' SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J.---The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 for recovery of US $1,865,473.66 with interest, late payment of interest, charges, costs till the date of realization of the suit amount. Pursuant thereto notices were issued to the defendants as contemplated by section 9(5) of the Ordinance, 2001. In response thereto the defendants Nos.1 to 4 filed an application under section 10 of the Ordinance (ibid) for unconditional leave to appear and defend the suit. Thereafter replication was filed by the plaintiff-Bank.
' The propositions raised by the counsel for defendants Nos.1 to 4 for grant of unconditional leave to appear and defend the suit by filing P.L.A. No,109-B of 2006 are, that the titled suit has not been filed by a duly authorized person, as the power of attorney in favour of Mr. Nadeem Siddiqui expired on 31-12-2005, the power of attorney was executed by Ms. Jennifer A. Sullivan, as authorized person on behalf of International Finance Corporation (plaintiff), but there is no document on record, in shape of a resolution passed by the Board, to show that the plaintiff bestowed such authority on Ms. Jennifer A. Sullivan, thus it is violative of the provisions of Articles 79 and 95 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984 therefore, not tenable. The power of attorney, also has not been witnessed by two independent witnesses nor is it attested by Pakistan Embassy in United States of America, therefore, it has no legal validity or efficacy in law, to augment his submissions he referred to the following precedents:--
(1) Ziauddin Siddiqui v. Mrs. Rana Sultana and another, 1990 CLC 645
(2) Gul-e-Rana and 4 others v. Citi Bank N.A. Lahore through Manager and another, 2005 CLD 1126.
(3) Province of Punjab through Collector Rajanpur and 2 others, 2005 CLC 1336.
(4) PICIC Commercial Bank Limited v. Spectrum Fisheries Limited, 2006 CLD 440.
' It was then argued that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the present suit. As section 2(2)(II) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is applicable to Pakistan only, but the plaintiff is not functioning in Pakistan, nor does it have any branch in Pakistan, in fact the agreement, itself bestows jurisdiction on the Courts of England, reference was made to the agreement dated 23-2-1993, section 9.07(b), section 4.03 and section 8.06. The pith and substance of the argument thus, was, that the jurisdiction of Pakistan Courts is barred and is with the Courts of England exclusively. Thereafter it was argued that the plaintiff does not fall within the definition of a Financial Institution, as defined in the Ordinance (ibid), because it has no authority to do Banking business, in view of bar contained in section 27, of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, as it does not hold a valid license for transacting Banking Business in Pakistan. Reference: National Development Finance Corporation v. Spinning Machinery Company of Pakistan Limited, 2002 CLD 53. It was argued next that the statement of account is not in accordance with law as it merely is a summary of statement and not a statement of account, as contemplated by section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. To fortify this proposition, reference was made to Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd.
Islamabad v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another, 2003 CLD 596, Messrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd.) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Duly Constituted Attorney, 2004 CLD 1356, Messrs C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v.
Investment Corporation of Pakistan, 2004 CLD 587, United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others, 2004 CLD 1338, Messrs State Engineering Corporation Limited, Islamabad, through Manager (Personnel) S.M. Akram Farhat v. National Development Finance Corporation and another, 2004 CLD 1344 and Investment Corporation of Pakistan v.
Sheikhupura Textile Mills Ltd. And others 2004 CLD 1396. It also was thereafter argued that interest cannot be charged beyond the contractual period, there also are material contradictions in the guarantee executed and statement of accounts, necessary documents for proper adjudication of the dispute have not been placed on record, the lapse is fatal to the maintainability of the suit.
Reference: Bankers Equity Limited through Principal Law Officer and 5 others v. Messrs Bentonite Pakistan Limited and 7 others, 2003 CLD 931, Messrs C.M.Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan, 2004 CLD 587 and Muhammad Nafees v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited through Manager and another 2004 CLD 937.
