein that even if the final order of BOR was passed in Lahore, but because the property about which the lis pertains and forum below in the hierarchy falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the respective Benches of the Lahore High Court, therefore, such writ petition cannot be heard at the principal seat. He has also relied upon the case reported as Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 2389 and has reiterated the rule of dominant purpose which should be the criteria and must be followed in deciding the question about the jurisdiction in writ matters.
4. Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has also relied upon the Sandalbar and Al-Iblagh's cases (supra) and has argued that as per the ratio of both these dictums, two Courts shall have the jurisdiction one, where the respondent (of the case) functions and the impugned order has been passed and the other where it (the assailed action/order) take its effect. As in the instant case, the petitioner has its head office at Lahore, most of its members are in Punjab, the impugned notice was addressed to and received by the petitioner at Lahore, therefore, it shall affect the petitioner (and its member) within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard, he has read quite a few paragraphs of the two noted judgments, on the strength of which, it is contended that both the Islamabad High Court as also the Lahore High Court shall have the concurrent jurisdiction in the matter and it is settled law that where such jurisdiction (concurrent) is vested with the two Courts, the petitioner has the right to choose the forum. As regards the rule of dominant purpose, it is argued that such purpose means not to escape and avoid the jurisdiction of any Court (i,e, I.H.C), rather on account of concurrent jurisdiction, the petitioner is exercising its right of choice. Learned counsel in support of his contention, besides the above judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, has relied upon the judgments reported as Sh. Abdul Sattar Lasi v.
7. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 6 others 2006 CLD 18 Para. No,8, Muhammad Idrees v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 5 others 1998 PLC (C.S.) 239 @ 242, 243, 247, Messrs Lucky Cement Ltd. v. The Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 2001 Peshawar 7 @ 14, Muhammad Aslam Khan and 9 others v. Federal Land Commission through its Chairman, Central Secretariat Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1976 Peshawar 66 Para.- 15, Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation (Pvt.) Limited and another 2000 SCMR 1703 Paras. Nos.8 and 10, Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Charsadda v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 1874 @ 1884 para. 4, Messrs AlIblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758 and Asghar Hussain, v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 1968 SC 387.
8. ' Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari co-counsel for the writ petitioner, for elucidating the dominant purpose has made reference to paras Nos.4 and 6 of Amin Textile's case supra.
5. Heard. The ratio of Sandalbar Enterprises, case (supra), is encapsulated in paragraph No,8 thereof, which reads below:- "We may observe that it has become a common practice to file a writ petition either at Peshawar, or Lahore, or Rawalpindi or Multan etc, to challenge the order of assessment passed at Karachi by adding a ground for impugning the Notification under which a particular levy is imposed, This practice is to be depreciated. The Court is to see, what is the dominate object of filing of the writ petition. In the present case, the dominant object was not to pay the regulatory duty assessed by a Customs official at Karachi."
9. ' Their lordships in this judgment though have distinguished Messrs Al-Iblagh Ltd's. Case (supra) on its own facts but have not revisited the powerful reasoning of the said judgment which reads as below:-- "The rules laid down in the said case would, we think, be applicable also in the circumstances of this case. The Central Government has set up a Copyright Board for the whole of Pakistan and it performs functions in relation to the affairs of the Federation in all the Provinces. Hence, any order passed by it or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of Pakistan would give the High Court of the Province in whose territory the order would affect such a person, jurisdiction to hear the case."
10. ' In paragraph No,5 of the judgment 2005 SCMR 1746, it has been observed:-- "Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that case of the petitioner would fall under Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution and not under sub-clause (ii) of the above said Article.
11. Essentially, the learned counsel contended that the question of territorial jurisdiction raised by the High Court was completely irrelevant as the President of Pakistan performs his functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation throughout the country and every High Court is competent to issue a direction as contemplated by Article 199 of the Constitution."
12. ' Thus considering the above, the Honourable Supreme Court in this case concluded "we do not find any flaw in the judgment of the High Court, which is not open to any exception".
13. ' In 2005 MLD 718, it has been held that the Court was to see what was the dominant object of filing of the constitutional petition and in. The instant case, dominant object is registration of the petitioner's qualification with the Medical and Dental Council; the office of the Council is located at Islamabad therefore, in the circumstances, the jurisdiction was held not possessed by the Quetta High Court where it was filed. More or less, same is the ratio of the judgment reported as PLD 2006 Lah.
14. 789.
