' SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.---This Constitutional Petition has been filed to call in question the legality and validity of the notifications dated 23-7-2008 and 15-9-2008 purportedly issued by the Government of the Punjab and it is prayed that respondents be restrained from holding an inquiry thereunder.
2. Relevant facts necessary for the adjudication of the lis at hand are that petitioner No,1 who is a former Media Advisor to the Government of the Punjab and former DGPR along with petitioner No,2 who was an Additional Director. DGPR of the Government of the Punjab have filed this petition and it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that Government of the Punjab in purported exercise of powers vested under section 3 of the Punjab Tribunal of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 Ordinance II of 1969 issued a notification dated 23-7-2005 appointing a Tribunal for purpose of making an Inquiry into the release and utilization of Government money and public funds during the financial year 2006- 2007 and 2007-2008 for running a print and electronic campaign of political advertisement.
' And by virtue of the said notification respondents Nos.6,7 and 9 were appointed as the Members with respondent No,6 as its President. Vide the same notification powers under subsections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of section 5 of the Ordinance II ibid were also conferred upon the Tribunal.
Furthermore, the powers under section 11 subsection (1) of the Ordinance supra were also conferred. The Tribunal was required to forward its recommendations by or before 15-8-2008.
' Petitioner No,1 filed writ petition 9452 of 2008 challenging primarily the conferment of powers under section 11 subsection (1) of the Ordinance referred to above. In the aforesaid writ petition, it was contended, that parawise comments were filed on behalf of the Government of the Punjab wherein it was allegedly stated that in the summary on the basis whereof notification dated 23-7- 2008 had been issued did not reflect conferment of powers under section 11 of the Ordinance upon the Tribunal and in this behalf, a fresh notification would be issued. In view of the aforesaid comments, the said writ petition was withdrawn and disposed of by this Court by means of order dated 4-8-2008. It is next contended that subsequently notification dated 15-9-2008 was issued by the Government of the .Punjab whereby respondent No,5 was appointed as Member of the Tribunal. Said notifications dated 23-7-2008 and 15-9-2008 have been challenged through this Constitutional Petition.
3. It was next asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notification dated 23-7- 2008 was time bound, the period fixed for the conduct of the Inquiry and submission of its recommendations was 15-8-2008 and consequently the said notification lapsed on 16-8-2008 and the Tribunal had ceased to exist. Adds that notification dated 23-7-2008 had become a dead letter by afflux of time, therefore, it could not be modified by subsequent notification dated 15-9-2008 and thus it was of no legal effect or consequence.
42 Learned counsel without prejudice to the aforesaid assertions further contended that even otherwise the notification dated 23-7-2008 was in violation of the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance, inasmuch as, the Inquiry sought to be conducted was not for a "public purpose" nor a "definite matter" had been specified therein. In this context, learned counsel further added that powers under subsection (2) to subsection (6) of section 5 of the Ordinance could only be conferred by a separate notification exhibiting definite application of mind. Hence, the purported conferment of said powers on the Tribunal vide the notification dated 23-7-2008 is illegal. Adds that no power under section 11 of the Ordinance has been conferred by notification, hence, could not be exercised.
5. Learned counsel further contended that purpose of the Inquiry is mala fide as only two financial years have been chosen. It is further contended that object of the Inquiry is indefinite and too wide in its scope. Further adds that relative independence is a sine qua non for a fact finding inquiry which is conspicuous by its absence in the instant case. Furthermore, the Members of the Tribunal are incompetent to hold such inquiry which would be reduced to a farce. And the purpose of the inquiry is merely to harass the petitioners and to victimize them and is even otherwise motivated by political ends.