3. In response to the arguments made by the learned counsel for the defendants, the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr. All Zafar, Advocate stated that the defendants have admitted in the PLA, execution of the agreement, security documents and availing of the finance facilities, which inter alia, include the payment made by the plaintiff to the United Bank Limited, on behalf of the defendant No,1, which now is repayable to the plaintiff. The amount of due loan by virtue of agreements dated 234-1993 (Annex C), agreement dated 30-9-2001 and dated 23-2-1993 (Annex F) stands admitted. Further the defendants Nos.2 to 4 executed guarantees for due payment, which are still operational, thus defendants Nos.2 to 4 are liable to liquidate the liability. He then specifically referred to the preamble of the agreement (A to K) adverting to respective positions of the parties and due performance by the plaintiff. But despite this clear obligation the defendants refused to liquidate the liabilities. The learned counsel, thereafter referred to paras.
7.1, 7.2, 8, 9 and 10 of the PLA to plead that the defendant No,1 has accepted the liabilities by admitting the execution of the agreements as referred to earlier, but qualified them by stating that the agreements are invalid in law. The liability of defendants Nos.2 to 4 accrues upon execution of the guarantees executed on 23-2-1993, the documents of title including memorandum of deposit of title deed dated 1-12-1993 and 26-2-2002, deed of floating charge dated 6-12-1993, letter of hypothecation dated 1-12-1993, duly registered, and lastly the defendant No,1 also executed an irrevocable general power of attorney dated 1-12-1993 in favour of the plaintiff. He also emphatically referred to the balance sheet issued by the defendant No,1 on 30-6-2003 to state that due liability of plaintiff is reflected therein, to conclude the learned counsel stated that the total liability due is:-- "(i) under the guarantee payments a sum of US $ 1,455,037 as on the date of filing of the suit along with interest thereon in accordance with the Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement dated 30-9- 2001 (Annex D/1 Page 145);
(ii) a sum of US $ 1,863,617 as on the date of filing of the suit along with interest thereon in pursuance of the Agreement dated 30-9-2001 (Annex C/2 page 91) in respect of Loan I; and
(iii) a sum of US $ 226, 764 as on the date of filing of the suit along with interest thereon in respect of the Put Agreement dated 30-9-2001 (Annex C/2 page 91) in respect of Loan I; and ' The defendants Nos.2 to 4 are jointly and severally liable to pay all payments in respect of the guarantee payments and Loan I by virtue of Guarantees dated 23-2-1993 (Annex B Page 19) and 30-9-2001 (Annex B/1 page 30)."
' The learned counsel thereafter pleaded that the PLA be rejected outright, since it is not in consonance with the requirements of section 10(4)(a) of the Ordinance, 2001, as the defendants clearly state that they availed the finance amount, defrayed back the same partially, but, no specific dates in this context are mentioned, which is sine qua non for a valid PLA, therefore, there is no PLA before this Court, consequently legal penalties be inflicted. To fortify his contention, the learned counsel referred to:--
(1) N.B.P v. Effef Industries Limited and others, 2002 CLD 1431.
(2) Bolan Bank Limited v. Baig Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. And others 2002 CLD 557.
(3) Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company Ltd. v. Mohib Textile Mills Limited and others 2002 CLD 1170.
(4) Bankers Equity Limited v. Ventonite Pakistan Limited and others 2003 CLD 931.
(5) Bank of Khyber v. Spencer Distribution Limited and others 2003 CLD 1406.
(6) Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Mohib Fabrics Industries Limited 2004 CLD 716.
(7) Zeeshan Energy Limited v. Faysal Bank Limited 2004 CLD 1741.
' The learned counsel also emphatically stated that there is no specific denial in the PLA by the defendants of availing the finance facilities, therefore, by implication, liability has been accepted by the defendants. Even if for sake of argument, if the same is termed as denial on their part, it amounts to evasive denial, which tantamount to an admission. To fortify his contention in this context, the learned counsel referred to Haji All Khan & Co. v. Allied Bank, PLD 1995 SC 362, Allied Bank v. Kohinoor Cotton Mills, PLD 1985 Lah:89, Rubina Jamshed v. United Bank, 2005 CLD 50 and IDBP v. NTN (Pvt.) Limited, 2002 CLD 369. To sum up the arguments, on this proposition, the learned counsel concluded that non-denial of loan and due execution of documents, coupled with statement account verified, as ordained by law, is enough to decree the suit.
