' This is a revision petition against the findings given on 24-6-1978 by the learned trial Court on certain preliminary issues which are to the following effect:-
(1) Whether the suit is time barred?
(2) Whether the plaint noes not disclose a cause of action?
(3) What is the effect of withdrawal of Court of Ward from the suit on the present suit?
(4) Whether the amended plaint is not in accordance with the order of High Court dated 7-2-1968 and its effect?
(5) Whether plaintiff No, 2 has no locus standi to file the suit?
' All these issues were decided by the learned trial Court against the petitioner.
2. The property in dispute is 23-Aikman Road which was owned by Princess Mehr Bano and which along with her other property was taken by the Court of Wards under its superintendence in the, year 1954. The present suit for possession of this property was filed by the Court of Wards on 18-5- 1963. Princess Mehr Bano died on 24-12-1963. On 18-2-1964 an application was submitted by respondents 1 to 6 under Order XXII, rule 3, C. P. C. For being impleaded as party (plaintiffs) to the suit. This petition was filed inter alia on the ground that these persons had a right to join the proceedings. It was allowed by the learned trial Court on 31-10-1964. The petitioner challenged this order by C.R. 496/1964 which was decided on a compromise between the parties on 7-2-1968 by virtue of which in modification of the order of the learned trial Court respondents Nos, 1 to 6 were allowed to be impleaded as plaintiffs under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C. After the death of Princess Mehr Bano her property was released under section 50 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act by the Commissioner on 11-8-1964 and the Court of Wards withdrew from the suit on 2-7-1969 thus leaving respondents Nos, 1 to 6 as the plaintiffs. The petitioner thereupon raised an issue (Issue No, that since respondents Nos, I to 6 had been impleaded as a party on account of their independent right under Order rule 10. C. P. C. As distinguished from Order XXII, rule 3 of that Code which was not at all applicable, they should be treated to have been impleaded as a party under the provisions of section 22 of the Limitation Act either on the date when they applied for this purpose or when the High Court passed the order on his civil revision petition.
3. The learned trial Court held that it made no material difference whether they were impleaded as a party under Order I, rule 10 or under the provision of Order XXII and consequently section 22 of the Limitation Act would not apply.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner agued that the learned trial Court has proceeded on the assumption that Princess Mehr Bano was the plaintiff which she was not. In fact the plaintiff was the Court of Wards and, therefore, the provisions of Order XXII, rule 3 could not be invoked after the death of Princess Mehr Bano. Respondents Nos, 1 to 6 should, therefore, be considered to have been impleaded on account of their own independent status and not on account of the devolution of property in dispute on them as a result of her death. He referred to Karim Bakhsh v. Court of Wards, Salarwaham Estate (1) for the proposition that in the circumstances of the present case when the suit was by the Court of Wards, it was not necesary to bring the legal representatives of Princess Mehr Bano on record as plaintiffs.
5. I am of the view that the learned trial Court has misconceived the situation while proceeding to discuss only the provisions of Order I, rule 10 or Order XXII. The property of Princess Mehr Bano being under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, the provisions of section 20 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act made it incumbent upon the Court of Wards to file the suit as a plaintiff. A right to be impleaded as party accrued to the plaintiffs after the release of the property of Princess Mehr Bano.
I am, therefore, in full agreement with the agument of the learned course for the petitioner that the respondent could not be brought on record a legal representatives of Princess Mehr Bano. The consequence was that A the entitlement to be substituted for the Court of Wards accrued to thes plaintiffs when it released the property of the deceased from its superintendence and control. This substitution could be made on the date, if any, fixed by the Commissioner in the notification of release of the property issued under section 50 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act or within a reasonable time thereafter. Since the the respondents had already been impleaded as plaintiffs on 31-10-1964 before the passing of the release order by the Commissioner it was not necessary to pass a fromal order of substitution and from the date fixed in the notification under section 50 they became plaintiffs in substitution of the Court of Wards. Thus on the date when the Court of Wards actually withdrew itself from the litigation the respondents had already been impleaded as plaintiffs. In this view of the matter the question of applicability of section 22 of the Limitation Act did not arise at any stage. In fact Issue No, 1 never arose.
