Javed Iqbal, J.--This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 10.11.2000 whereby the revision petition preferred on behalf of Mst. Khurshid Begum (respondent) has been accepted.
2. Leave to appeal was granted on 17.11.2001 which is reproduced herein below to appreciate the legal and factual aspects of the controversy:- "Briefly stating the fasts of the case are that vide an agreement to sell dated 1.3.1971 predecessor- in-interest of the petitioners, Munshi Khair Din, sold 3 marlas of land situated in Chak No, 122, Sargodha Road, Faisalabad, against sale consideration of Rs,5,000/- to the predecessor-in- interest of the respondents Mukhtar Ahmad. After his demise the respondents filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement on 1.11.1978. The petitioners contested the suit inter alia objecting to its maintainability on the ground of limitation. The learned trial Court vide order dated 21.4.1982 dismissed the suit. Similarly appeal filed by the respondents was also dismissed by the District Judge on 24.1.1984. Thereafter, they filed a civil revision before the Lahore High Court, Lahore, which has been allowed vide impugned judgment dated 10.11.2000. Hence, the instant petition for leave to appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the agreement was executed on 21.3.1971 whereas the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents died on 31.3.1974 and in this way the period for filing of suit for specific performance under Article 113 of the Limitation Act has already commenced and expired. Therefore, the learned Judge of the High Court without adverting to the provisions of Section 9 of the Limitation Act has condoned the delay in filing the suit only taking into . consideration the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the said Act.
3. The contentions raised by the learned counsel need examination. Leave to appeal is, accordingly, granted. Status quo is to be maintained during the pendency of the appeal."
3. Heard Mr. Muhammad Anwar Sipra, learned ASC on behalf of appellants who mainly contended that the legal and factual aspects of the controversy have not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. It is further contended that the suit in question was time barred as the limitation had started to run against Mst. Mukhtar Ahmad original agreement-holder by virtue of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which after his demise could not be stopped by disability of any of the legal heirs. It is next contended that the provisions as enumerated in Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1908 have been misinterpreted and misconstrued as the same cannot be made applicable in view of the chequered history of the case. It is also contended that the learned single Judge in chambers has failed to consider the import and significance of the provisions as contained in Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
4, Mr.' Altaf Ellahi Sheikh, learned ASC entered appearance for respondents and supported the judgment impugned for the reasons enumerated therein with the further submission that no illegality or irregularity whatsoever has been committed and the legal provisions as enumerated in Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1908 have been interpreted correctly. It is also contended that Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has no relevancy whatsoever with the controversy in hand and cannot be made applicable.
5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of the parties and perused all the judgments passed by learned Courts below including the judgment impugned. We have thrashed out the entire evidence with the eminent assistance of learned ASC on behalf of the parties. The pivotal question which needs determination would be as to whether Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908 can be made applicable in this case? A careful scrutiny of the provisions as eumerated in Article 11,3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would reveal that the same are free from any ambiguity and couched in a very simple and plain language. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides "a period of three years for filing a suit for specific performance of contract and the same, from which this period of three years begins to run, is provided as the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is 'refused.
When the case falls within first clause the second clause is not to be resorted to. In .case the time is extended the extension of time would prove a fresh terminus a qua for limitation. Two sets of facts are contemplated by Art. 113, Limitation Act, one where date is fixed by the party for performance in the agreement itself and second where no such date is fixed.' Prescribed period of three years in the second case is to start from a point of time when plaintiff had notice that the defendant refused to perform the contract." (la unawar Bibi v. Maheen Quddusi 1986 CLC 1887, Muhammad Yasin v. Allah. Din 19.91 CLC 1457, Ghulam Nabi v. Muhammad Yagoob PLD 1983 SC 344, Khushi Muhammad u. Khurshid Alam 2002 YLR 1369).
6. No doubt that the plaintiff/respondent had instituted the suit on 30.10.1978 whereas it should have been filed ordinarily within three years from 19.7.1974. It weighed with the learned trial and appellate Courts that the suit was barred by time. It is, however, observed that the learned trial and appellate Courts have determined the question of limitation in oblivion of the provisions as enumerated in Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1908. There is no cavil to the proposition that "if Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act are to be read together and if it is done then it would appear clearly that Section 8 controls Section 6 which means that after attaining majority plaintiff can file suit within three years and if limitation had started running against him and remainder of the limitation is less than three years, then also suit could be filed within three years without any further extension of time." (Kolandavel Gounder and another v. Chinn append and others AIR 1965 Mad. 541, Sk. Md. Zafir v. Sk. Amiruddin and others AIR. 1963 Pat. 108, Allah Ditta and another v.
