MUHAMMAD YOUNAS TAHIR, J.--- The above captioned revision petition is filed under section 43(A) of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 against the judgments of learned Custodian dated 9-5-2000 and 18-10-2001 passed in its appellate and review jurisdiction.
2. Along with the revision petition, a separate application under section 14 of the Limitation Act for exclusion of time spent in the High Court and Supreme Court was moved by the petitioners herein.
3. Brief facts of the case are that land measuring 64 Kanals comprising Survey Nos.201, 325, 402/202, 360, 373, 165, 349, 371, 407, 372 and 54 situated in Village Nandpur, Tehsil Bhimber, District Mirpur (now Tehsil Barnala District Bhimber) was allotted in the name of Abdul Aziz son of Shahsawar (deceased), the husband of petitioner No,4 and father of others petitioners. The respondents herein filed different suits on 1-4-1980 before the Deputy Custodian, Bhimber for redemption of land in dispute. The petitioners defendants resisted the suits by filing their written statement. After trial of the suits, the Deputy Custodian decreed all the suits vide judgment, dated 30-10-1991. An appeal was preferred by the petitioners before the Custodian. The learned Custodian upheld the judgment recorded by the Deputy Custodian vide its judgment dated 9-5- 2000. Feeling aggrieved from the above mentioned judgment, the present petitioners filed a review petition before the Custodian. The learned Custodian dismissed the same vide his judgment dated 18-11-2001. The petitioners challenged the said order through a writ petition on 26-4-2002 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 25-10-2000 by this Court in view of decision of the apex Court rendered in Appeal No,54 of 2004. The other petition titled Muhammad Reaz and others v.
Pervaiz Mehndi and others: was contested by the petitioners and pro forma respondents, which was ultimately disallowed on the ground that an alternate. Efficacious remedy was available to the petitioners in the shape of section 43-A of Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Being dissatisfied with the above mentioned judgment of the High Court, the petitioners filed an appeal before the apex Court. The Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the appeal vide its judgment dated 6-5-2005. This judgment was also assailed in a review petition, but the apex Court dismissed the same in limine on 25-11-2005.
4. After completion of first round of litigation, the petitioners herein filed a" revision under section 43-A of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 before this Court. Both the learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the application under section 14 of Limitation Act may be taken first. In view of the agreement of the learned Advocates, arguments have been heard on this application.
5. Haji Muhammad Afzal, the learned counsel representing the petitioners vehemently argued that the petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court bonafidely and prosecuted that same in a good faith. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to seek the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel further contended that the period spent in the aforesaid cause may kindly be condoned and the revision petition under section 43-A may also be treated to have been filed within limitation. The learned counsel maintained that the petitioners fulfilled the required conditions for exclusion of the time spent in a wrong forum as is visualized by section 14 of Limitation Act. The learned counsel further maintained that the case of the petitioner is also covered by section 5 of Limitation Act, because no limitation runs against a void order. According to the learned counsel, the exclusion of full period in the instant case is requirement of the justice.
6. Ch. Muhammad Taj, the learned counsel for the respondents controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for petitioners. The learned counsel argued that no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioners. The learned counsel contended that the petitioner call in question the validity of judgment of learned Custodian in a writ petition before this Court, but subsequently, this writ was dismissed on the request of petitioners. The learned counsel maintained that in Writ Petition No,29 of 2002, the High Court given a direction, that the petitioners may seek their remedy by invoking the revisional jurisdiction under section 43-A of Administration, of Evacuee Property Act. The learned counsel maintained that in the presence of clear-cut direction, the petitioners did not avail the, proper remedy, but with the connivance of pro, forma respondents filed an appeal before the Apex Court. The learned counsel also submitted that after the dismissal of appeal and thereafter review petition, the petitioners were not legally entitled to file the instant revision petition. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners do not deserve any leniency due to their own conduct. The learned counsel further argued that section 14 of Limitation Act does not apply in the case in hand. This section is confined to only suits, not to appeals or revisions. The learned counsel placed reliance on a case titled Masood Ahmed and others v. United Bank Limited and others 1992 SCR 98 and Abdul Ghanni v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1997(?) SC 102. The learned counsel for respondents further controverted that the revision petition was filed beyond the period of limitation and is hopelessly time-barred. Therefore, he prayed that by rejecting the application under section 14 the revision petition may also be dismissed.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record made available with care and also perused the case-law cited at bar.