15. ' In PLD 2009 Kar. 154, it has been observed:-- "From a perusal of the actions and omission of the members of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Lahore Bench we have seen that such acts and omissions took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court and therefore the cause of action fully arose at Lahore."
16. ' It is on account of the above, the Karachi High Court obliged to hold:-- "the Income Tax Tribunal Lahore Bench does not function within the territories subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and even the petitioner and the person and the members of the Income Tax Tribunal Lahore or the Taxation Officer based at Lahore do not function within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and are not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in this constitutional petition."
17. ' In paragraph No,20 of the judgment PLD 1986 Kar. 525, it has been held:-- "Even in respect of the cases covered by Article 199(1)(a)(i) direction could be issued only to a person who performs the functions within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court in connection with the affairs of the Federal, Provincial or local authorities for the purposes mentioned therein.
18. Similarly under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) a declaration could be made in respect of any act or proceedings taken only, if the act was done or the proceedings taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In other words for granting a writ in the nature of Mandamus or prohibition, the person whose acts of commission or omission are challenged must have performed or omitted to perform the acts, complained of within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Likewise a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued only in respect of orders passed or proceedings taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and not otherwise.
19. ' In 1998 SCMR 2389, Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd's case (supra), it was held:-- "The matter essentially relates to the demand of the Bank in respect of a loan and other facilities taken by the petitioner at Karachi from the Bank and, as observed, the dues of the Bank are payable at Karachi and even, according to the petitioner, the agreement dated 6-6-1994 with the Bank was executed at Karachi and payments are being made in instalments to the Bank. In filing the writ petition the dominant object was to avoid the demand of the Bank and, in the facts and circumstances Lahore High Court had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter."
20. ' In the judgment cited by Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited 1985 SCMR 758 at page 762 provides:-- "While dealing with a somewhat similar situation, this Court was called upon to examine the terms of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution (which are similar in Commissioner, Pakistan and other's case PLD 1968 SC 387. In this case the East Pakistan High Court had held that The said High Court could not exercise jurisdiction with regard to the decisions of the Election Commission of Pakistan as the said body was not located in nor performed its function in the Province of the East Pakistan and, therefore, East Pakistan High Court was precluded on account of territorial limitations, from exercising jurisdiction in connection with orders passed by it. While rejecting this contention it was observed by this Court that:-- The plain meaning of the words.--"a person performing in the Province functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre" excludes territorial limitations, such as, that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories."
21. (underling is ours) It explained that:-- "The Central Ministries as well as many Departments of the Central Government as located in Islamabad or at Rawalpindi. Nevertheless they perform functions in both the Provinces in connection with the affairs of the Centre, such as, Defence of Pakistan, External Affairs, Insurance, Copyright, Patent, Design...." (underlining is ours) ' and found that the orders made or proceedings taken by the said Departments in connection with the affairs of the Central Government but having effect on parties in East Pakistan would be subject to the writ jurisdiction, of the High Court of that Province.
22. ' The rules laid down in the said case would, we think, be applicable also in the circumstances of this case. The Central Government has set up a Copyright Board for the whole of Pakistan and it performs functions in relation to the affairs of the Federation in all the Provinces. Hence, any order passed by it or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of Pakistan would give the High Court of the Province, in whose territory the order would affect such a person, jurisdiction to hear the case. (for emphasis underline is mine)
23. ' The learned Deputy Attorney General Mr. Munir A. Sheikh who appeared on behalf of the respondent-Copyright Board, supported this interpretation of the constitutional provision in question and submitted that the writ petition filed by the appellant before the Lahore High Court should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the said High Court, as it also had jurisdiction to entertain it, concurrently with the Sindh High Court.
24. ' We agree and are of the opinion that both the Lahore High Court as well as the Sindh High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter and both the Courts could have entertained a writ petition against the impugned orders in the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, hold that the Lahore High Court has illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction in this case. The case will, therefore, go back to the Lahore High Court for decision of the writ petition filed by the appellant before it for decision on merits, in accordance with law."
25. ' In 1997 SCMR 1874 at 1884, it has been held:- "Mr. Pirzada further contended that in the present case not only the order of Collector of Customs and Central Excise was in question but relief is also claimed against the Central Board of Revenue, which functions at Islamabad, and therefore, the High Court at Peshawar and Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. The contention of Mr. Pirzada, the learned counsel for the appellants is not without force."
