1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--This petition calls in question the order dated 24-6-1979, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereby the petitioner's writ petition arising out of disposal of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the Land Settlement Authorities, was dismissed.
2. ' The petitioner obtained the allotment of land on the assertion that he was successor of Qamar Din and Kalwa, the original right holders. This was however, cancelled by the Land Settlement Authorities on the 21st of December 1960 on a finding that the petitioner's claim was bogus. A revision petition filed against this cancellation was accepted by the High Court. The matter however, in the meanwhile having been reported to the Martial Law Authorities, the petitioner was convicted by a Summary Military Court in 1961 for having made a bogus claim. He was awarded six months rigorous imprisonment and the land was also ordered to be confiscated. His appeal/representation to the Martial Law Authorities only partly succeeded in that, as stated by the learned counsel, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment, was set aside but the confiscation of land was kept intact. It is-admitted that the order of the Military Court was not challenged any further in any other forum except through a mercy petition which did not bear any fruit. Ultimately, the petitioner filed a writ petition in 1969 which, it is stated, was dismissed in default. A fresh writ petition was filed in 1978 which having now been dismissed by the impugned order the petitioner has sought leave to appeal.
3. ' Learned counsel has raised the following contentions :-
(1) that the order of confiscation of land passed by the Military Court was based on a finding by the Settlement Authorities that his claim was bogus and because the order of the Settlement Authorities was set aside by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction therefore, the entire basis for confiscation of the land having been removed, there was no validity left for the order of the Military Court to uphold the same notwithstanding the fact that the High Court had then (and later also) refused to disturb the confiscation.
(2) that according to a general instructions issued by the Headquarter, Martial Law Administrator Zone 'B' on 25th May 1962, it was necessary that "where the sentence of the Court confiscating before 6th March, 1962 or 11th April 1962, as the case may be, the sentence of confiscation shall not be carried out and such cases shall be referred to this Headquarter for suitable orders by Martial Law Administrator, Zone B" (para. 3(c)(ii) Annexure G). As stated by the learned counsel, the petitioner's case fell under this directive, the confiscation was not final; and
(3) that in any case, the order of confiscation not having been implemented, allotment of the land in favour of the respondents by the Land Settlement Authorities was illegal.
4. ' Except for a report submitted by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner relied upon by the learned counsel there is no positive proof of the fact that the Summary Military Court had decided the criminal case against the petitioner solely on the basis of the opinion of the Settlement Authorities. From the facts narrated by the learned counsel it appears that the trial of the petitioner by the Summary Military Court was held twice. During the first trial, it is stated, he was not afforded enough opportunity. His conviction in the first round was set aside and the case was remanded for retrial. There is nothing on the record to show as to what was the basis of the final decision of the Military Court. It is not impossible that independent evidence was led before the Military Court with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of the claim of the petitioner. The first argument of the learned counsel accordingly has force.
5. ' It is true that the so-called policy decision relied upon by the learned counsel did make provision for some of the cases of confiscation of land as a result of conviction recorded by. The Military Court but we agree with the learned Single Judge that the petitioner would not be entitled to gain any advantage on that account. It was provided in the same policy letter that where the excess land bad been confiscated by the Military Court and the sentence of the Court after confirmation and promulgation had been duly implemented before the 6th March 1962 or 11th April 1962, as the case may be, such cases shall not be disturbed and the confiscation shall stand. It has been found as a fact by the learned Single Judge that the order of confiscation was implemented by making an entry in R L-I1 Register and the land was also allotted to other parties. Not only this, the petitioner accepted the implementation and applied for purchase of the land to the Deputy Commissioner.
6. There is no justification for interfering with these findings of fact. Thus the second argument of the learned counsel is also without force.
7. ' The last argument in fact concerns the validity or otherwise of the allotment of the land made to the respondents and other persons. If the petitioner is not entitled to the land in dispute on account of his claim having been held as bogus and confiscation of land by the Military Court, he cannot be treated to be an aggrieved person qua the allotment made to other persons. Reliance in this behalf was placed by the learned Single Judge on letter dated 21st June, 1962 (R-9 filed with the earlier writ petition) particularly para. 1 thereof is unexceptionable.
8. ' Before parting with this order it needs to be observed that the petitioner's writ petition could not succeed on another ground as well. He for a considerable time accepted the confiscation by the Military Court as valid. The writ petition filed in 1969 (which was dismissed in default) and the fresh writ petition filed in 1978, suffered from laches and were also hit by the principle of estoppel. In the meanwhile the land in dispute had been settled on third parties. Even if there was any technical defect in some proceedings, the approach of the learned Single Judge in refusing relief to the petitioner was unexceptionable. For the same reasons it is not a fit case for grant of special leave to appeal. This petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.