' MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, J.--- This appeal, by leave of the Court, arises out of the judgment of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court dated 18th October, 2007 passed in Civil Revision No,4 of 2007, whereby the revision petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts of the case are that the Collector Land Acquisition Mangla Dam Upraising Project issued the Award bearing No,7 of 2006 on 9-5-2006 in respect of property belonging to respondents Nos.1 to 6 apart from other people. The respondents feeling aggrieved from the amount of compensation determined by the Collector made an application to the Collector Land Acquisition Mangla Dam Upraising Project, Mirpur on 5-6-2006 for referring the matter to the Reference Judge for determination of original compensation on the grounds that the land which has been acquired is a precious land. The Collector has fixed the compensation against previous sale-deeds in respect of the lands in the village. The Collector has fixed the price of the land according to the kind of land, while the land has been acquired for residential and commercial purposes. It was incumbent upon the Collector to fix a uniform price of whole land. It was also averred in the application that a large number of population hailing from Mirpur is living abroad due to this reason the land in the Mirpur is costliest one as compared to the other area. The Collector Land Acquisition referred the matter to the Reference Judge. Most of the evidence of the petitioners has been recorded when on 18-11-2006 the counsel for the petitioners got recorded his statement. During recording of the statement he produced a copy of the Notification issued by the Azad Government on 16-12-1998, whereby the land under acquisition has been shown in the limits of Municipal Committee Islamghar. Another Notification issued by the office of Deputy Commissioner Mirpur on 31-12-2002 was also produced. He also produced certified copies of the sale-deeds, dated 27-5-2004, 19-5-2004 and 9-3-2006. The learned counsel for the appellants/respondents objected to the production of these documents on the ground that the documents cannot be produced at this stage. These documents were not relied upon in the application nor were these entered in the list of documents filed in the Court. The trial Court repelled the objection and allowed the documents to be produced in evidence which were exhibited as "P.A. " , "P.B. ", "P.C. ", "P.D. " and "P . E. " .
3. This order of the trial Court was challenged by the appellants through a revision petition before the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court on 18-1-2007. A learned single Judge in the High Court dismissed the revision petition vide impugned judgment on 18-10-2007, hence this appeal.
4. Ch. Muhammad Afzal, the learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the reference application is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector referred the matter to the Reference Judge for determination of market value/compensation of the acquired land. No separate procedure for trial of the reference is provided in the Land Acquisition Act. The proceedings before the Reference Judge are conducted under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. He relied upon section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act which provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable in proceedings before the Reference Judge. He submitted that a learned Single Judge in the High Court has incorrectly held that the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in proceedings before the Reference Judge. His argument is that the application under section 18 for all practical purposes is a suit, it shall be treated as a suit. The requirements of the application are same which are for presentation of suit. All the documents upon which the plaintiff bases his case shall be filed along with the plaint and if any document relied upon is not available it shall be entered in the list and produced on the first hearing of the suit. He relied upon Order VII, rules 14 and 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further argued that the Court can allow those documents which are relied upon in plaint, to be produced in the Court at a later stage under the provisions of Order XIII, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in that case sufficient cause has to be shown by the party for production of the same at the belated stage. He argued that the learned Judge in the High Court has misinterpreted the provisions of rules 14 and 18 of Order VII and Order XIII, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He contended that another single Judge in the High Court in Civil Revision No,10 of 2007 decided on 30-5-2007 has accepted the revision petition and documents allowed by the trial Court were ordered to be kept out of record. He argued that both the judgments are contrary judgments, which need resolution. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the reported case titled as Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Sardara Singh and others AIR 1981 Punj.
354.