' On the question of jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that the word "financial institution" used in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 in section 2(a) has enlarged the definition of a Banking Company, he adverted to the word "means and includes", to submit that the intent of the legislature is clear that any legal or juristic person, transacting business as a financial institution is covered by this definition, it also is applicable not only to companies incorporated in Pakistan but also includes the companies transacting this business outside Pakistan, even by associate or ancillary branches. The plaintiff though was incorporated in Washington, but is also working in Pakistan, under the International Finance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act XXVII of 1956), it has branches in Islamabad, Pakistan, therefore, it clearly is a financial institution, as defined in the Ordinance, 2001, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The defendants have availed the finance facilities, therefore, they fall within the definition of a "customer" as envisaged by section 2(c) of the Ordinance, 2001, thus, they are required to discharge their obligation, which position has not been controverted in the PLA, the suit therefore, be decreed on this ground as well.
' As far as the set up of the plaintiff is concerned, it is stated that it is one of the largest financers in the world and has been providing facilities to the Governments worldwide including Pakistan. It also has an office in Islamabad and by enactment of the International Finance Corporation Act, 1956, it falls within the definition of a financial institution and therefore can operate and work under the B.C.R.F.I.O.
2001. The defendants, therefore, are its customers and as such required to liquidate the liability, to fortify his contention, in this context, the learned counsel referred to an unreported judgment of this Court: COS No,115 of 2000 titled "IFC v. Regent Knitwear".
' The learned counsel further submitted that the question of exclusive jurisdiction vesting in the Courts of England qua adjudication and decision is not fathomable. The agreement dated 23-2- 1993 stipulates that any action for recovery is for the exclusive benefit of IFC and may be brought in the Courts of England, therefore, discretion in this context vests with the IFC and not with the defendants. Further the word "may" is a significant and it empowers the plaintiff to initiate action for recovery in a Court of its choice. The main agreement itself was executed in Pakistan, the agreement referred to (Guarantee agreement dated 9-3-2002) is irrelevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, as it is inter se IFC and U.B.L, the defendants, therefore, cannot raise issue in this context. Section 4.04 of the agreement specifically provides that legal proceedings can and may be initiated in Pakistan, the issue of jurisdiction is purely legal and the parties cannot divest a Court of its inherent authority in this context. Ref: Hitachi v. Rupali Polyester Limited, 1998 SCMR 1618.
As agreements were executed in Lahore, therefore, the Courts in Pakistan have unfettered jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As far as the objection to statement of accounts is concerned, the use of the word "summary" of accounts, it is incorrect, as a detailed statement of account is available with the plaint as required by section 9, of the Ordinance, 2001, and has been certified in accordance with law. The power of attorney in favour of Mr. Nadeem Siddiqui is in consonance with all legal requirements, it contains a clear stipulation that a recovery suit may be filed against Sarah Textiles Limited and its guarantors, the concerned person has been bestowed with authority to file suits, petitions, affidavits etc. It has been duly attested by the Pakistan High Commission, bears the stamp of the Embassy of Pakistan. The last objection qua "Director Legal's" authority to bestow such powers upon Mr. Nadeem Siddiqui, is irrelevant as a formal resolution was duly passed on 15-12- 1997, and the same cannot be objected or challenged to by the defendants. The objection qua power of attorney being effective till 31-12-2006 also is irrelevant as the suit was filed earlier to this date, the proceedings commenced earlier and thus would continue unabated without requiring any further authorization. To fortify his contentions, the learned counsel referred to the following precedents:--
(1) Mashriq Bank v. Farooq Habib Textile Mills 2007 CLD 320.
(2) Muhammad Nawaz Ch. v. Citibank 2002 CLD 334.
(3) M.C.B. v. Rizwan Textile Mills Limited 1998 MLD 529.
(4) Banque Indosuez v. Jet Travels Limited 1991 CLC 446.
(5) PICIC v. Bawani Industries Limited PLD 1998 Kar.
400.
(6) N.B.P. v. Muhammad Ashraf Sanik PLD 1987 Lah.
17.
(7) ICEPAC Limited v. Asian Leasing Corporation 2003 CLD 232.
(8) Robina Jamshaid v. U.B.L, 2005 CLD 50.
(9) 1998 MLD 529.
(10)Citibank v. Judge Banking Court, 2001 CLC 171.
(11)2006 CLD 440; (12)U.B.L v. Sheharyar Textile Mills Limited 1996 CLC 106.
