' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--- Instant appeal, under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act filed by the Government of Sindh through Land Acquisition Officer and others, proceeds against judgment dated 15-11-1999, whereby the learned High Court of Sindh, Hyderabad Circuit dismissed appellants' appeal (1st Appeal No,12 of 1999) in the following manner:--- "(a) Market. Value at Rs,3,00,000 per area under section 23(1) of L.A. Act is maintained as awarded by the learned lower Court.
(b) Compulsory Acquisition Charges @ 15% on amount of (a) is maintained as awarded to the respondents.
(c) Additional compensation @ 15% per annum under section 28(a) is maintained as awarded by the learned lower Court.
(d) Simple interest I@ 6% per annum on the excess amount under section 28 of L.A. Act is awarded to the respondents."
2. As we proposed to remand the case to the learned High Court, therefore, there is no need to narrate the facts of the case, which have been tabulated in the impugned judgment.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents, at the very outset, submitted that present appeal was barred by 12 days and it was so reported by the Office, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that although impugned judgment was announced on 15-11-1999, but decree sheet was drawn on 8-12-1999, therefore, the period of limitation for filing the appeal before this Court would run from the date of drawing and signing of the decree and thus the appeal was within time. He relied upon the judgment reported as Tulsidas Polumal v. Parsram R. Thadani AIR (35) 1948 Sind 18. As regards merits of the case, his contention is that the impugned judgment is devoid of reasons, inasmuch as, the learned High Court did not refer to any document or evidence on record. He referred to the judgment reported as Hyderabad Development Authority v. Abdul Majeed PLD 2002 SC 84. Learned AOR for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and while referring to Zaitoon Bibi v. Dilawar Muhammad 2004 SCM R 877, submitted that impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record. Firstly, dealing with the question of limitation. Admittedly, the impugned judgment was announced on 15- 11-1999 and decree sheet (available at page 31 of the paper book) shows that it was drawn and signed on 8-12-1999. Order XX, rule 7 of C.P.C. Provides that the decree shall bear date, on which the judgment was pronounced, that the decree will be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and it will be signed. This Court in the judgment reported as Government of West Pakistan v. Niaz Muhammad PLD 1967 SC 271 while considering the provisions of Order XX, rule 7, Order XLI, rule 1 and Article 156 of Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908, held that limitation for filing appeal will commence from the date of decree and that time which elapses between the announcement of the judgment and signing of the decree is included in time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment and decree. Thus it can safely be held that limitation under Article 156 of the Limitation Act for filing the appeal runs from the date of signing of the decree. As noted above, the decree was drawn and signed on 8-12-1999, therefore, as per the law declared by this Court in the case of Government of West Pakistan (ibid), the period for filing appeal before this Court will run from the date of signing of the decree i,e, 8-12-1999. The learned counsel for the respondents does not dispute that if the time is computed from 8-12-1999, the present appeal is within time. In view whereof, we are of the firm view that time to file the present appeal will run from 8-12-1999, therefore the present appeal was filed within time and the Office objection to this effect stands overruled.
5. As regards merits of the case. We upon deeper examination of the impugned judgment find that the learned High Court after narrating the facts of the case and recording respective contentions raised by learned counsel of both the parties without assigning any reasons abruptly dismissed appellants' appeal, inasmuch as, no findings were rendered by the learned Single Judge. This Court in the cases reported as Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173, held that the Court must pass a speaking judicial order manifesting by itself that the Court applied its mind to the issues B involved in the case. Even section 24-A of the General Clauses Act requires an executive authority to pass the order reasonably, fairly, justly and by rendering reasons. Learned counsel for the respondents, when confronted with the afore-noted legal position, has nothing to say much.
Additionally, we find that the learned High Court while deciding the matter neither referred to neither evidence nor any other material available on record justifying dismissal of appellant's appeal. Although learned counsel for the parties have raised other contentions, yet we have restrained we from giving any findings on the said contentions, lest it may prejudice cause of any of the parties in post remand proceedings. However, the parties are at liberty to raise the pleas available to them under the law before the learned High Court.
6. As regards the case of Zaitoon Bibi (ibid), relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, suffice it to say that the same is of no help to the respondents, as it was held in the said case that appellate Court was not under statutory duty to discuss each issue separately and record findings separately. In the case in hand the controversy is as to whether the impugned judgment, which is devoid of reasons, is sustainable or not, therefore, the case of said Zaitoon Bibi is of no avail to the respondents.
7. For what has been discussed above, the present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 15-11-1999 is set aside. Resultantly, appellants' appeal (1st Appeal No,12 of 1999) shall be deemed to be pending before the learned High Court for its decision, afresh. We are sanguine that the learned High Court shall decide the appeal within a period of three months from today after hearing all concerned.