26. ' In 2006 CLD 18, after taking into account considerable case-law on the subject, the Division Bench of the Quetta High Court has held:-- "8. So far as the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in the matter is concerned, it may be observed that under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic 'Republic of Pakistan, 1973 writ could be issued against any. Person who is performing in the Province any function irrespective of its nature relating to the affairs of the Federation, Province or a local authority within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. In the instant petition the petitioner has challenged the vires of section 15 of the Ordinance, 2001 i,e, the law equally applicable to the Province of Balochistan, which in our view is the main relief claimed in the petition whereas; the other reliefs for declaring public auction notices as illegal, void or setting aside auction proceedings carried out in the exercise of powers conferred under section 15(4) are ancillary to the main relief, as such (for emphasis underline is mine); this Court has the jurisdiction in the matter which cannot be ousted only on the ground that the properties auctioned and purchased happen to be situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court or that the respondents were residing outside the jurisdiction of this Court because the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is not contingent upon residence of an aggrieved person but it requires that a person/authority/functionary of State against whom order was sought to be issued should be operating or be amenable to jurisdiction of High Court, therefore, the provisions of section 20, C.P.C. Could not be pressed into service or to be read in Article 199; as vires of the Federal Law has been challenged which is applicable to whole of the Pakistan. In this regard, we are fortified by the judgment reported in 1996 CLC p.539. The relevant observations are reproduced herein below:-- ' The ratio deducible, from the foregoing discussion is that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) is not contingent upon the residence of aggrieved person.
27. Equally it is not relatable to places where the writ issued by it will have effect. What is required by this Article is, that the person/authority/functionary of the State against whom the writ is sought to be issued shall be operating or be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. In other words it means that the writ issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territory subject to its jurisdiction and secondly that the person an authority to whom the Court was to issue writ was amendable to its jurisdiction either by residence or by location within its territory. The elements embodied in section 20 of C.P.C. Cannot be introduced in Article 199 of the Constitution. Applying this principle to facts and circumstances of the cases in hand, it is quite clear to us that the impugned order was passed by Chairman Federal Land Commission at Rawalpindi; that the Federal Land Commission was/is a Federal Institution and operates within the territories of whole of Pakistan; that it functioned at relevant time at Rawalpindi and it was so clearly amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court of Lahore. We, on this view, have no reason to depart from the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 29-3-1976. In result, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Deputy Attorney General is found to be misconceived and is accordingly repelled."
9. In the judgment reported in 1995 CLC (Quetta)1027 this Court held that the provisions as contemplated under Article 199 of the Constitution are read together as such; the words "without lawful authority" used in clause (1)(a)(ii) of Article 199 of the Constitution are suggestive of the fact that Article 199 is applicable to all persons, Authorities, Tribunals, Corporations and Autonomous and semi-Autonomous bodies subject to Constitution and, thus; constitutional jurisdiction cannot be limited within the boundaries of a Province.
28. 10.In the judgment report as PLD 1988 SC 387, the Honourable apex Court held that the Election Commission is a person or authority which exercises jurisdiction in the Province of. East Pakistan in connection with the affairs of the Centre namely elections to the office of the President, National.
29. Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and for holding a Referendum as provided for in the Constitution, as such; Commission is subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court notwithstanding that its main office and Secretariat are located in the Province of West Pakistan because the plain meaning of the words "a person performing in the Province functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre" exclude territorial limitation, such as that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories.
11. Whereas; in the judgment reported in PLD 1987 SC page 334 the Honourable apex Court held that while determining the constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court has to see the dominant object of filing of the constitutional petition.
12. In view of the dictum laid down in the above authorities and considering that the dominant object for filing of the instant petition is to challenge the validity and vires of section 15 of the Ordinance, 2001, we are inclined to hold that this Court has the jurisdiction in the matter."
30. ' In 1998 PLC (C.S.) 239, the petitioner of the case was an employee of the Government of Pakistan, in relation to his service an order passed by the Government at Islamabad, which was conveyed to him in Quetta, where he was posted, he filed a constitutional petition with a prayer:- "It is prayed that this Honourable Court may graciously be pleased to issue appropriate direction in nature of writ of mandamus directing respondents to reconsider and finally decide petitioner's - representation for antedation of his promotion."
31. ' A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Deputy Attorney General about the lack of territorial jurisdiction and the Division Bench of the Court, in the judgment authored by the learned Judge, (now the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan) held "As far as Federation is concerned, it represents to all the provinces, therefore, if an aggrieved person residing in any of the provinces, where such order action has been communicated to him, he can invoke the jurisdiction of said respective High Court." (for emphasis underline is mine). Furthermore "Thus, it is concluded that objection raised in this behalf by the learned Deputy Attorney-General has no substance which is accordingly overruled concluding thereby that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Constitutional petition against the functionaries of the Federal Government because cause of action accrued to petitioner against the adverse orders determined to his service interest passed by a competent Authority during his posting at Quetta."
