1. ' ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.--This appeal by the leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment dated the 9th of October, 1977, of a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, by which a constitution petition moved by the appellant Said Muhammad to challenge the confiscation of his car under clause (80) of section 156 (1) of the Customs Act, 1969, was dismissed.
2. ' The relevant facts are that on receiving information that notorious smugglers, namely, Noor Muhammad and Said Muhammad alias Saida sons of Abdul Muhammad. Residents of Jamrud were carrying smuggled goods in their Dodge Car No, L E C 4911, the Customs officials, headed by Deputy Superintendent Mumtaz Ali Khan of Customs Mobile Squad No, 9, Peshawar, had placed a road-block near Speen Jamat on Jamrud Peshawar Road, in the early hours of the morning on 30th of July, 1975, at about 5.00 a. m. Soon after car No, P R B 3224 driven by petitioner Said Muhammad, along with four other persons, appeared on the road piloting car No, L E C 4911, and passed the point of Nakabandi at a very high speed, Thereupon the Customs squad chased the two cars, and on reaching near Tehkal Payan village they found that the road had keen blocked by the occupants of the two cars, who were armed with rifles and other fire arms and started firing at the Customs Officials. After the exchange of fire the cars changed their direction and headed towards Jamrud side and managed to get away. A separate case was registered under sections 148, 307 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 149 thereof.
3. ' The pilot car bearing No, PRB 3224 was seized by the police on 13-12-1975 for contravention of section 164 of the Customs Act and another case was registered under clauses (80) and (85) of section 156 (1) of the Customs Act. The case was tried by the Deputy Collector of Customs, who held that the appellant had not appeared voluntarily before the police or the Customs authorities, and that the offence alleged against the appellant was proved, and, as a result, he ordered the confiscation of the car. An appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Collector on the 13th of March, 1976. His revision petition was also similarly dismissed by the Central Board of revenue on the 11th of February, 1977.
4. ' Thereupon the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It was contended on his behalf that the confiscation of his car was illegal for the reason that the confiscated car was not carrying any smuggled goods; that the other car bearing No, L E C 4911 alleged to be carrying contraband goods had not so far been seized; that the show-cause notice was not served upon the appellant within the prescribed period; and that as the criminal case registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code was still pending decision, therefore, it was premature to take action under the Customs Act.
5. ' All these contentions were, however, repelled by the learned Judges of the High Court, holding that the show-cause notice had been served upon the appellant within the period of two months from the date of seizure as provided under section 168 of the Customs Act; that the pendency of the criminal case under the various provisions of the Penal Code was no bar in the way of proceedings under the Customs Act; and, that the requirements of section 164 of the Customs Act had been fully met in this case as the Customs authorities had given a signal to the car in question to stop.
6. ' Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on the 24th of April, 1978, to consider the true scope of section 164 read with section 156 of the Customs Act, 1969, as to whether a pilot car could be said to have been used for the carriage of smu ggled goods.
7. ' After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel appearing for the Federal Government and the Customs authorities we are of the view that the action taken by the Customs authorities was within the relevant provisions of the law, and the High Court was, therefore, right in refusing to interfere with the same.
8. ' Section 156 of the Customs Act, 1969, provides punishment for various offences falling under the Act. Clause (80) of subsection (1) of this section reads as follows:- "If, save for good and sufficient cause, any conveyance having been summoned under section 154 to stop fails to do so, the person in charge of such conveyance shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five thousand rupees; and such conveyance shall also be liable to confiscation."
9. ' Section 164 of the Customs Act is as under:- "Power to stop and search conveyances.-(1) Where the appropriate officer has reason to believe that within the territories of Pakistan (including territorial waters) any conveyance has been, is being, or is about to be, used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods, he may at any time stop any such conveyance or, in the case of an aircraft, compel it to land, and:-
(a) Rummage and search any part of the conveyance;
(b) examine and search any goods thereon; and
(c) break open the lock of any door, fixture or package for making search.
(2) Where in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1)-
(a) it becomes necessary to stop any vessel or compel any aircraft to land it shall be lawful for any vessel or aircraft in the service of the Government while flying her proper flag or bearing flag marks and any authority authorised in this behalf by the. Federal Government to summon such vessel to stop or the aircraft to land, by means of an international signal, code or other recognised means, and thereupon such vessel shall forthwith stop or such aircraft shall forthwith land, and if it fails to do chase may be given thereto by any vessel or aircraft as aforesaid and if after a. Gun is fired as signal .The vessel fails to stop or the aircraft fails to stop or the aircraft fails to land, it may be fired upon;
(b) it becomes necessary to stop any coveyance other than a vessel or aircraft, the appropriate officer may use or cause to be used all lawful means for stopping it or preventing its escape including, if all other means fail, firing upon it."
10. ' It will be seen that section 164 comes into play where the appropriate officer has reason to believe that any conveyance has been, is being or is about to be used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods. In such a situation, he may at any time stop such conveyance etc., and for this purpose take the various steps mentioned in subsection (2) if it becomes necessary to do so. Is any person in charge of such a conveyance fails to stop after he has been summoned to do so, then he renders himself liable to punishment under clause (80) of section 156 (1) of the Act. Now, the question is whether the ingredients of section 164 were present in the instant case.
11. It will be seen that a road block had been erected in the early hours of the morning by the Customs squad after receiving information that the smuggled goods were being carried by car No, L E C 4911, and when the Custom Officials were waiting for the arrival of this car, the car now in dispute appeared on the road, travelling at a high speed. It did not stop even though visible Naka-Bandi, or a road block, had been erected by the Customs authorities. We were informed that the usual manner in which this NakaBandi is carried out is by the uniformed and armed staff of the Custom authorities standing on the road side, constituting a clear signal to all vehicle to stop. In the present case, all the departmental authorities, who have deal with this case, as well as the High Court, have taken the view that the pre sence of the road block clearly amounted to a signal to stop, and this was reinforced by the chase given to this car by the Customs Mobile Squad. We not see how we can interfere with this finding of fact, which is based do on a proper appreciation of the situation created by a Naka Bandi arranged the Customs Squad. In the circumstances, there could clearly be no doubt in the mind of the driver of the car that he was being signalled to stop by the Customs authorities, but he clearly failed to obey the signal. It thus appear that there was failure on the part of the driver of the car to obey the signal mentioned in section 124 of the Act.
12. The next question is whether the condition precedent, namely, that the conveyance had been, was being, or was about to be, used in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods, was also fulfilled in this case. It is correct that according to the information received by the Customs authorities the smuggled goods were being carried in the other car, which apparently has not been seized so far; and no smuggled goods were found in the car in dispute before us. It appears to us that the words used in subsection (1) of section 164 of the Act to the effect that the conveyance has been, is being or is about to be, used in the smuggling of any goods or in carriage of any smuggled goods, are wide enough so as to include not only the conveyance which may be directly concerned with these operations, but also those conveyances which may be escorting, piloting or otherwise assisting such a conveyance so as to facilitate its mission, as they would all form an integral part of the arrangements intended to carry out the mission. Any other interpretation would clearly defeat the object of the law and place a premium upon criminal devices adopted for the smuggling of goods or for the carrying of smuggled goods.
13. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the car driven by the appellant clearly fell within the ambit of subsection (1) of section 164 of the Act, and the appellant's failure to stop when signalled to do so by reason of the road block created by the Customs authorities brought the matter within the mischief of clause (80) of subsection (1) of section 156 of the Act. Thereby rendering the the car liable to confiscation, beside the punishment of fine for the appellant. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.