5. While controverting the arguments of the counsel for the appellants, Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, Advocate, for respondents Nos.1 to 6, argued that the documents produced during the statement of the counsel for the petitioners/respondents are public documents i,e, two Government Notifications and four certified copies of the sale-deeds. All of these documents are part of public record, authenticity of the documents is beyond doubt. It is settled practice of the Courts and law also provides that the documents the authenticity of which is beyond doubt and are part of public record can be produced even at belated stage. Elaborating his argument he contended that one of the documents relates to the boundaries of the Municipal Committee Islamghar, while the other Notification relates to the fixation of market price for the purpose of sale- deeds made by the Deputy Commissioner Mirpur and other four documents are sale-deeds made by the different persons prior to the issuance of award. He argued that these documents were in power and possession of the petitioners, they got the copies of the same and produced in the Court. The High Court has correctly dismissed the revision petition the interest of justice so demands. He further argued that property has been acquired for the benefit of Water and Power Development Authority and it has not challenged the order in the High Court nor any appeal has been filed by WAPDA in this Court. The appeal has been filed by the Chief Engineer who was not a party before the proceedings in the trial Court as such appeal is not competent.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly argued his case on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable in the proceedings and the learned single Judge in the High Court has held that the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable, while another learned Single Judge in the High Court has held that the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable. If it is so, then the application is to be treated as a suit. A perusal of both the judgments of the High Court reveals that the learned Judge has held at page 7 of his judgment that the Code of Civil Procedure in the proceedings is applicable. The same view is adopted in Civil Revision No,10 of 2007, so there is no question of contradictory judgments in respect of application of Code of Civil Procedure. The argument is misconceived.
7. As regard the question of application being treated as a suit, the learned counsel has relied upon the case reported as Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Sardara Sigh and others AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 354. In this case an appeal against the judgment of District Judge in acquisition proceedings was decided by the High Court and while drawing the decree-sheet under the provisions of the High Court Procedure Rules the question of costs of the counsel fee for the parties arose, that how under the High Court Procedure Rules the costs is to be calculated. Keeping in view the High Court Procedure Rules and the Land Acquisition Act the application under section 18 was treated to be a suit. Their Lordships observed as under:- ' Thus we have the least hesitation in holding that an application under section 18 of the Act has to be treated as a plaint and the proceedings on its basis as the proceedings in the suit and the resultant award as a decree. In view of the above noted legal position, we accept the submission of the learned counsel for the claimant-petitioners to the effect that for purposes of determining or calculating counsel's fee while preparing the memo. Of costs, a decree of this Court in a Land Acquisition case is to be treated as if passed in a suit for specific property and the Rules contained in Chapter 6-1 of Volume V relating to such a decree have to be resorted to for the above said purpose ...."
' The rule of law was laid down in particular circumstances of case as such is not applicable in this case.
8. A perusal of the Land Acquisition Act reveals that it is a special law which has been enacted for the acquisition of property for the public purpose. The Collector is authorized to acquire the property and determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners on account of such acquisition. Under the provisions of this Act any person aggrieved from the award made by the Collector cannot directly approach the Civil Court. The interested person, who has not accepted the award, may by written application to the Collector require that matter be referred by the Collector to the Court for determination. It will be useful to produce section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act:--- "18. Reference to Court.---(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that' the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation-among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: ' Provided that every such application shall be made,--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."
9. It is evident that the person who has not accepted the award cannot approach the Court directly. He has to move the Collector Land Acquisition by a written application that he has not accepted the award whether it is in respect of measurement of the land or amount of compensation or his objections are in respect of entitlement of compensation to the person to whom it is payable or apportionment of the compensation amount to the interested person. The section also provides that the application shall be made in a specified period.
10. The word used in section 18 is "application". According to Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition page 98 the word "application" means "a putting to, placing before, preferring a request or petition to or before a person, the act of making a request for something. "In the Oxford Dictionary for the New Edition for the 1990's at page 52 the word "application" is defined as "the act of applying." The meaning of word "application" has to be taken in ordinary dictionary meaning. Under section 18 of the Land.Acquisition Act, there is no specific mode that how the application under the section is framed and presented before the Collector. The application under section 18 sent even by post has been accepted as validly presented. There is also no condition that application shall accompany with all documents upon which the petitioner relies. If the conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled then it is incumbent upon the Collector to forward the same to the Court.