32. ' In PLD 2001 Peshawar 7 at page 14, on an order passed by the BOR, Collectorate of Customs initiated action against the petitioner (Lucky Cement Ltd.) in the Province of N.-W.F.P. Where it had established its plants, Lucky Cement filed petition challenging such action before the Peshawar High Court, which was resisted on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. Considering the case-law on the subject, the Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, concluded:- "Any order passed by such Board or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of the Country would give High Court of the Province in whose territory order would affect such a person jurisdiction to hear the case. It was thus declared that Sindh High Court and High. Court in whose territory order affects a person would, therefore, have concurrent jurisdiction."
33. In PLD 1976 Peshawar 66 (in para 15), it was held:-- "On a careful reading of the above quotation it would appear that this Court has got the powers to make an order directing a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, or of a province, or a local authority to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do. The crucial points for the exercise of the jurisdiction, therefore, are that the person should be performing functions within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and again he is doing that which he is not permitted by law to do. It is true that the Federal Land Commission is located at Islamabad, but a mere reference to its order dated 28-1-1975 as in Annexure A and the advertisement as in copy Annexure AD-B would show that it wants to perform some functions in the area of Upper Tanawal which is within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Court (for emphasis underline is mine). The fact that this function is being performed in connection with the affairs of the Federation or the Province is immaterial, for in either case it will be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. In this view we are reinforced by the weighty pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asghar Hussain v. The Election Commission, Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1968 SC 387 and a recent authority of this Court in Khaista Gul. v. Akbar Khan and 7 others PLD 1975 Peshawar 146"
34. ' In 2000 SCMR 1703, it is held:- "The learned Single Judge of the High Court in Chambers has elaborately dealt with this aspect of the matter in the judgment in writ petition and has held that the respondent No,1 having cause of action against Federal Government could bring the Constitutional petition either at Karachi or at Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court. The learned Single Judge rejected the objection of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that affairs of Trading Corporation of Pakistan are being controlled by the Ministry of Commerce at Islamabad. Before the High Court the relief was not only claimed against the petitioner but was also claimed against the respondent No,2, the Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan at Islamabad as such the petition was competently filed.
11. Similar aspect of the case came up for consideration before this Court in the case Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Limited (supra). An objection was raised by the learned Deputy Attorney-General that the Rawalpindi Bench, Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction in the case as the order impugned in the writ petition was not passed by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise functioning at Peshawar. It was contended that relief was claimed against the Central Board of Revenue which functions at Islamabad, therefore, the High Court at Peshawar and Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. Contention was found convincing and it was held that both Courts had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.
35. ' From what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that both Courts at Karachi as well as Rawalpindi have the jurisdiction in the matter and remedy can be resorted in either of them. Thus, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi ,Bench had concurrent jurisdiction to decide the matter. Accordingly we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
36. ' Consequently leave to appeal is refused and the petition is dismissed."
6. From the judgments cited at the Bar on both the sides, the portions whereof have been extensively reproduced, the following ratio is deducible:--
(A) The Federal Government or any body politic or a corporation or a statutory authority having exclusive residence or location at Islamabad with no office at any other place in, any of the Provinces, shall still be deemed to function all over the country.
(B) If such Government, body or authority passes any order or initiates an action at Islamabad, but it affects the "aggrieved party" at the place other than the Federal capital, such party shall have a cause of action to agitate about his grievance within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in which said order/action has affected him.
(C) This shall be more so in the cases where a party is aggrieved or a legislative instrument (including any rules, etc.) on the ground of it being ultra vires, because the cause to sue against that law shall accrue to a person at the place where his rights have been affected. For example, if a law is challenged on the ground that it is confiscatory in nature, violative of the fundamental rights to property; profession, association etc. And any curb has been placed upon such a right by a law enforced at Islamabad, besides there, it can also be challenged within the jurisdiction of the High Court, where the right is likely to be affected.
37. ' In this context, illustrations can be given, that if some duty/tax has been imposed upon the withdrawal of the amounts by the account holders from their bank account and the aggrieved party is maintaining the account at Lahore, though the Act/law has been passed at Islamabad, yet his right being affected where he maintains the account (Lahore), he also can competently initiate a writ petition in Lahore besides Islamabad; this shall also be true for the violation of any right to profession, if being conducted by a person at Lahore, obviously in the situation, he shall have a right to seek the enforcement of his right in any of the two 'High Courts.
