' ZIA PERWEZ, J.--- Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the impugned order, dated 5-8-2008, whereby the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi dismissed his Criminal Appeal No,39 of 2008.
2. The petitioner lodged F.I.R. No,1 of 2002 in Police Station F.I.A., Crime Circle-II, Karachi under sections 409/420/468/471/34, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2), P.C.A. Act, II, 1947 alleging that respondent No,1 Naeem Sagar resident of Karachi obtained forged N.I.C. For his sister Rukhsana Sagar, earlier married to petitioner by changing/tampering the date of birth in the record of D.R.O.
(East), Karachi. That the date of birth was tampered to be read as 1959 instead of 1951 alleged to be the correct date on the date on the original Form "A" in the record of D.R.O. (East) Karachi. Further enquires revealed that RG-9 Form regarding subsequent issue of revised N.I.C. In the years 1977, 1987 and 1999 are also missing from the record of D.R.O. Karachi. On enquiry, the D.R.O. East, Karachi vide letter No,Regn.-107/3/2001-KAR(E)T/8090, dated 2-11-2001 and letter No,7978, dated 27-10-2001 stated that the record could not be traced at the D.R.O. Office. During trial of respondents Nos.1 to 5 namely Naeem Sagar, Rukhsana Ayoob, Allah Nawaz, Bakhtiar Ahmed and Hadayat Ali Zaidi, the prosecution examined P.W.1 Afzal Wali Jilani at Exh.1, P.W.2 Sharifullah Khan at Exh.16, P.W.3 the petitioner/ complainant at Exh.18 and P.W.4 Abdul Sattar Malik, Ex-S.-I. F.I.A. At Exh.24. However, the Special Judge Central-II, Karachi on elaborate perusal of prosecution evidence and the statements of the accused recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. On considering the inconclusive nature of evidence acquitted the respondents accused. In appeal, the judgment of the learned Special Judge was maintained while dismissing the same.
3. Mr. Mazhar Ali B. Chohan, learned Advocate-on-Record appearing for the petitioner contended before us that the duplicate I.D. Card was issued showing the year of birth of Rukhsana Ayoob as 1959 instead of the actual year of birth i,e, 1951. Ms. Rukhsana Ayoob got married and on subsequent knowledge of her earlier year of birth led to the trial of the accused. However, there is sufficient material on record to the effect that the said Rukhsana was present at the time of her engagement with the petitioner. The prosecution evidence adduced before the trial Court could not prove the charge to lead to conviction of the accused. The learned counsel on being asked failed to point out any non-reading or misreading of the evidence calling for interference in the impugned order.
4. The principles attracted to acquittal appeal have been laid down in the case of Ghulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11, wherein it has been held that:---
(1) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of the Court acquitting the accused. This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the reappraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions; one initial, that, till found guilty, the accused is innocent; and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence.
(2) The acquittal will not carry the second presumption and will also thus, loose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below: (a) disregarded material evidence; (b) misread such evidence; (c) received such evidence illegally.
(3) In either case the well-known principles of reappraisement of evidence will have to be kept in view when examining the strength of the views expressed by the Court below. They will not be brushed aside lightly on mere assumptions keeping always in view that a departure from the normal principle must be necessitated by obligatory observances of some higher principle as noted above and for no other reason.
(4) The Court would not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence it comes to the conclusion different from that of the Court acquitting the accused provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusion and irresistible conclusion; and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualized in these cases, in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny under the foregoing searching light, should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous."
5. In view of the above principles, as no ground or sufficient incriminating evidence to prove the charge was brought on record during the trial, which could be shown from the record by the learned Advocate Supreme Court, the acquittal as well as dismissal of criminal acquittal appeal does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The petitioner only adopted proceedings to cause undue harassm ent by frivolous litigation in a family dispute, such practice cannot be encouraged.
However, taking a lenient view, we dismiss the present petition and refuse to grant leave to appeal with costs amounting to Rs,10,000 (Rupees ten thousands) to be deposited with the Assistant Registrar of this Court within two weeks.