(13)Emirates Bank v. Fair Commission Agencies 1991 CLC 450.
(14)1991 CLC 446.
(15)1990 MLD 538.
(16)H.B.L v. Green Garments Manufacturers PLD 1978 Kar.
1027.
(17)PLD 1966 SC 684.
(18)1986 MLD 2930.
(19)Fida Muhammad v. Mir Muhammad Jan PLD 1985 SC 341.
(20)1994 SCMR 818.
(21)M. Yasin v. Dost Muhammad PLD 2002 SC 71.
(22)PLD 1959 Dhaka 636.
(23)Anis Fatima v. Anwar Hussain PLD 1979 Kar.
22.
(24)1992 CLC 2137.
4. Heard.
5. As far as the PLA is concerned although the arguments made at the bar and contained in the PLA are not in harmony and consonance with each other, several new dimensions and propositions have been urged, though they were not part of PLA. Normally a party cannot go beyond its pleadings under the principle of "secondum allegata et probata". But as defendants have raised propositions of law and partially facts which are part of PLA, therefore, the PLA cannot be summarily rejected and shall be decided on merits.
6. The first objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendants is, that the power of attorney on the basis of which, the present suit has been filed, is not in consonance with law, as it expired on 31-12-2006. The contention has no force, the power of attorney, itself stipulates that cessation shall not effect any act, theretofore done, in exercise hereof. The suit admittedly was filed earlier, thus cessation of authority on 31-12-2006, does not abridge the attorney's authority, thus the same is overruled.
' The next contention that the plaintiff has not placed on record any resolution by the Board authorizing Ms. Jennifer A. Sullivan to authorize Mr. Nadeem Siddiqui to institute the present suit and is violative of Articles 79 and 95 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is against record, as perusal of record reflects, that Mr. Nadeem Siddiqui, is a legal and validly constituted attorney of the plaintiff, the power of attorney in this context, clearly reflects that it has been signed, notarized and endorsed by the Embassy of Pakistan, in Washington, U.S.A. And was duly attested by two witnesses as required (Annex A). It clearly empowers the attorney to file the present proceedings. Authority in this context was duly delegated by Ms. Jennifer A Sullivan, Director and General Counsel, Legal Department of the plaintiff, this clinches the whole issue and there is no need to further dilate upon the matter. A formal resolution in this context also, is available on record.
7. The next proposition raised is that whether this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute or not. The learned counsel for the defendants stated that authority in this behalf has been exclusively bestowed upon the Courts of United Kingdom.
' A perusal of the agreement referred to by the learned counsel for the defendants clearly reflects that section 4.03 and section 8.06 relate to applicable law and jurisdiction, section 9.07(b) of the amended agreement executed inter se the parties relates to the question of jurisdiction. It reads:-- "Section 9.07(b) For the exclusive benefit of IFC, the Company hereby irrevocably agrees that any legal action, suit or proceedings arising out of or relating to this agreement may be brought in the High Court of Justice of England. By the execution of this Agreement, the Company hereby irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such Court in any such action, suit or proceedings and agrees to designate, appoint and empower Lane and Partners, 46/47 Bloomsbury Square, London WCIA 2RU, England as its authorized agent to receive for and on its behalf serve of the writ of summons or other legal process in any such action, suit or proceedings in such Court. The company further agrees that, so long as it shall be bound to IFC under the Agreement, it will maintain a duly appointed agent for the service of the writ of summons and other legal process in London, England, for the purposes of any such legal action, suit or proceedings brought by IFC in respect of this Agreement and shall keep IFC advised of the identity and location of such agent."
' It clearly reflects that the question of jurisdiction for filing a suit or proceedings or initiating any legal action is for the exclusive benefit of IFC, therefore, choice of forum also vests with the plaintiff in this context. The defendants cannot take exception to the same. The plaintiff has opted to file the proceedings in Pakistan, therefore, by virtue of this agreement, it was fully authorized to initiate proceedings in a Court of its choice, thus the objection qua the jurisdiction is not maintainable.
