' ZAKAULLAH LODHI, J.-Messrs Gul Baran Coal Company, the first respondent herein, was allowed mining concession over an area of 413-22 acres of land in Sharigh, District Sibi, under a prospecting licence issued on 3rd September, 1975. At the time when their application was under consideration, the petitioner and few others raised an objection to its acceptance on the ground that they themselves being residents of the district, where the mining area was situated, were better entitled to its allotment. This contention appears to have found favour with the Deputy Commissioner, Sibi who recommended their claim to the Joint Director, Mineral Development Department, Quetta on 25th February, 1975 ; but we are not, aware as to what happened next. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to inform us whether the petitioner also formally applied for the allotment of this area and was as such a contestant for the same vis-a-vis the first respondent or he has appeared on the scene now for the first time.
2. The first respondent worked the mines, with heavy investment, as pleaded by them, until the licence issued to them was cancelled, on 26th October, 1978 by the Joint Director, Mineral Concession, Quetta on the grounds that Government dues amounting to Rs, 1,755.36 had not been paid by them and that they had also failed to apply for conversion of the prospecting licence into a mining lease. It may be mentioned here that under rule 31 of Baluchistan Mining Concession Rules, 1970 (hareinafter referred to as the "Rules") prospecting licence could not be extended beyond a period of three years but if a licence desired to retain the mining area under his possession, it was incumbent upon him to apply for its lease, before the determination of the licence, under rule 38 of the said Rules.
3. After cancellation of the licence referred to above the first respondent preferred an appeal to the Secretary Industries, the second respondent herein who upon the consideration of the facts that the Government dues had been cleared and the first respondent had also made considerable investment towards the development of this area accepted the same on 27th January, 1975 and restored the licence ; but at the same time he remarked that if and when they applied for conversion of the licence into a lease the matter would receive consideration on merits. From this observation it is apparent that the question as to whether or not lease should be granted to them after the expiry of three years' licence period was yet to be considered independently. He also considered the delay caused in the filing of the appeal and condoned it after conscious application of mind, and it is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he had sufficient discretion under law to do so. The petitioner appeared before the appellate authority as an intervenor to oppose the appeal, but his objections were turned down as he had no locus standi, whatsoever, in the matter. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the orders passed in appeal has invoked our Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. Mr. Nazir Ahmed, appearing for the petitioner has raised two-fold contentions before us, namely ; That the appeal preferred by the first respondent was barred by time and could not be lawfully entertained by the second respondent, and that by virtue of rule 39 of the Rules the licence stood determined and the appellate authority had no powers under law to revive it.
4. Learned Assistant Advocate-General representing the second respondent supported by Mr. Abdur Rashid Khan, appearing for the first respondent, at the very outset objected to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioner was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution ; as such the petition was incompetent. Mr. Nazir admitted the fact that the petitioner was never a contestant for this mining area and the only application made by him in this respect was submitted to the Department about 12 days before the cancellation of the first respondent's prospecting licensee. It means that this application was submitted at a stage when the mining area in question was not available for allotment, as such, on the basis of the same he cannot be regarded a person aggrieved by the order of the revival of the said licence. However, tie tried to find support from the case of Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (1). In this case a person having no vested right in strict juristic sense in connection with the dispute before the Court was held competent to maintain his writ petition as an "aggrieved person" mainly on the ground that he had been able to show that his heavy investment in property, which had relevance to the dispute before the Court, was at stake. In such view of the matter the disability of the petitioner that his interest was remote and indirect was overlooked. However, the instant case is clearly distinguishable as the petitioner does not stand to lose anything at all if the licence of the first respondent continued to subsist. The question as to who could be considered an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Article 98 of 1962 Constitution which is in pari materia with Article 199 of the present Constitution was considered in the case of Muhammad Abdul Salam v. Chairman, East Pakistan Election Authority and others (2) and it was held that a person invoking writ jurisdiction of the Court should at least be able to show that he had suffered a "legal grievance" if not an actual grievance. Such' person, it was held, could be one who was deprived of some - benefit or had suffered any disadvantage by the order sought to be challenged by him. Such is not the case here. We are therefore of the view that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person in any recognized sense of the term, and is, as such, incompetent to maintain this petition.
5. It was also urged by Mr. Nazir Ahmed that the appeal was time barred by 8 days and could not be entertained by the second respondent ; but at the same time he concedes that on the analogy of the general principle of law, which executive authorities and quasi-judicial tribunals were normally bound to follow ; the second respondent was vested with discretion to condone the delay.
It is evident from the impugned order that the question of delay received proper attention of the second respondent and he exercised discretion in first respondent's favour, after due consideration of relevant facts and circumstances. This is not all. Learned Assistant Advocate General pointed out to us that the appeal was not, in fact, barred by time as it had been preferred within less than one month after the communication of the order appealed against. The record bears witness to this assertion. We are therefore, reluctant to take notice of this objection as well. Even if this point had some substance it will hardly benefit the petitioner who is out of the field for want of locus standi to maintain this petition.
6. During the course of arguments it was also contended that strict compliance of rule 39 was necessary and that having been ignored by their second respondent, the impugned order was illegal. Since we are not prepared to grant any relief to the petitioner, it would only be proper to leave this question open to be decided in a proper case. Even otherwise, this question is bound to come for consideration before the departmental
(1) PLD 1969 SC 223 (2) PLD 1965-Dacca 231 authorities if and when the first respondent takes up. The matter of conversion of the licence into lease with them ; as is evident from the abovesaid remarks of the second respondent.
' For the foregoing reasons we see no force in this petition which is hereby dismissed with costs.