6. In pursuance of this Court's order, reports and parawise comments have been filed on behalf of the respondents. Kh. Haras Ahmed, learned Advocate-General Punjab by controverting the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners contended that the Tribunal has been established vide notification dated 23-7-2008 in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government of the Punjab by section 3 of the Ordinance. And by referring to the aforesaid provision of law, the learned Advocate-General Punjab contended that fulfilment of the purposes of the inquiry and the forwarding of its recommendations is the overriding factor. As regards time specified, he contends that it is only secondary in nature. He further referred to section 7 of the Ordinance to contend that term of Tribunal established under section 3 could only be terminated by subsequent notification under the said provision of law. Even otherwise it is contended that the time mentioned in the notification of 23-7-2008 has been extended by a subsequent notification dated 17-9-2008 and currently the Tribunal is to submit its recommendations to the Government of the Punjab on or before 15-11-2008. Adds that notwithstanding that the time specified in the previous notification dated 23-7-2008 having lapsed, life of the Tribunal can always be extended through a subsequent notification as has been done in the instant case by means of notification dated 17-9-2008. To substantiate his contentions learned Advocate-General Punjab relies on AIR 1955 SC 25.
7. It is further contended that a fact finding inquiry is not person specified and pertains to the misuse and abuse of public funds which is always a public purpose. Furthermore, the nature of the inquiry is definite as is obvious from the notification dated 23-7-2008. He further maintained that Members of the Tribunal are fully qualified to conduct the Inquiry as one of the Members is a senior Police Officer with experience in the field of investigation while the other Members have a sound background in financial matters, hence, their competence and credibility is above board. Adds that Members of the Tribunal are independent and there is nothing on the record to cast any shadow of doubt upon their impartiality and neutrality.
8. With reference to conferment of powers under subsection (2) to subsection (6) of section 5 of the Ordinance ibid, learned Advocate-General Punjab contended that such powers have been specifically conferred by the notification itself and that there is nothing in law which requires issuance of separate notification in this behalf, and that such powers have been rightly conferred in the notification dated 23-7-2008. With reference to the powers conferred under section 11 of the Ordinance 1969, the learned Advocate-General contended that in the summary whereupon notification dated 17-9-2008 was issued, the matter has been specifically dealt with and on the basis thereof, said notification has been issued. Further without conceding the learned Advocate- General Punjab stated at the bar that before the said powers are exercised by the Tribunal, a separate subsequent notification conferring powers under section 11 of the Ordinance would be issued by the Government of the Punjab.
9. The learned Advocate-General Punjab also states that inquiry is fact finding in its nature and is not directed against any person. Adds that it pertains to the financial years 2006-2007 and 2007- 2008 during which period an extraordinary amount was spent for the media campaign and in fact said expenditures were to the tune of Rs,2.37 billion which necessitated the constitution of the Tribunal.
10. Whereas, in rebuttal learned counsel for the petitioners reiterates that since the notification dated 23-7-2008 had died its natural death on the 16-8-2008 and thereby became a dead letter therefore its life and that of the Tribunal constituted thereunder could not be extended by the notification dated 17-9-2008. Further contends that notification dated 17-9-2008 has not been published in the official Gazette, hence can have no legal effect.
11. On a specific Court's query, Kh. Haras Ahmed learned Advocate-General Punjab affirms that copy of the notification dated 17-9-2008 has been dispatched to the Government Printing Press Lahore, as in mentioned in the notification itself, and the same would have been published by now.
Further states that only after publication of the notification dated 17-9-2008 in the official Gazette, the Tribunal would proceed in the matter strictly in accordance with law.
12. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties have been heard and record appended with this petition perused.
13. Section 3 of the Ordinance confers powers on the Government to constitute/appoint a Tribunal for purposes of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. Perusal of the provisions of the Ordinance reveals that there is no statutory provisions fixing a time for the conclusion of the inquiry by the Tribunal. Whereas, section 3 merely provides that such time whereunder the Tribunal may conclude its proceedings be specified. Fixing of such time has been left entirely upon the discretion of the Government. There can be no escape from the fact that the power and discretion conferred under a statue is not exhausted by its exercise and can always be exercised from time to time, as is apparent from section 13 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956.
