' MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, J.--- The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the order, dated 2-4-2007 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, in Writ Petition No,526 of 2006.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are to the effect that Nawab Khan son of Taj Muhammad, predecessor-in-interest, of respondent No,2 Muhammad Rafique had filed a "Mukhbari" application on 8-9-1963, for cancellation of the land confirmed against claim Form No,17953 at RL-II No,3/10 Mauza Jhakar Imam Shah. An enquiry was conducted and the application filed by Nawab Khan was found correct and on 11-5-1974, it was directed that the cancelled land be allotted in his name against his verified claim. This order was challenged through a revision petition before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan Division, Multan with powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner and the revision filed by Mst. Manati was dismissed. The proceedings were pending when the Evacuee property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, was enforced. The allotment was not made in favour of Nawab Khan. Resultantly on 30-1-2004, the Notified Officer passed an order and allotted the land in favour of L.Rs, of Nawab Khan. The said order has been challenged by the petitioners through a Writ Petition No,5261 of 2006 in the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, vide the impugned order dated 2-4-2007, out of which the present petition for leave to appeal has arisen.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was not a pending case under the Settlement Laws and the land could not be allotted to respondent No,2, who had further made transaction in favour of respondents Nos.3 and 4. Further contended that after the enforcement of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, the petitioner was in occupation of the land as tenant of the Government and in view of subsection (1), clause (b) of section 3, the petitioner is entitled for purchase of the land. Further contended that the order impugned in the writ petition was a void order and the principle of "laches" is not attracted to that case. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance on the cases of Ali Muhammad through L.Rs, and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner 2001 SCM R 1822 and Ahmed and 25 others v. Ghama and 5 others 2005 SCM R 119.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record with his kind assistance.
5. It is admitted position that Nawab Khan, father of respondent No,1, had filed a "Mukhbari" application under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons Land (Settlement) Act, 1958, for cancellation of the land allotted at RL-II No,3/10 of Mauza Jhakar Imam Shah, quite in time. Before the enforcement of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, the Settlement Authorities on his "Mukbari" application cancelled the land and directed allotment of the said land in favour of Nawab Khan, against his verified claim. But the matter could not be completed till the enforcement of the said Act. Section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, deals with transfer of property. The relevant provisions of the section are reproduced as under:-- "3. Transfer of property.--- All properties, both urban and rural, including agricultural land, other than such properties attached to charitable, religious or educational trusts or institutions, whether occupied or unoccupied, which may be available for disposal immediately before the repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, or which may become available for disposal after such repeal as a result of a final order passed under subsection (3) of section 2, shall stand transferred to the Provincial Government on payment of such price as may be fixed by the Federal Government in consultation with the Provincial Government, for disposal.
(a) in the case of urban properties, by the Provincial Government under a scheme to be prepared by it in this behalf; and
(b) in the case of rural properties, by the Board of Revenue of the Province under a scheme to be prepared by the Provincial Government in this behalf: Provided that agricultural land occupied by any person continuously for four harvests immediately preceding Kharif, 1973 shall first be offered for sale to such person unless an order of ejectment has been passed against him in respect of such land: ' Provided further that only so much land shall be offered to such person as does not together with land already held by him, exceed a subsistence holding within the meaning of the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972."
' From plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it reveals that person who is continuously in possession for four harvests immediately preceding Khareef, 1973 shall first be officered for sale of the said property unless an order of ejectment has been passed against him in respect of such land. The petitioner has annexed copies of "Khasra Girdawaries" with this petition to establish his right of first purchase. From minute scrutiny of these documents (Khasra Girdawaries), it is established that these "Khasra Girdawaries" pertained to the crops Rabi 1986-87 Kharif, 1992-93 to Rabi 1994 and crops of 2004 to 2005. There is no evidence or document showing possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute of the crops mentioned in the proviso to subsection (1), clause
(b) of section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons (Repeal) Act, 1975. The petitioner has not been able to prove his possession continuously for four harvests preceding Kharif, 1973.
Therefore, the property in dispute could not be offered for purchase to the petitioner as first purchaser. The petitioner came forward claiming to be the first purchaser for the first time when he filed writ petition before the High Court, Multan Bench, on 28-9-2006. If at all, he was a tenant of the land, he has not produced any evidence that under whose orders and permission he occupied the land. Secondly, why he kept silent over his right and remained in a state of dormancy for such a long period? Thirdly the order dated 30-4-2004 has been challenged after the expiry of about three years.
7. As to the case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e, Ali Muhammad (supra), the same is not attracted and applicable to all the four corners of the present case. The case Ahmed and 25 others (ibid), is also not helpful to the petitioner, rather it support the opponent of the petitioner. The relevant portion of paragraph (b) of this judgment is reproduced as under:- "There is no cavil with the proposition that existence of laches is sufficient for dismissal in limine of petition."
8. The writ petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the High Court applying the principle of "Laches" and it has been laid down by the superior Courts that if the .Order is not challenged within the reasonable time, the vested legal right is accrued to the person in whose favour the impugned order is passed. In the instant case, after the acceptance of their "Mukhbari" application and direction of the Settlement Authorities, the allotment of land in favour of the "Mukhbar", a vested right has been accrued to him. Respondent No,2 is the son of Nawab Khan (Mukhbar) and he cannot be deprived of a valuable legal right which he acquired due to negligence of the petitioner. This argument is further fortified by the dictum laid down by this Court in the cases of Rehmatullah and others v. Ulas Khan and others 1968 SCM R 975, Abdul Hamid v.
Chief Settlement Commissiimer and others 1968 SCM R 120, Rahim Bux v. Settlement Authorities and others 1968 SCM R 78, Ahmad Din v. Mst. Rasul Bibi 1968 SCM R 843, Masooda Begum through Legal Heirs v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Forest, Lahore and 9 others PLD 2003 SC 90.
9. In view of above discussion and following the principle laid down by this Court in the cases referred to above, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court, which is unexceptionable.
10. The upshot of what has been discussed above is that this petition being devoid of any force is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the same is dismissed and leave to appeal refused.