' MUHAMMAD AHSAN BHOON, J.---Through the instant revision petition, the petitioners namely Wali Muhammad, Matali, Karam Ali, Nazir, Muhammad Anwar, Mst. Rasoolan Bibi, Mst. Manzoran Bibi and Ghulam Haider (legal heirs of the deceased and injured P.Ws.) have called in question the order, dated 4-7-2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, M.B. Din whereby he, dismissed the application filed by petitioner No.1 under section 345(6), Cr.P.C. For effecting compromise in absence of the accused/respondent .Nos.2 and 3.
2. Briefly the facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are that a criminal vide F.I.R. No.65 of 1982 was registered on 5-7-1982 against respondents Nos. 2, 3 and others at Police Station, Malakwal District M.B. Din, offence under sections 302/149, P.P.C. Read with sections 307/149, P.P.C. For the murder of Bashir Ahmad son of Ali Muhammad and for having launched murderous assault on Bashir Ahmad son of Khawaja, Ghulam Sabir, Ghulam Haider, Mst. Sardaran Bibi and Muhammad Anwar P.Ws. Noshervan son of Abdul Rehman and Abdul Rehman son of Muhammad Khan were declared proclaimed offender by the learned trial Court. Their case was separated. Case to the extent of Abdul Rehman son of Sultan Khan, Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Anwar was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gujrat, who vide his judgment, dated 20-1-1987 convicted them under section 302/34, P.P.C. And sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life plus to pay fine of Rs.10,000 each, in default whereof to suffer further R.I. For one year each. Half of fine, on recovery had been ordered to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased and under section 307, P.P.C. To undergo R.I. For 10 years each. They filed criminal appeal No.65 of 1987, which to the extent of Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Anwar was allowed and appeal to the extent of Abdul Rehman son of Sultan was dismissed vide judgment, dated 18-10-1989.
3. The petitioners/legal heirs of the deceased filed an application on 28-5-2007 under section 345(6), Cr.P.C. For acquittal of respondents Nos.2 and 3 (Both P.Os) on the basis of compromise which was dismissed vide impugned order. Aggrieved of the said order the present petition has been filed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that impugned order passed by the learned ASJ, dated 4-7-2007 is illegal because the provisions of section 345, Cr.P.C. Are beneficial one and their construction and interpretation should be liberal and compromise with proclaimed offenders can be allowed even if they do not appear before the Court, and has placed reliance on the judgments reported as (PLD 2006 SC 53), (PLD 2006 Pesh. 82), (1998 MLD 1) and (1994 MLD 1).
5. Learned DPG on behalf of State has defended the order passed by the learned ASJ, MBD and contends that accused Noushervan and Abdul Rehman are absconders since July, 1982 and till date they have not appeared before any Court of law and their case was separated under section 512, Cr.P.C. The genuineness or voluntariness of compromise cannot be determined unless the accused appears or surrenders before the Court of law.
6. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.
7. First of all I would say that none of the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case because in all the four above said judgments, the compromise of the convicts with the heirs of the deceased was filed but in the present case ultimately beneficiary of compromise are accused Noushervan and Abdul Rehman who are absconders in the present case since, 1982 for the last 26 years. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners they are still abroad residing in USA. As per the ratio of judgment of Honourable Supreme Court reported as (PLD 2006 SC 53) the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under:- "Section 345(2)---Compromise as a mitigating circumstances--- Scope---Courts at all level, without any legal impediment, while deciding the criminal cases on merits in the regular proceedings, can consider the compromise of an offender with the victim or his legal heirs as a mitigating circumstance for the purpose of awarding sentence in a non-compoundable offence, but after final disposal of a criminal matter Courts cannot assume jurisdiction to re-open the case on merits in collateral proceedings arising out of miscellaneous application."
The above quoted observation of august Supreme Court would show that there is no cavil to the proposition that Court at all levels without any legal impediment while deciding case on merits in regular proceedings can consider the compromise of an offender with the victim or legal heirs but in the present case no regular proceedings are pending before any Court of law as case of both the absconding accused was separated under section 512, Cr.P.C. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be presumed that any proceedings before any Court of law are pending, which could culminate into a compromise between the offender and the heirs of deceased or victim. It would be appropriate to mention over here that in the above cited case, the sentence of death of appellant was confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan under section 369, P.P.C.
And later on the heirs of deceased compromised with the convict and through miscellaneous application, acquittal was sought but the Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the application of compromise and death sentence was upheld. So even facts of above cited judgment of Honourable Supreme Court are absolutely different from the case in hand.
8. I may observe here that no doubt that provisions of section 345, P.P.C. Are beneficial and its construction and interpretation must be liberal but at the same time the Court must be mindful of the fact that a compromise is genuine and voluntarily arrived at between the parties, object of which is to promote harmony and brotherhood among the inhabitants of welfare State.
9. To cater the situation like the present one, the legislature in its wisdom had enacted the provisions of section 498, Cr.P.C. To save an accused from undue and uncalled for humiliation. If the compromise in cases like instant one is allowed, that would frustrate the beneficial purpose of enactment. The Court is to satisfy itself that the compromise arrived at between the parties is not tainted with pressure, coercion, undue influence, blackmail, extortion or similar other infirmities and only such compromise would qualify for acceptance which is above any blemish either mild or strong.
' In view of above discussion, I do not see any merits in this criminal revision, which is dismissed.