' This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge, dated the 19th September, 1973 by which the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Gujrat dated the 24th April, 1972 was set aside.
2. The facts of the case are that the appellant filed a declaratory suit to the effect that he was the owner of land to the extent of 3/4th. One Allah Loke who was the owner of land measuring 177 kanals 11 marlas situate in village Jandala Tehsil Kharian District Gujrat died on the 1st August, 1932.
The land in question was mutated in favour oI Mst. Hassan as his widow. At that time Ahmad Khan, was a son of pre-deceased daughter of Allah Loke, Mst. Thandi. In 1962 when Muslim Personal Law Shariat (Application) Act was promulgated the life estate of Mst. Hussan was terminated and A. C.
II, Kharian sanctioned the mutation of inheritance of Allah Loke vide his order dated the 22nd September, 1968 in the following manner :
(i) Mst. Hussain-1/4
(ii) Sakhi Mohd-3/4
3. Ahmad Khan, the son of the pre-deceased daughter Mst. Thandl filed an appeal against the order of the A. C. Il Kharian, dated 22nd September, 1968 which was accepted. Second appeal was filed by Sakhi Muhammad against the order of the Collector but the same was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner vide his order dated the 28th June, 1969. Sakhi Muhammad thereafter filed the suit in the manner stated above which was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Gujrat vide his judgment and decree dated the 24th April, 1972. On an appeal filed by the respondents the same was set aside and the respondent No, 1 was given 1/2 share as being the son of pre- deceased daughter,
4. The question involved in the present appeal is, therefore, whether by virtue of the application of S. 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 a son of pre-deceased daughter of Allah Loke deceased would be entitled to inheritance on the re-opening of the succession under the provisions of West Pakistan Shariat Application Act, 1962. Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 reads as under "Section 4.-In the event of the death of any son or daughter of the porosities before the opening of succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens, shall per stripes receive a share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter, as the case may be, would have received, if alive."
5. The West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 was promulgated on 31st December, 1962. Section 2 of the said Act provides that notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary all questions regarding succession (whether testate or intestate) apart from other matters specified in the said section shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) in cases where the parties are Muslims. Section 3 terminated the life estate held by a Muslim female under the customary law. Section 4 deals with the operation of certain wills on the death of the legatee-in- enjoyment which is not relevant for the present case, However, section 5 on which reliance has been placed reads as under "The life estate terminated under section 3 or the property in respect of which the further operation of a will has ceased under section. 4 shall devolve upon such persons as would have been entitled to succeed under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) upon the death of the last full owner or the testator as though he had died intestate ; and if any such heir has died in the meantime, his share shall devolve in accordance with Shariat on such persons as would have succeeded him if he had died immediately after the termination of the life estate or the death of the said legatee.
' Provided that the share to which a Muslim female holding a limited estate under Customary law would have been entitled under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) upon the death of the last full owner shall devolve on her."
' A perusal of the above section would show that on the termination of the life estate the heirs of the last full owner would be entitled to succeed under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
5. In the case reported as Yusuf Abbas v. Mst Ismat Mustafa and pthers (1) the words "in the event of death of any son or daughter of propositus before the opening of succession" appearing in section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (VIII of 1961) were interpreted so as to bring within their compass the sons or daughters dying before as well as after the Ordinance came into force and the only condition placed is that death should occur before succession has opened. The precise contention raised in that case was that the Ordinance applied only in cases where the death of the propositus and of his pre-deceased son or daughter both occur after the promulgation of the Ordinance. It was further observed that the purpose of the Ordinance should be borne in mind in interpreting section 4 of the Ordinance. In this connection it was observed as under "The words "in the event of" refer only to the death of the son or daughter of the propositus occurring before the succession opens. These words would bring within their compass the sons and daughters dying before, as well as after the Ordinance came into force. The only condition is that the death should occur before the succession has opened, and if the succession opens after the promulgation of the Ordinance, section 4 would apply with full force, and the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter of the propositus would be entitled to be included in the succession to the estate of the propositus. One consideration which has to be borne in mind in construing section 4 of the Ordinance, is the purpose for which this law was passed. The Ordinance aims at alleviating the sufferings of the children whose unfortunate lot it is to lose their father or mother during the lifetime of their grandfather, or grandmother as the case may be. The construction of such statutes should be just, sensible and liberal, so as to give effect to the purpose for which they are passed."
7. According to the facts of the present case Mst. Thandi had died before her father Allah Loke, therefore Ahmad Khan was son of predeceased daughter. When life estate of Hassan was terminated Ahmad Khan was alive, and as such all the conditions laid down in section 4 of the Ordinance were applicable. Only because Allah Loke had died before the promulgation of the Ordinance would not deprive Ahmad Khan respondent of the benefits of this section. The contention that the propositus as well as the death of the son and the daughter must occur after the coming into force of the Ordinance had rightly been repelled in Karachi case and no reasons had been advanced to differ from the view expressed.
' In view of the above discussion, this appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
(1) PLD 1968 Kar. 480