11. In a reported case titled as Venkatasami Naidu and others v. State of Madras, represented by the Collector AIR 1964 Madras 434, it was held as under:--- ' We held that the implication of that letter was that the respondent did not accept the estimate and that he sought for a reference to Court. In the present case the position is even clearer. The appellants have expressly stated that they are not accepting the compensation. We have no hesitation in holding that the implication of this letter is that they have asked for a reference under S.18 of the Act."
12. In case of suit a plaint is presented. The plaint has to be framed under rule 1 of Order VII, C.P.C., which is as under:-- "(1) Particulars to be contained in plaint.--- The plaint shall contain the following particulars:---
(a) the name of the Court in which the suit is brought;
(b) the name description and place of residence of the plaintiff;
(c) the name description and place of residence of the defendant, so far as they can be ascertained;
(d) where the plaintiff or the defendant is a minor or a person of unsound mind, a statement to that effect;
(e) the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose;
(f) the facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction;
(g) the relief which the plaintiff claims;
(h) where the plaintiff has allowed a set off or relinquished a portion of his claim, the amount so allowed or relinquished; and
(i) a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fees, so far as the case admits."
' After framing the plaint the suit has to be instituted in accordance with rule 1 of Order IV, C.P.C.
Which is as under:--- "(1) Suit to be commenced by plaint.--- (1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf."
'The scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure for presentation of plaint and of the documents accompanied with the plaint is provided in Order IV, rule 1 and Order VII, rules 14 and 18. It is also provided in Order VII, rule 11 that a plaint can be rejected on any ground enumerated in rule 11 of Order VII. Likewise, there are other provisions which are necessary for trial of the suit, while this is not the case in an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector has to only satisfy himself before making the reference to the Court for exercising of jurisdiction:---
(a) that there is written application;
(b) that an application has been made by a person who is interested and has not accepted the award;
(c) that he has rejected the award in respect of measurement of land or amount of compensation or a person to whom it is payable or as the apportionment of compensation amount to the person interested; and
(d) that the application is within the period prescribed under section 18 subsection (2).
' If these conditions are fulfilled then the Collector has to refer the matter to the Court and the Court has to decide the reference. No doubt under section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable and only those provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are excluded which may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Single Judge in the High Court has correctly held that "the purpose of reference is to hold an inquiry on the basis of documents which are submitted either before the Collector or before the District Judge, a strict view cannot be taken in such like cases."
12-A. Now, the question is that whether the documents produced in the trial Court were correctly allowed to be produced in evidence or these have to be rejected. The documents which are produced in the statement of the counsel are all part of public record, two documents are the Notifications one issued by the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and other by the Deputy Commissioner Mirpur while rest of the documents are certified copies of the sale- deeds. Rule 1 of Order XIII, C.P.C. Provides that all the documentary evidence in the possession of the parties or their power shall be produced at the first hearing. It is correct that the party who bases his suit on certain documents it shall file these documents with the plaint and other documents on which the party intends to rely shall be entered in the list filed with the plaint. There is an exception to rule 14 of Order VII, which is provided in rule 2 of Order XIII that documents can be provided at a later stage. Rule vests a discretion in the Court to receive the documents in evidence at a later stage, although, a condition has been imposed that good cause for non-production of documents at a later stage has to be shown. The object of this condition is to exclude the possibility of forged documents being produced in evidence. If the documents intended to be produced are part of public record and have come from proper custody, their authenticity is beyond doubt, furthermore, these are necessary for correct decision of the case, the dial Court shall exercise its discretion in favour of accepting the documents and such like documents shall not ordinarily be refused. The documents which are part of public record, should not be ordinarily refused on the ground that these were not produced at earlier stage. Rules should be interpreted liberally, of course, while exercising the discretion the Court shall keep in mind that the documents intended to be produced shall not prolong the trial and these are absolutely free from any suspicion. The parties shall not unnecessarily be put in a position so, they lose their case due to non-production of genuine documents. Our above view is fortified by the cases decided by this Court and the case-law enunciated by the superior judiciary of the Sub-Continent.