Further various agreements subject matter of the dispute were executed in Pakistan, therefore, under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, suits qua moveable property, personal actions and where cause of action arises are instituted where any of the said event takes place. In the present matter, the defendants admittedly are residents of Pakistan, agreement was executed in Pakistan, therefore, this Court is bestowed with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dispute. The matter has already been addressed in Hitachi v. Rupali Polyester Limited, 1998 SCMR 1618 and COS No,115 of 2000 IFC v. Regent Knitwear, therefore the objection qua the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present proceedings is also repelled. The precedents referred to by the learned counsel for the defendants in this context are distinguishable and not applicable to present facts.
8. The next objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff does not fall within the definition of a financial institution, as it cannot transact Banking business under section 27 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, due to the bar contained, that no individual, association, or body of individuals or company, shall transact the business of Banking in Pakistan unless it holds a valid license issued by State Bank of Pakistan. The proposition is correct but has to be examined in detail and in a larger prospective. The International Finance Corporation was enacted on 18-4-1956 by a legislative act, giving reasons, and its purpose and powers to sue, therefore, it is a body corporate. The question now arises, is, is it a "financial institution" as defined in section 2 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and can it seek benefit of this enactment. The history of legislation in this context starts with the promulgation of the Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984, this Ordinance, in section 2, mentions a "Banking Company" and defines the institutions covered by its definition, it is noteworthy, that the definition, ended with the word "means" which clearly holds, that a Banking Company was to be construed in narrow and restrictive sense. Thereafter provisional enactments were made but the next substantive enactment "The Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997" was enacted, repealing the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. In section 2 of this enactment again the word "Banking Company" was used and it ended with the word "means" as stated earlier, the definition was narrow and restrictive. Finally "The Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)
Ordinance, 2001" was enacted on 30-8-2001, but in the present enactment, a clear departure from previous definitions on the subject was made, the word "Banking Company" was dropped and substituted with the word "Financial Institution", the scope also was enlarged as is evident from the definition used in section 2(a) of the Ordinance, it reads:-- "financial institution" means and includes.--
(i) any company whether incorporated within or outside Pakistan which transacts the business of Banking or any associated or ancillary business in Pakistan through its branches within or outside Pakistan and includes a government savings bank, but excludes the State Bank of Pakistan;
(ii) a modaraba or modaraba management company, leasing company investment Bank, venture capital company, financing company, unit trust or mutual fund of any kind and credit or investment institution, corporation or company;
(iii) any company authorized by law to carry or any similar business as the Federal Government may by Notification in the official Gazette, specify; ' Thus with inclusion of the word "includes" the definition of a "financial institution" stands enlarged, as the word "includes", has been interpreted by the apex Court in the, Don Basco High School v. The Assistant Director EOBI and others PLD 1989 SC 128.
' Thus as the principle of "ejusdem generis" is applicable to the present enactment, therefore, it includes the plaintiff. Further the plaintiff, clearly is an investment institution duly recognized by the Government of Pakistan. The bar of section 27 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, also is inapplicable as the enactment is not restricted to transacting Banking business only but also covers ancillary or associated business, therefore, the agreement inter se the parties, permits the plaintiff to sue under the present Ordinance.
' Additionally the provisions of the Ordinance as contained in section 4 ibid have an overriding effect over other laws and provisions.
' The situation becomes even more clear, as the definition of the word "finance" used in section 2(d) of the Ordinance reads:-- "Section 2(d) "finance" includes.--
(i) an accommodation or facility provided on the basis of participation in profit and loss, mark-up or mark-down in price, hire-purchase, equity support, lease, rent-sharing licensing charge or fee of any kind, purchase and sale of any property including commodities, patents, designs, trade marks and copy-rights, bills of exchange, promissory notes or other instruments with or without buy-bak arrangement by a seller, participation term certificate, musharika, morabaha, musawama, istishnah or madaraba certificate, term finance certificate;
(ii) facility of credit or change cards;
(iii) facility of guarantees, indemnities, letters of credit or any other financial engagement which a financial institution may give, issue or undertake on behalf of a customer, with a corresponding obligation by the customer to the financial institution;
(iv) a loan, advance, cash credit, overdraft, packing credit, a bill discounted and purchased or any other financial accommodation provided by a financial institution to a customer;
(v) a benami loan or facility that is, a loan or facility the real beneficiary or recipient whereof is a person other than the person in whose name the loan or facility is advanced or granted;
(vi) any amount due from a customer to a financial institution under a decree passed by a Civil Court or any award given by an arbitrator; any amount due from a customer to a financial institution which is the subject matter of any pending suit, appeal or revision before any Court; any other facility availed by a customer from a financial institution."