Furthermore, any notification issued can always be amended by the Authority issuing such notification and such power is recognized and conferred by section 20 of the Punjab General Clauses Act 1956. In this view of the matter, there can be no escape from the fact that Government of the Punjab can always amend its notification issued under section 3 of the Ordinance including by substituting or changing the Members of the Tribunal and extending time specified therein for the submission of its recommendations as has been done in the instant case vide notification dated 17-9-2008. The only question that could arise would be with respect to the period between the time specified in the first notification and the issuance of the subsequent notification extending the period for the submission of the recommendations. In the instant case it would be from 16th of August 2008 as the time mentioned in the notification dated 23-7-2008 having lapsed on 15th of August 2008 to 17th of September 2008 when the subsequent notification was issued. This Court was informed that no proceedings were conducted by the Tribunal during the said period, hence, the issue does not arise in the instant case. In holding so this Court is fortified by a judgment of the Indian jurisdiction report as AIR 1955 SC 25 Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar and others v. State of Ajmer and another and the relevant portion is reproduced hereunder: "Rule 3 of the rules framed under section 30 of the Act expressly lays down that the State Government may fix the term of the committee when it is constituted and may from time to time extend it as circumstances require. The State Government had therefore a right to extend the term of the committee in such way as it liked, The only question is whether it could do so after the period originally fixed and come to an end. Mr. Chatterjee relied in this connection upon certain case which held that the Court could not grant extension of time in an arbitration proceedings after the award was filed and an award made after the prescribed period is a nullity. In our opinion this analogy is not at all helpful to the appellants in the present case. It is not disputed that the committee did not function at all and did no work after the 16th of July 1952 and before the 21st of August next when its term was extended."
14. Adverting now to the other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, there can be no escape from the fact that the alleged abuse or the misuse of public funds is always a question of public importance. Such funds which belong to the public at large and are vested in public functionaries as a trust. Thus the instant case, the object of the Tribunal is a public purpose.
5. The opening lines of the notification dated 23-7-2008 reads as under:-- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Punjab Tribunal of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 (II of 1969) the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to appoint a Tribunal for the purpose of making an inquiry into the matter of public importance of the release and utilization of Government money of public fund during the financial years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 for running a massive print and electronic campaigns of political advertisements."
16. The purpose as is apparent from the aforesaid. The specified functions enumerated in the aforesaid notification dated 23rd of July 2008 referred to above from clauses (a) to (t) and para. 2 of the Notification have to be read obviously in conjunction with the aforesaid which spell out in great detail the terms of Reference of the fact finding inquiry to be conducted by the Tribunal and leave no doubt about the definitiveness of the inquiry and hence the provision of section 3 of the Ordinance have not been offended against. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this behalf appear' to be unfounded and misconceived.
17. The nature and the terms of reference as spelt out in the notification dated 23rd of July 2008 make it clear and obvious that the same could not be adhered to and acted upon unless the powers contemplated by subsection (2) to subsection (6) of the section 5 of the Ordinance are also conferred. Learned counsel for the petitioners has been unable to show as to how any of said powers is irrelevant to the terms of reference. There is also nothing in section 3 of the Ordinance to require a separate notification for the conferment of powers thereunder as has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
18. With regard to the powers under section 11 of the Ordinance the learned Advocate-General stated at the bar that a separate notification in this behalf shall be issued and published before such powers are exercised by the Tribunal.
19. The purpose of the Tribunal on the face of it appears to be in unequivocal terms to conduct an inquiry by the Members who ex facie possess the requisite investigation skill as well as financial knowledge to fulfil the terms of reference and there is nothing on record to persuade this Court to doubt their competence, independence and integrity.
20. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as to how and why two specific financial years have been chosen, in this context suffice it to say that a large amount of Rs,2.37 billion was expended from the public exchequer for advertisements. Coincidently general elections 2008 was also on the cards and subsequently held within the same period.
21. In view of the aforesaid there is hardly any illegality and infirmity in the notifications dated 23-7- 2008, 15-9-2008 and 17-9-2008 issued by the Government of the Punjab nor the inquiry being conducted by the Tribunal so constituted can be misconstrued to be illegal or invalid.
22. For the foregoing facts and reasons, this petition being misconceived and devoid of any merit must fail and the same is therefore dismissed accordingly with no order as to cost.