13. In a reported case titled Muhammad Ameen and 6 others v. Mst. Akbar Jan 2005 CLC 1322, it was held that:- "(6) After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we have gone through the record and reports of the cited cases. There is no cavil with the proposition of law that the documents which are in possession and power of a party must be produced at the first hearing of the case. Although it can be said that a document, copy of which can be obtained from an office on an application, is within power of a party, but practically the documents are not in his power and control. A party needs to locate the office, file application for obtaining the copies of the same and then furnish it in the Court. A party relying on such document is expected to obtain a copy of such document well in time for production before the Court, but if the party fails to do, it is not absolutely precluded from producing the same before the Court at a later stage, if good reason is given for that. The rule is not inflexible that it cannot be allowed at all. Even an Appellate Court may allow certified documents on showing good reasons. However, it varies from case to case depending upon the conduct of a party as to when such an indulgence can be allowed. If the Court is satisfied that the document is authentic, it is not concocted, fabricated, prepared later and that it was not in possession and power of the party and is relevant and necessary for just decision of the case, it can be allowed at any stage. The documents sought to be produced in this case are the certified copies of public record, copies of which are obtained from the relevant authority of the Government. There can be no doubt about their authenticity and genuineness, however, their effect on the case only remains to be judged by the Court."
14. In a case reported as Umar Hayat v. Naik Alam PLD 1977 AJ&K 78 it was held that: "Admission of documents is essentially a procedural matter. Precluded rules are intended to provide a uniform manner of seeking relief, so that litigants are spared of hazarding guesses as what to do and at the same time provide against conflicting procedures that would have flowed if each litigant were left to his own ingenuity. Obviously therefore, it was never meant to obstruct justice on respective merits of the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation. Procedural law should therefore, receive the most liberal construction so as to advance the cause of real justice as compared to technical justice. It was held in 9 Cal. 763, 21 Mad.373, AIR 1930, Cal; 53., AIR 1946 All.
425, AIR 1930 Cal. 53; PLD 1963 SC 382 and PLD 1965 SC 691 that the Code being a procedural law, ought to be construed liberally and as far as possible, technicalities should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. It was held in the AIR 1945 All. 811 that procedure was merely a machinery and its object was to facilitate and not to obstruct the administration of justice. It was held in PLD 1972 SC 9 that rules should not be interpreted so as to defeat the ends of justice."
' The consideration that may, therefore, in my view, weigh with the Courts in the matter, should be:- --
(1) Judge should not be tied up to any particular line. The Legislature has thoughtfully made him the Judge of the situation. His powers should be left unfettered, to be exercised in the circumstances of the case.
(2) The rule needs to be interpreted liberally because it is an enabling provision intended for the advancement of justice.
(3) Admission being generally wise, may be the rule and refusal an exception, provided of course, the document is, prima facie, genuine because admission would do no harm as its reliability and effect are to be determined latter when it can be held to be of no value or consequence, but in case of rejection its value or importance will never be known and may result in injustice. It would be in accord with the maxim: Abundans cautela non nocet (Great caution does no harm).
(4) Merely because it was the misfortune of the party not to have produced the document at the first hearing or merely because the existence of the document was within his knowledge or by employing due diligence its existence could be known, should not, by itself, be pushed to the extent of disentitling him to consideration. One or the other argument can be available in every situation and yet the rule has been enacted for application. The question as to whether the delay was reasonably explained can best be decided by determining whether the non-production was attributable to human failing or whether it was out of a bad motive. The Court may ask itself:--
(1) Did the defaulter reap any real benefit out of its non-production so far?
(2) Would it prolong the trial and if so, which one should, in the circumstances of the particular case, be allowed to outweigh the other; Earlier disposal of the case or the admission of the documents?