' Therefore, it is clear that the defendants and plaintiff validly executed this agreement recognizing each others status and entity. The word "obligation" as used in the Ordinance requires the defendants to liquidate the liability as they have obtained finance from the plaintiff. This position was earlier examined by this Court in COS No,115 of 2000. "IFC v. Regent Knitwear" and answered in affirmative, therefore, under the principle of consistency, and the discussion made above, there absolutely is no need to take a view contrary to the one already expressed by this Court earlier, as such this objection raised too, is over-ruled.
9. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants that the statement of account is not in consonance with the parameters of section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, because the entries contained in it are incorrect and that penalties and other fees have been incorporated in the same. It also has been stated that the statement is a summary and not therefore, a statement of account, as contemplated by law. The following precedents were referred to by the learned counsel:--
(1) Saudi Pak Industries and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. Islamabad v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another 2003 CLD 596,
(2) Messrs Ittefaq Industries (Regd) through Managing Partner and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Duly Constituted Attorney 2004 CLD 1356,
(3) Messrs C.M. Textile Mills* (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587,
(4) United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338,
(5) Messrs State Engineering Corporation Limited, Islamabad, through Manager (Personnel) S.M.
Akram Farhat v. National Development Finance Corporation and another 2004 CLD 1344 and Investment Corporation of Pakistan v. Sheikhupura Textile Mills Ltd. And others 2004 CLD 1396.
Appraisal of record appended with the plaint clearly reflects that the statement of account appended with the plaint is in accordance with the parameters of section 9 of the Ordinance, 2001, there absolutely is no ambiguity in the same, it has been certified, as required by law, the defendants have not objected to any specific entry in this context, they were required in law to raise a specific objection, but it was not done, as is evident from the contents of PLA, as such they cannot now raise this issue under the principle of "second= allegata et probata". It is also imperative to state here that the defendants denied liability in law and not on facts, as they did not deny the execution of the documents subject of the present dispute. This objection too is over- ruled. The precedents referred to are of no help to the defendants, and distinguishable on facts.
10. The contention of the learned counsel that there are material contradictions in the agreements executed inter se the parties and the guarantees executed, also is without any substance. The guarantee agreement was concluded inter se the parties on 23-2-1993, thereafter the same was amended by another agreement dated 30-9-2001. Another guarantee agreement was executed on 9-3-2002 between U.B.L and I.F.C., the recitals contained in these compliment each other and prove a valid, legal and binding financial transaction between the parties. Thus defendants were obliged to adhere to their obligations and discharge them. A specific objection was raised qua accounts in para. 10 of the plaint, it states that the claimed amount is US $ 131, 503. But in the statement of account at page 221, the amount claimed is referred to US $ 251, 729.92, thus there is contradiction between the two. The statement of account appended pertains to three transactions, the amount adverted to is covered and reflected in the statement of accounts. It also is in consonance with the plaint, because it contains the entry referred and explains it, along with other entries. This objection too is not therefore, tenable.
11. For what has been sated above the defendants have not been able to raise any substantial question of law or fact, which needs recording of evidence, therefore, the leave application has no merits, and is dismissed.
12. The perusal of the plaint, PLA, the replication and the documents appended with the plaint, specifically, guarantees executed by the defendants and referred to earlier, the documents of title qua memorandum of deposit of title deeds dated 1-12-1993 and 26-2-2002, deed of floating charge dated 6-12-1993 and 26-2-2002, letter of hypothecation dated 1-12-1993 and 26-2-2002 the general power of attorney and admissions made in PLA, clearly spell out that not only a valid agreement was executed by the parties but it stands proved from the record, as discussed above, these documents jointly and severally prove the transaction made. Therefore, the suit is decreed as prayed for. A decree sheet be accordingly prepared.
13. In case the defendants fail to liquidate the liability within 30 days, the proceedings shall stand converted into execution petition as contemplated by section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.
14. Now to come up for further proceedings on 17-3-2009.