1. MUHAMMAD DAUD KHAN (CHAIRMAN). ---This appeal by the Government of Pakistan against Mahmoodul Hasan Iqbal is to avoid the consequences of judgment and degree passed by Mr. Qaisar Ahmad Hamidi, Addl. District Judge, Karachi, whereby the respondent's suit was decreed with respect to declaration and arrears of salary amounting to Rs. 8,969. The Government made an appeal before the High Court but the Service Tribunals Act having been enforced, the appeal was dismissed as abated. The only alternative left with the Government was to seek its remedy in the Service Tribunal.
2. Facts leading to the judgment and decree may be enumerated. The respondent was a Civilian Stenotypist in the office of Torpedo Engineer Officer, Karachi. He was governed by the Civilian Employees in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1961. He availed of 16 days leave on medical ground to resume duty on 23-11-1961. He again absented himself froth service from 19th January 1962, onwards. On 22nd January 1962, an application was received by the office for grant of 8 days C/Leave. He was directed to appear before Pakistan Naval Medical Officer on 30th January 1962, who referred him so a Psychiatrist. He was subsequently advised to get admission in the Pakistan Naval Hospital for further observation and treatment. He refused to avail the offer vide his application dated 10th February 1962, and asked for 3-- months leave. No medical certificate was attached yet he availed of leave without its grant.
3. On 20th February 1962, a Memo. Was issued to the respondent to join duty. On 1-3-1962, he applied for 1-- months medical leave. Two medical certificates were attached. The leave was again declined with clear direction to report for duty.
4. On 9-4-1962, the respondent was charge-sheeted for unauthorised absence since 12-2-1962 and for disobedience of the order to seek admission as recommendation of Pakistan Naval Paychiatrist.
5. He was suspended from service on 1-5-1962, An explanation was submitted where after a provisional order of removal from service was passed. But in consequence of a notice under section 80 of the C. P. C. The final order was withheld. An inquiry Officer was appointed to record statement of the respondent. He made a statement but refused to sign it. On 14-9-1963, he was removed from Service. A civil suit that his removal from service is invalid, was instituted but as a result of compromise, it was withdrawn. Another Depart--mental inquiry was held to retire him from service on 4-8-1966.
6. The plaintiff/respondent filed another suit requesting for declaration that he remained in service continuously upto 4th of May 1966, and the order of suspension dated 1-6-1962, and subsequent orders including that of compul--sory retirement were illegal and ultra vires. He also claimed an amount of Rs. 8,3699 of arrears due. The case, as pointed out above, was decreed and the appeal filed by the Government, abated.
7. The two preliminary points-to be considered were limitation and juris--diction of the Tribunal to entertain the appeal wherein a final order had been passed long before 1st of July 1969.
8. Dealing with the 1st point, it may be pointed out that application under section 7 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1963, read with section 5 of Limitation Act, filed for condonation of delay. But no specific reason, except an effort at confusion, was engendered. It is said that Service Tribunals Ordinance did not give the employer such a right while the Act came into force on 29th of September, 1973, was enforced by constituting the Tribunal on 22nd February 1974, and thereafter Ministry took their due time for engaging a counsel.
9. The order of abatement passed on 21-12-1975, was under Service Tribunals fact. Therefore, absence of any provision in the Ordinance, is useless involvement which does not really affect condonation.
10. The Service Tribunals Act coming into force on 29th September 1973, gave only 90 days to the appellant from the date of establishment of the Tribunal (section 6 proviso). T lie appeal having been filed on 17th of August 1964, is beyond 90 days and beyond time. No pertinent reason being given to attract discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal under section 5 of Limitation Act, the delay cannot be condoned merely because a Ministry could not make up to mind the Appeal is definitely time-barred.
11. The other point is whether a right of appeal to the Service Tribunal accrues, irrespective of date of departmental order despite restriction placed by section 4(1)(c). This is an argument by the appellant who has ignored the very clear interpretation of law by the Supreme Court in Faizullah Kundi v. Government of Pakistan. It was laid down that matters finally settled by the departmental authority prior to 1st of July 1969 Would not fell within the purview of the Service Tribunal. Obvious implication is that section 4(1)(c) of the Service Tribunals Act controls section 6(6) as well and of a departmental decision was prior to 1st of July 1969. The Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain it. The distinction being drawn as to judgment and decree of a civil Court being earlier or later to relevant dates in 1969 is immaterial because this Tribunal does not sit in judgment on the decree of a civil Court. It only tries to resolve the issues involved. The matter in issue is always departmental order and if it is earlier than the contemplated date in 1969, the Tribunal will have no jurisdic--tion irrespective of whether the appeal was under section 4 or under section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
12. The other point taken up by appellant's counsel also falls under heading of jurisdiction--". It is vested nature, of his right to go in appeal it is said that right of appeal was created in September 1973, on passing of the Act (Service Tribunals Act). It cannot be taken away by subsequent addition of section 4(1)(c). He has referred to Supreme Court Ruling PLD 1965 SC 681 wherein it was held that an amending law will not affect pending appeals. Facts, involved therein, completely offer a different pattern. There being no appeal pending at the time of amendment of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, which came into force on 8th of May 1974, the parallel drawn to Supreme Court case ends. The amendment, moreover restored the right of appeal to civil Court. The only change brought by the amendment was as to the venue of appeal and not the right itself. The amendment only affecting procedure will be retrospective in effect.
13. Nature of amendment besides it cannot be ignored that a Special Tribunal is always governed by the charter, which creates it. It, therefore, cannot question its vires. If the Act says that Tribunal shall have jurisdic--tion with respect to departmental decisions made after 1st of July 1969, and Supreme Court held the proviso to be applicable to section 6, there is do jurisdiction in the Tribunal to say otherwise. The limited jurisdiction created by the Act has been defined. It cannot be enlarged. It may also be argued that although a vested right to appeal accrues, yet the Tribunal of limited jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to accord it. It cannot deliver the goods, in the present appeal anyway no vested right has been violated and Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with depart--mental orders of dates earlier than 1st of July 1969.
14. For the reasons given, the appeal is incompetent and time-barred, it is dismissed in limine.