' Appellant through this Intra-Court Appeal has called in question judgment, dated 4-3-2004 by learned Judge in Chamber, passed in Writ Petition No. 12477 of 2003.
2. The property in dispute is land measuring 35-Kanals, 15-Marlas comprising of Khasra No.139/33 situated at Mandi Bhaha-ud-Din. Officials of respondent No.1 put property in dispute to auction on 22/23-4-2002 and was transferred to respondent No.5 through registered sale-deed, dated 18-7- 2003. Mutation in this respect was attested on 22-7-2003. The sale was approved by Federal Government and the same was conveyed. Appellant challenged the sale on the ground that Evacuee Trust Property Board is not competent to sell and transfer evacuee trust property. Prior approval of Federal Government is necessary, which has not been sought and auction was not conducted legally. The property was sold without fixing necessary price. The impugned sale through auction to respondent No.5 was approved by Evacuee Trust Property Board. Letter, dated 23-4-2003 (Annex-EE) in this respect was referred.
3. Learned Single Judge in Chamber dismissed the writ petition on 4-3-2004. Appellant has challenged the order, dated 4-3-2004 before this Court through instant I.C.A. As well as through a petition (C.P.L.A. No.1376-L-2004) before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Appellant has resorted to both the remedies. It is settled law that appeal is substantive right and can only be availed if law provides the same. An appeal at two different fore cannot be made available to an aggrieved litigant.
4. We are not inclined to entertain this appeal firstly for the reason that petition in the higher forum (Hon'ble Supreme Court) is pending and to entertain this appeal would nullify the effect of the pendency of that petition; secondly that disputed property was declared as evacuee property, sold in auction and sale was approved by Evacuee Trust Property Board. Provisions of section 17 of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, provide the remedy of revision before the Federal Government. The I.C.A. In view whereof is not competent. While holding so we follow the view of another learned Division Bench of this Court, which has held in an unreported case titled "Pepsi Cola International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Evacuee Trust Property Board etc." (ICA No.310 of 2003). Relevant portion is reproduced as under:- "The legislature has specifically used following terminology in section 17 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975:-
(i) The Federal Government may at any time of its own motion;
(ii) or otherwise;
(iii) or proceedings under this Act;
(iv) which is pending;
(v) or in which the Chairman and Administrator, a Deputy Administrator or Assistant Administrator pass an order.
' The world 'or' clearly used by the legislature in the sense of disjunctive, meaning thereby that each phrase and clause in the afore-said section is independent of each other. The legislature also used "comma" "," which has its own significance as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and others" (PLD 1993 SC 473). Similarly, the word "proceedings" has its own meaning in the said section. It is pertinent to mention here that appellant has challenged the proceedings initiated by the respondents against the appellant with regard to eviction of the premises in question or for granting the premises in question on lease to the appellant or not. The word "proceedings" is defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the following terms in "Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore"
(PLD 1985 SC 107):-- "The above contention, however, can no longer be accepted, because a similar question has been elaborately examined by this Court recently in a settlement case, namely Mst. Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh and others (PLD 1984 SC 344), and it was held that the meaning of the expression 'original order' is the order with which that proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. It was observed that:-- "The crucial words are the 'original order'. It is clear from the wording of proviso that the requirement of the availability of an appeal in the law applicable is not in relation to the impugned order in the Constitutional petition, which may be the order passed by the lowest officer or authority in the hierarchy or an order passed by the higher authorities in appeal, revision or review, if any, provided in the relevant statute. Therefore, the relevant order may not necessarily be the one which is under challenge but the test is whether the original order passed in the proceedings was subjected to appeal under the relevant law."
' The conclusion was expressed thus:- "Apparently the meaning of the expression 'original order' is the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced.'
' In view of this clear enunciation of the law, the 'original order in the present case was clearly, the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated 21-9-1970. As such the view expressed by the learned Judges of the High Court in the impugned judgment that an intra-Court Appeal was not competent because the law provided for an appeal against the original order, dated 21-9-1970 is unexceptionable.
' In view of what has been discussed above, we are of the view that appellant has alternate remedy of revision before the Federal Government under section 17 of the said Act, therefore, ICA is not maintainable in view of proviso of section 3(2) of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the basic judgment on the point i.e. "Mst. Karim Bibi and others v. Hussain Baldish and another" (PLD 1984 SC 344)."
5. For the foregoing, instant appeal is not competent and the same is accordingly dismissed with no orders as to costs.