(3) Is the document absolutely free from any suspicion of being fabricated?
(4) Whether loss of case by the party, occasioned by refusal to admit his documents, would appear as an excessive penalty for their late production?"
15. In a reported case titled as Muhammad Ajaib v. Khalid Hussain PLD 1995 AJ&K 5, it was held:-- "(9) In the present case admittedly the record which was tendered in evidence was available with Patwari. It could have been in the possession of the petitioner only if he would have obtained certified copies of the same. It is not proved that actually the plaintiff had obtained these copies which he had failed to produce at the first hearing of the suit. From the language used in Order VII, rule 14 and Order XIII, rule 1, C.P.C., it, becomes crystal clear that the object behind these provisions of procedural law is to obviate the possibility of the parties presenting forged documents at late stage of the litigation when the points at issue stand formulated.
(10) In the present case, apparently the Revenue Record relating to the land in question has been tendered in evidence and got exhibited. Keeping in view the controversy at issue, I think, this record was essential for the just decision of the case and could have been allowed to be tendered in evidence at any stage of proceedings. Keeping in view the language used in Order VII, rule 14 or Order XIII, rule 1, C.P.C., I think that the bar contained in these provisions is not absolute. It is clear from Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. That Courts of law are permitted to exercise their discretion to meet the ends of justice and allow such documents to be brought on record in proper cases which the parties have failed to produce at the first hearing of the suits. However, the law demands that the trial Court should apply its mind properly and give its reasoning if any document is allowed to be tendered in evidence at a later stage. This Court in revisions can interfere only if it is disclosed that the order under challenge has been passed arbitrarily, capriciously and by ignoring the recognized judicial principles of law in this regard."
16. In the case reported as the Lahore Improvement Trust v. Messrs Khuda Bakhsh-Meraj Din PLD 1956 Lah. 252, on the day fixed for evidence of the defendant, the defendant tried to produce some documents from the file of his own but list of which he relies upon had not been filed at all and the documents though in the possession of the defendant had not been produced at the first hearing.
The trial Court refused to received the documents in evidence. Mr. Justice B.Z. Kaikaus, as his Lordship then was, after going through the interpretation of Order VII, rules 14 and 18, Order VIII, rule 1 and Order XIII, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Made by the superior judiciary of the Sub-Continent, ruled as under:- "Statutes are to be interpreted with due regard to their objects. The object of Order XIII, rule 2, was to exclude forged documents and to expedite the trial and not to exclude genuine documents. If there be no. Doubt as to the authenticity of a document and if at the same time its admission were not in any way to delay the trial of a suit, words of rule should not be allowed to bar its production.
' What then is the interpretation which can be consistent with the object of the statute and yet will not unduly strain its wording? It appears to me that the only reasonable construction of words "unless good cause is shown for the non-production thereof" is to construe them as meaning "unless good cause is shown for reception in evidence in spite of such non-production." In using in rule 2 of Order XIII the words "unless good cause is shown for non-production the legislature was emphasizing the need of considering the reason for non-production with a view of deciding whether the document may not be fabricated and did not intend to provide that the effect of non- compliance with O.XIII, rule 1 should be entirely different from non-compliance with other connected rules. The effect of the rule is only to make the reception of documents dependent on leave of Court. If the document be authentic and the delaying effect be negligible there should be no objection to its being produced."
' Although I am unable to find any case where the interpretation of the words "unless good cause is shown for interpretation of the words "unless good cause is shown for the non-production thereof" may be discussed, there are a number of cases wherein it has been held that if the documents to be produced are public records about the authenticity of which there can be no doubt they should ordinarily be admitted in evidence in spite of noncompliance with a procedural provision relating to their production." (Underlining is ours)
' While applying the rule of law enunciated in the above referred authorities and considering the circumstances of the case, it can safely be held that the trial Court rightly admitted the documents and the High Court has dismissed the revision petition while correctly applying the law in the case.
' In the circumstances, the appeal has no force, it is, hereby, dismissed with no order as to costs.