6. But the learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that even under the Court ,of the Wards Act respondents Nos, 1 to 6 could file an independent proceeding by virtue of section 32 thereof and as such they should be considered to be impleaded as a party in their own independent right. But this argument does not improve the situation since assuming these persons had been impleaded as party on account of their independent right which is not correct, there would be no necessity of passing any formal order of subtitution after the withdrawal of the Court of Wards from this litigation. These persons
(1) AIR 1921 Lab. 295 have been left as plaintiffs after the said withdrawal and since the suit had been filed within time, it could not be deemed to be barred by time after the virtual substitution of these persons as plaintiffs
7. But section 32 does not entitle respondents Nos, 1 to 6 file an independent suit in view of section 20 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act and particularly when the suit on behalf of the Court of Wards had already been filed. Section 32(1) is as follows:- ' Subject to the provisions of section 19 and section 31 nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as preventing any claimant from bringing or prosecuting any suit or executing any decree, in any competent Court, in respect of any claim which has been duly notified, within the time and in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, to the Deputy Commissioner, and which has, whether in whole or in part, been disallowed by him: ' Provided that no suit or proceedings in execution of any decree shall at any time be brought or be maintainable-
(a) in respect of any claim which has not been so notified; or
(b) to set aside or modify the order (if any) of a Deputy Commissioner fixing a date for such claim or regulating the order in which claims against the ward or properties under the superintendence of the Court of Wards shall be paid.
8. This section is subject to sections 19 and 31. Section 19 only provides that no suit relating to the person of any ward or property under the superintendence of the Court of Wards shall be instituted except by service of notice of two months on the Deputy Commissioner. Section 31 is in Chapter VI which deals with the claims of person against a ward or his property. Section 26 in this Chapter provides for the publication of a notification by the Deputy Commissioner after the assumption of the property by the Court of Wards. The notice is printed for with a view to give information to claimants who would like to file their claims. It is for this reason that subsection (3) provides that" the Deputy Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that any claimant had reasonable excuse for not submitting his statement of claim within six months, receive his claim at any time after the expiry of the period aforesaid, but any claim so received, shall unless the Deputy Commissioner otherwise directs and notwithstanding any law, contract, decree or award to the contrary, cease to carry interest from the date of expiry of the period aforesrid." Section 27 deals with the presentation of claims. Section 28 is about the examination into admission and rejection of claims. Section 28 is about the bar of claims which have not been duly notified. Section 30 pertains to the exclusion of documents not produced in support of the claims and section 31 deals with the decrees against which the decrees againts wards or their properties and their execution. Its subsection (2) provides that on the publication of a notice under section 26, all suits and all proceedings in execuion of any decree against a ward or as affecting any property under the superintedence of the Court of Wards then pending in any civil Court shall be stayed. Subsection (3) is about the revival of such proceedings and the time limit for such revival is subject to provision that 6 months must have expired from the date of the publication of the notice under section 26 and also 2 months period must have expired after notice in writing has been delivered or left in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of the district.
9. From these provisions to which section 32 is subject it is clear that the scope of section 32 cannot be extended to litigation of the present nature where a suit to further the interest of the ward in regard to his property had already been filed in the civil Court by the Court of Wards and the Court of Wards was looking after the interest of the ward. It generally deals with these cases in which the dispute is about a claim against the ward or his property, for example, claim in the nature of debt or loan. I, therefore, do not agree that section 32 is at all applicable.
10. Though my grounds are different for arriving at the same conclusion as arrived at by the learned trial Court but the finding of the learned trial Court on Issue No, 1 is unexceptionable.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit for the reason that his claim rested on an alleged gift to him by his mother Nawabzadi Shehr Bano, who could not not make the gift under the law. The learned Civil Judge held that Nawabzadi Shehr Bano had originally been impleaded as party on the application dated 18-2-1964 and Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan made an application after the gift on 19-11-1968 under Order I, rule 10 for being impleaded as plaintiff in place of the donor. Clearly therefore as an heir of Nawabzadi Shehr Bano Nawabzada Sheh Ali Khan could be impleaded as plaintiff after her death on 18-1-1969. The objection about locus standi which was the subject-matter of Issue No, 7 was thus held to be without force. The learned Court also pointed out that though the present petitioner had sought a review of the order dated 13-1-1970 by which the legal heirs of Nawabzadi Shah Bano were brought on record but that application was rejected on 29-4-1971.
12. I agree with the learned Court below that in the circumstances of this case when Nawabzadi Shehr Bano had died on 18-1-1969, Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan had the locus standi to be impleaded as a plaintiff at least as her legal heir if not on the basis of the gift.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to challenge the gift as such but I did not allow him to argue this point which is not covered by any issue.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted under Issue No, 4 that the learned trial Court had not correctly held that the amended plaint was in accordance with the order of the High Court dated 7-2-1968 but he could not point out any inference of the amendment being unwarranted could be drawn. The issue was rightly decided.
15. The learned counsel challenged the findings on Issues Nos, 2 and 3. These issues were taken up by the learned trial Court together. The second issue is "whether the plaint does not disclose a cause of action ?". The cause of action in the present suit is clearly the claim of possession from the petitioner and the right of the Court of Wards to take possession of this property. It is amply disclosed by the plaint.
16. So far as the withdrawal of the Court of Wards from the suit is concerned, that point has already been considered by me under Issue No,
1. I have already held that the withdrawal of the Court of Wards resulted in the substitution of the present plaintiffs for the Court of Wards.
17. This petition is without force and is dismissed with costs.