(D) On account of the above, both the Islamabad and Lahore High Courts shall have the concurrent jurisdiction in certain matters and it shall not be legally sound or valid to hold that as the Federal Government etc. Resides in Islamabad, and operates from there; the assailed order/action has also emanated from Islamabad, therefore, it is only the Capital High Court which shall possess the jurisdiction. The dominant purpose in such a situation shall be irrelevant, rather on account of the rule of choice, the plaintiff/petitioner shall have the right to choose the forum of his convenience.
7. In order to evaluate, if the present case qualifies the test of concurrent jurisdiction, it is expedient to examine the contents of the show-cause notice, which has admittedly been issued by respondent No,3 under the provision of section 30 of the Competition Ordinance, 2007 from Islamabad. In the notice, after having made reference to certain inquiry and other factums, in paragraph No,15 it has been mentioned:- "Whereas, in view of the foregoing the commission is satisfied that there has been and/or is likely to be a violation of section 4(1) in terms of section 4(2)(a)(f) and (g) of the Ordinance and section 3
(1) read with sections 3(2) and 3(3)(d)(e) and (g) of the Ordinance."
38. ' Thus the writ petitioner was required to show-cause in writing within fourteen days by placing before the Commission the facts and material in support of its (LGPAG) contentions. It is further mentioned in the notice as to why an appropriate order under clause (c) of section 31 and/or section 32 of the Ordinance may not be passed and/or a penalty for the above-mentioned violations should not be imposed under section 38 of the Ordinance.
39. What is a show-cause; show-cause notice? (which can be construed synonymous to show-cause order) and whether it causes any effect to the person upon whom it is served? Are important proposition, which needs to be attended in the case. According to Black's Law Dictionary Eight and Sixth Editions respectively, it means:-- Show cause:-- "To produce a satisfactory explanation or excuse, usu. In connection with a motion or application to a Court.
40. Show cause Order:-- "Court order, decree, execution, etc. To appear as directed and present to the Court such reasons and considerations as one has to offer why a particular order, decree, etc, should not be confirmed, take effect, be executed, or as the case may be.
41. ' Any order to a person or corporation, on motion of opposing party, to appear in Court and explain why the Court should not take a proposed action. If the person or ,corporation fails to appear or to give sufficient reasons why the Court should take no action, the Court will take the action."
42. ' Section 30 of the Competition Ordinance, 2007 under which impugned notice- has been issued is of peculiar nature entailing certain serious repercussions, as it provides:-- "Proceedings in cases of contravention.
(1) Where the Commission is satisfied that there has been or is likely to be, a contravention of any provision of Chapter II, it may make one or more of such orders specified in section 31 as it may deem appropriate. The Commission may also impose a penalty at rates prescribed in section 38 in all cases of contravention of the provisions of Chapter-II.
(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Commission shall:--
(a) give notice of its intention to make such order stating the reasons therefore to such undertaking as may appear to it to be in contravention; and
(b) give the undertaking an opportunity of being heard on such date as may be specified in the notice and of placing before the Commission facts and material in support of its contention: ' Provided that in case the undertaking does not avail the opportunity of being heard, the Commission may decide the case ex parte.
(3) The Commission shall publish its orders in the official Gazette for the information of the public.
(4) An order made under subsection (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or memorandum or articles of association.
(5) Any order issued under this section shall include the reasons on which the order is based."
43. ' It is obvious from the above that the show-cause notice in general and because of its peculiar nature in this case shall seriously affect the person to whom it is issued and the final order based thereupon can have far reaching adverse effects, therefore, the place where it is sent, communicated, served and received has the relevance for the purposes of the concurrent jurisdiction. In the above context, it is pertinent to specify the word "affect" which according to Black's Law Dictionary, Deluxe sixth Edition, means "to act upon; influence; change; enlarge or abridge; often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things. To lay hold of or attack (as a disease does); to act; or produce an effect or result upon; to impress or influence (the mind or feelings); to touch." I am of the view that almost all the major traits of the meaning shall apply to the petitioner and both the Islamabad and Lahore High Courts have the concurrent jurisdiction in the matter, therefore, the writ petition at Lahore has been competently and validly filed with the consequences that C. M. No,2202 of 2009 has no merits and is hereby dismissed.