It is settled principle of law, that the benefit of section 14 would be available to a party who has diligently and with good faith prosecuted his case in a wrong forum. In other words, the benefit of section 14 can only be extended, if the'following conditions are fulfilled:--- "(a) That the plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceedings against the defendant;
(b) that he has been prosecuting it with due diligence;
(c) that this proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action;
(d) that it is prosecuted in good faith; and
(e) that it does not bear fruit because that Court is unable to entertain it due to the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.
(f) that both the proceedings are in a Court."
8. III the present case, the circumstances are altogether different.
Admittedly the order of learned Custodian was challenged in a writ petition before this Court. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order, dated 25-10-2005 on the request of the petitioners, in the light of decision of apex Court in a Civil Appeal No,54 of 2004 decided on 6-5- 2005. After dismissal of writ petition, the petitioners herein filed a revision petition before this Court on 22-2-2006. 'Whereas revision petition under section 43-A of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act can be filed within three months of such declaration given by the Custodian.
9. It would be useful to reproduce section 43-A of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property)
Act, 1957 as under:--- "43-A. Revision by High Court.--- If in any case in which a Custodian has, on or after the first day of January, 1953, declared any evacuee or any evacuee property to be a non-evacuee or, as the case may be, non-evacuee property, the Central Government or the Government of West Pakistan considers it necessary so to do, it may, notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force send, within six months of the commencement of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee property) (Amendment) Act, 1958, or within three months of such declaration, whichever be later, the record of the case to the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or proprietary of the order passed by the Custodian, and the High Court may pass such order in the case as it may deem fit".
' Careful perusal of the provision shows that when the custodian declared any evacuee property to be non-evacuee then only remedy is available to a party to file a revision petition before this Court within prescribed limit but needful was not done by the petitioners. It is to be noted that no plausible explanation has been shown in the revision petition as well as in the application under section 14 of Limitation Act, that why the petitioners have filed the instant revision petition at such a belated stage. No reasonable grounds have been given by the petitioner for exclusion of time in the application. Especially when this Court has observed its judgment, dated 22-1-2004 that in a case in which the Custodian has declared any property to be non-evacuee, the remedy in shape of revision under section 43-A of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act was available to the petitioners, it was essential for the petitioners to file revision petition before this Court under the relevant provision of law immediately but needful was not done by them.
10. We agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that section 14 of Limitation Act deals with the time spent in suits not in appeals in wrong forum.
11. On the proposition in hand, the Apex Court has already observed in Masood Ahmed's case 1992 SCR 98, as under:--- "We may however observe that this section has nothing to do with appeals and its application is confined to suits. In this provision of law it is laid down that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit, the time spent by the plaintiff in prosecuting, with due diligence, another civil proceeding shall be excluded."
12. In Abdul Ghanni's case reported as PLD 1997 SC 102, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that:--- "Section 14 permits the exclusion of time only for proceedings "prosecuted in good faith" therefore, in order to make out sufficient cause under section 5 an appellant must prove that he had acted in good faith in presenting his appeal in the wrong Court. Good faith has been defined in clause (7) of section 2 of the Limitation Act as: "good faith", nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention:"
13. From the perusal of the record and after considering the case-law, referred to hereinabove, we are of the view that in the circumstances of the case, benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended to the petitioners. The principle of coram-non-judice is not applicable in the petitioner's case. Same proposition has already been resolved by the apex Court in a Civil Appeal No,54 of 2004 decided on 6-5-2005. The apex Court has observed at page 14 of the judgment as under:--- "The myth of coram-non-judice is not acceptable in the case in hand because Custodian had the power to make any declaratior; under section 22, whether declaration is with authority or without authority in view of section 3-A does not make the order coram-non-judice."
14. As the next contention of the learned Advocate that petitioner's case is covered by section 5 is also devoid of any force, because, period of limitation for filing the revision petition is provided by the special law and section 5 of the Limitation Act is not made applicable to the proceedings before the Custodian. This view finds support from a judgment, reported as PLD 1970 Lah. 6.
15. Even otherwise, no sufficient cause or reasons have been shown by the petitioners in their revision petition or in the application under section 14 of Limitation Act.
16. A contemplate perusal of the record shows that a gross negligence was committed by the petitioners themselves, by not availing proper remedy within reasonable time. It is not a case of good faith rather is of gross negligence.
17. The upshot of the above discussion is that finding no force in to application, it is hereby rejected, consequently, the revision petition is declared time-barred and is hereby dismissed.