ORDER KR. FAROOQ SAEED, J. - The petitioner in this case is a private limited company having its head office at Islamabad. The petition is against an ex parte decree passed on .25.6.1993 against which an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was filed on 20.1.2004 for setting aside the said ex parte judgment and decree dated 26.6.1993. The. Respondent found that by virtue of Section 7(6) of the Ordinance, 2001, the jurisdiction in the said case was no more available with him, hence he transferred the application to the Banking Court, Rawalpindi for appropriate decision in accordance with law.
2. This writ petition has been filed on the ground that the respondent No. 1 has mis-interpreted Section 7(6) for the reasons that this case was not pending at the time of promulgation of the'
Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. In this case the matter had been disposed of by' the predecessor of respondent No. 1 under the Act of 1984. The matter, therefore, was not pending in terms of Section 7(6). Furthermore, the respondent No. 1 had ho jurisdiction to transfer the case, In the opinion of the petitioner it is the Section 5(3) of the Ordinance of 2001 which is applicable-as the same provides for the jurisdiction to transfer the case ,from one Court to another if it is in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties or the witnesses. He, therefore, urged that the writ petition should be admitted and the respondent No. 1 be advised to dispose of the application oh merits.
3. The respondent; however, reiterated that the petitioner is only using the delaying tactics and he has already availed almost four years through filing this writ petition. Even otherwise he said that- the Ordinance of 2001 was introduced in super-session to all earlier Ordinances, Acts and such other laws, hence they were not in field on the day of promulgation of the Ordinance of 2001.
Regarding judgments referred by the petitioner in terms of "Muhammad Rezzanullah Khan Vs. Abdul Khayer and' others" (PLD 1.956 Dacca 285) and "Messrs Sialkot Dairies Ltd. And 8 others vs. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan through Manager, A.D.B.P, and others" (2003 CLD 67) h said that both are not direct on the issue. The power of transfer of jurisdiction for the. Convenience of the parties concerned, is undoubtedly with the High Court but that also does not, restrict the original jurisdiction provided under the law itself. The Ordinance, 2001 has repealed the earlier Act of 1997 and subject to the provisions of General Clauses Act, Section 6 has taken place in respect of all the proceedings. On the day when this C.M. Was filed, the jurisdiction of the case had already been transferred as the execution of the decree was in the field. Thus on one hand the proceedings practically were still pending while on the other hand legislature itself assigned jurisdiction 0n the basis of the location of the parties concerned. This was for the obvious Season that prior to the said Ordinance Banking Courts were available at few places of Punjab, It was for the convenience of the parties in such suits that new Banking Courts were, placed at various parts of the Province of Punjab, In view of . Assignment of specific territorial jurisdiction through the new law to various parties in suits, no exception was required.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that Section 7(6) should be totally ignored and the provision of Section 5(3) should be considered as valid and applicable in this case. He, however, has totally ignored that Section 5(1) and (2) has provided the power to the Federal Government to establish through notification in official Gazette . The Banking Courts and appoint Judge or Judges and specific territorial limits with which each of the Banking Court shall exercise. Besides the Federal Government also has the power to define the territorial jurisdiction of each of the Court.
This is, in continuation whereof that the power, of Banking Courts have been defined in Section 7.
The same starts with the language 'subject to the provision of this Ordinance', which obviously means that all other provisions of this Ordinance are to be read alongwith this provision, In its sub- section (6) which has been referred by the petitioner, it clearly defines that all proceedings pending in any Banking Court constituted under any Banking. Company Law of Pakistan shall, stand transferred to of be deemed to be transferred to the Banking Courts having jurisdiction under this Ordinance. The language of law leaves no doubt as to the assignment of jurisdiction and an automatic transfer of the cases in which proceedings are pending to the area of jurisdiction assigned by the Federal Government.
5. The provision of law speaks as follows:-- "(6.) All proceedings pending in any Banking Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery , of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (XV of 1997) including suits for recovery of "loans" as defined under ' that Act shall stand transferred to, or be deemed to be transferred to, and heard-and disposed of by, the Banking Court having jurisdiction under this Ordinance. On transfer of . Proceedings under this sub-section, the parties shall appear before the Banking Court concerned on the late previously fixed.
(7) In respect of proceedings transferred to a Banking Court under sub-section (6) the Banking Court shall proceed from the stage which the proceedings had reached immediately prior to the transfer and shall not be bound to recall and re-hear any witness and may act on the evidence already recorded or produced before the Court, from which the proceedings were transferred."
Above provision of law is clear and it applies on. All proceedings including on suits of recovery of loan which are pending in any Banking Court, In the presence of this language it shall be naive to quote the provision of Section 5(3). This Court while interpreting the above language of law is guided by the golden rule of interpretation which has the approval of the Courts in Pakistan. The said rule in the language of J. Pahke B in Grey Vs. Pearson (1987) 6 H.Z Cas 61 which is probably most Commonly cited today, speaks as follows:-- "I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe,, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of law in West minister Hall, that in construing wills and indeed, statute, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but no farther."
6. It may be worth mentioning here that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance No. XLVI of 2001) came in super-session to the earlier law, in terms of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (Act XV of 1997) which had earlier superseded Banking Companies Act and Banking Tribunal Ordinance. The Act of 1997 also obtained a similar provision which incidentally too was sub-section (6) of Section 7 of the Act, 1997, Through the said provision the jurisdiction of Banking Courts and the Banking Tribunal was transferred to the Banking Courts created under the said Act. Now keeping in view the history of legislation as well as the golden principle of interpretation, this Court is constrained to hold that Sections 5 and 7 of the Ordinance of 2001 under discussion are to be read together. None of the provisions are to be read and interpreted in isolation being a part of the sequence in the law. The jurisdiction has been assigned by the law and it is subsequently to be explained by the Federal Government in respect of territory etc. The role of the High Court shall come after and it may transfer the jurisdiction of one Court to another after the same has come to place as per original directions of the Federal Government. The respondent No. 1, therefore, has not given any direction at his own. He has only conveyed the petitioner that he has come to a wrong forum and that he should, approach to the Court of original jurisdiction and in a way has done favour to him by transfer of his application to the said forum. There is no question of wrong exercise of jurisdiction by the respondent No. 1 in this case. The order impugned by the-respondent No. 1 being in strict compliance of the above law is un-exceptionable. This petition, therefore, is considered as without any useful purpose and is dismissed in limine.