M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-By this appeal the Department seeks reversal of the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, on 16-3-1974 decreeing the Civil Suit No. 162/1/280/1 instituted on 18-2-1972 by the respondent granting him declaration that, his termination/reversion from the post of Assistant Research Officer by the order of Chief Engineer, Irrigation, to the post of Reclamation Supervisor eras illegal, void and mala fide and not binding upon the present respondent and that he was entitled to the post of Assistant Research Officer with all the privileges attached to the said post and that he shall be treated on duty to the said post from 16-3-1956.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the respondent was serving as Supervisor in the band Reclamation Division (Central) when on 9-5-1955 he was appointed as Assistant Research Officer in the Punjab P. W. D. (Irrigation Branch). The appointment as such was notified on 30-8-55. On 16- 3-1956 he was served with a three months' notice for the termination of services by the Chef Engineer, Irrigation in accordance with para. 3(1) of his letter of appointment dated 9-5-55. The respondent was in fact relieved from the post on 6-6-56 (A. N.). It appears that in the meantime the reason--dent approached the Department for his reversion as Supervisor in the Land Reclamation Division to which office he originally belonged. The respondent's option to be posted as Supervisor was asked for on 10-5-56. He opted to go back as Supervisor in the Land Reclamation Department. On 15-5-56 the Research Officer, Soil and Water Testing Wing accordingly ordered that after the expiry of the notice period, he wild be posted as Land Reclamation Supervisor. In the light of the above a revised order dated 31-12-1957 was issued by the Chief Engineer, Irrigation substituting for the orders dated 16-3-56 according to which the word `termination' of services used in the letter dated. 16-3-56 was substituted by "reversion" to the post of Land Reclamation Supervisor, a post held substantively by the present respondent. It appears that the respondent accepted the orders but after a lapse of abut 12 years made a representation in 1969 against his reversion which was rejected by the Government of West Pakistan, Irrigation and Power Department, on 20-3-70/1-4-70 observing that the services were terminated due to his "work and conduct", After the rejection of his claim the appellant instituted a Civil Suit ado. 162/1 and 280/1 on 18-2-1972 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, who decreed the same on 16-3-74 holding that the appellant stood appointed in the post of Assistant Research Officer for indefinite period and that the Secretary rejected the representation of the appellant on the grounds of his "work and conduct" which rendered the impugned order as penal and thus the respondent was entitled to be issued a show-cause notice. The learned Civil judge, while coming to the conclusion above, relied upon PLD 1967 Dacca 820 and PLD 1966 SC 253. He also held that the order of termination and reversion was passed by an in competent authority and was, therefore, void. In this regard he relied upon PLD 1965 SC 206 and PLD 1974 Kar. 685. As regards the objection to the limitation, the learned trial Court observed that his departmental appeal was entertained on merit therefore the limitation period had to be computed from- the final orders issued by the Department on 20-3- 70/1-4-70, and thus the suit filed ors 18-2-72 was in time. The present appeal was filed by the Department before us in the first instance on 16-10-1974 which was returned on 28-10-74 for removing certain formal defects and the same was refiled on 2-11-74.
3. The learned Government Pleader urged and pressed the following contentions:-
(i) That it was quite obvious front the letter of appointment of the appellant a, Assistant Research Officer dated 9-5-55 that his services were for a. Specified period of ore year in the first instance.
He was served with a notice of termination within the aforesaid period. He pointed out that under para. 3(1) of his letter of appointment the services of the respondent were liable to be terminated on three months notice on either side which was what had been precisely done by the Department.
(ii) He further submitted that tile respondent was not entitled to the discretionary relief to the declaration inasmuch as he himself had requested for reversion as Supervisor and he kept silent for a long period extending over 12 years which clearly indicated that he had accepted the orders.
(iii) in any case the suit filed by the respondent had already become time-barred and the period of limitation having once run out could not be deemed to have recommended after the orders of the Secretary oft 20-3-70/1-4-70 rejecting his representation.
(iv) That the rulings relied upon by the learned trial Court were inapplicable to the case under consideration.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the reasons contained in the judgment under appeal.
5. After hearing both the parties we are clearly of the view that this appeal has to be accepted. In the first instance it was clear that the initial appointment of the respondent was for a period of one year which was to expire in May 1956, and there was no order of extension in the employment period of the respondent. Thus the appellant was not bound to keep the respondent in service for an indefinite period. The findings of the learned trial Court in our view evidently ignored the relevant clause in the appoint merit order dated 9-5-55 which specifically fixed the duration of the period of appointment of the respondent. Thus the respondent in law bad no right to continue beyond 9-5-
55. We also find considerable force in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the services of the respondent were liable to termination with three months' notice on either side. The Depart--ment served the respondent with a three months notice on 16-3-56. We find little merit in the finding of the trial Curt that the respondent stood appointed for an indefinite period as there vas nothing on the record to justify its conclusion in this regard. 1n fact the period of employment of the respondent was extended beyond 9-5-56 to 16-6-56 (A. N.) because of the requirement of three months' notice, otherwise the intention apparently was to terminate the services of the respondent within the specified period. Thus the termination of his services was strictly in accordance with his terms and conditions of appointment. In the circumstances the departmental order dated 16-3-1956 was unexceptional. The citation relied upon by the respondent before the Trial Court had no application to the facts of this case. The order dated 23-12-1957 was also unassailable inasmuch as besides having been passed at the request of the respondent himself it, could not be termed as penal. The observations in the order dated 20-3-70/1-4-70 that the termination of service of the respondent was due to the "work and conduct" was also of little advantage to him. Evidently the respondent held the post of Supervisor in the Land Reclamation Office substantively. As such his position as Assistant Research Officer was merely in the officiating capacity and in fact it could not he otherwise. It was on this ground that he claimed his reversion to the post of Supervisor. The law is well settled that reversion to the substantive post could not b; termed as reduction in rank. The following observations from In re: The Province of West Pakistan v.
Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 93), fortify the conclusions above: "Further, reversion to the substantive post cannot in terms mean the same as reduction in rank. If reduction in rank was considered to cover reversion from a higher to a lower post rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which corresponds to rule 14 of the Civil Service Rules (Punjab), which apply to the respondents in this case, would have mentioned such reversion as one of the penalties."
6. As regards the objection as to the competence of the Chief Engineer, the Department has produced the Delegation of Power Rules dated 15-2-1956, according to which the Chief Engineer was competent to appoint an Assistant Research Officer in an officiating capacity. Thus he had also the powers to revert him from the said post. We accordingly hold that the Chief Engineer was competent to pass the impugned order. We are also inclined to agree with the objection of the learned Government Pleader that the civil suit was time-barred. The impugned orders were passed on 16-3-1956 and 31-12-57. The respondent has not shown that he had filed a representation to the next higher authority thereafter. Obviously the limitation started to run, from the aforesaid dates.
The period of limitation prescribed for such cases under Article 120 in the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act was six years. This period expired in 1963. Thus any order passed in 1970, did not affect the issue of limitation and as the suit had already become time-barred, we do not feel disposed to subscribe to the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court that the order passed in 1970, had given fresh cause of action to the respondent. Consequently this appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside with no orders as to cost. Parties be informed accordingly.