Muhammad Azeem PLD 1953 BJ 1, Lal Bano etc. v. Hasseen Akhtar etc. NLR 1980 AC 134, Mst.. Hanifa Begum v. Muhammad Afzal Khan and others 1981 CLC 1156 and Batuk Prasad Bhagat and another u. Rudra Das Chakravarty and others AIR 1940 Pat.206, Moolchand v. Muhammad Yousuf PLD 1994 SC 462).
7. It was also observed in case (Moolchand v. Muhammad Yousuf PLD 1994 SC 4621 (supra) that "we feel inclined to form the view that combined effect of Sections 6. and 8 is to enable a person who has been dispossessed during his minority to file a suit within three years of his attaining majority or within usual period of time ordinarily allowable to a major, which is longer. If minor attains majority after three years of cause of action he can sue within nine years from the date of attaining majority if period of limitation is 12 years."
8. A similar proposition was discussed in case Naganna v. Krishnamurthi (AIR 1932 Madras 139) whereby was held as follows: "The short question for decision appears to be whether there is anything in Ss. 6 and 8. Limitation Act to prevent a suitor who comes within those sections from having the benefit of S.4. In my opinion there is not. S.4 provide's an exception to the general rule laid down in S. 3. S. 6 enables a person who was a minor at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, to institute a suit within the same period after he attains majority as would otherwise have beer.' allowed from the time prescribed therefor in Col. 3 of Sch 1. This concession is cut down by S. 8 which says that nothing in S. 6 shall be deemed to extend for more than three years from the cessation of the, disability the period within which any suit must be instituted. The illustrations to S. 8 make it quite clear that what is meant is that when time has begun to run against a person during his minority in no case is the period in which he can institute a suit .to be extended for more than three years after the cessation of the disability. In, other words, by the operation of Ss. 6 and 8 the prescribed period within which an ex-minor can institute a suit is limited to three years from the date when he reached majority. If the three years so prescribed expire on a day when the Court is closed, the position seems to me to be precisely within the terms of S. 4. S.4 does not extend the period of limitation beyond the prescribed period. But it enables the plaintiff, by excluding the time during which the Court is closed, to institute his suit on the reopening day and so to have the benefit of the three year period which the Act gives him for that purpose."
9. The upshot of the above discussion would be that a minor can institute a suit within the same period as prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1908 after his disability has ceased as would otherwise has been allowed from the time prescribed, therefore, there is no denying the fact that Plaintiffs No, 4 to 8 were minors of Mukhtar Ahmad and thus the provisions as enumerated in Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 can be made applicable and the limitation against them would commence after having attained the age of majority. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of learned ASC that the provisions as contemplated in Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 have been ignored for the simple reason that "Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is founded on the general principle that when once limitation has commenced to run it will continue to do so unless it is stopped by virtue of any express statutory provisions." (Saba v. Patricia 1996 CLC 348, Ramakrishna v. Srinivasalu AIR 1950 Mad. 552, Ajab Lal v. Jai Prakash AIR 1953 Pat.35).
10.It hardly needs any explanation that unless a case falls within any one of the exception contained in Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act, 1908 no exemption can be sought from the bar of limitation arising under the Limitation Act, 1908. The case of respondents admittedly falls within the provisions as enumerated in Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908, hence the question of applicability of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908 does not arise. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid dawn in case Narayan Jivaji Patil v. Gurunathgouda Khandappagouda Patil (AIR 1939 Bom 1), Hukam Chand v. Shahab Din (AIR 1924 Lah. 40), Hari Singh v. Muhammad Said (AIR 1927 Lah. 200).
11. It is to be noted that concurrent findings of facts qua the execution, of agreement to sell do not warrant interference as only the point of limitation was contested. No illegality or irregularly whatsoever has been committed by the learned single Judge in chambers and the omission of the learned Courts below has been cured, vide judgment impugned which being well based does not warrant interference. The appeal being merit less is dismissed.