MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, J. --- Facts giving rise to the present writ petition are to the effect that; the . Petitioner is serving under Federal Directorate of Education in BS-19 as Assistant Professor in Political Science in FG' Boys Higher Secondary School, Sihala, Islamabad under College Cadre.
The petitioner issued a Press Conference as President of Federal Government College Teachers Association (FGCTA) for the term 2003-2005. In response to this press conference, through letter dated 22.10.2004 Director Schools had called for from him to explain his
(a) Whereas you participated in the Press Conference on 20th October, 2004 and reportedly, instigated the teaching community against the lawful , authority of Federal Directorate of Education, Islamabad.
(a) You are thus trying- to create resentment and disturbance in the smooth functioning of Education System in Islamabad Capital Territory.
(a) You have indulged an unlawful activity with a view to hamper the functioning of education system for your ulterior motives.
He was called upon in writing by 1300 hours, the next day, as to why disciplinary action be not initiated against him under relevant rules. In response thereto, he has submitted - his explanation, challenging the jurisdiction of Director Schools. Vide Notification dated 8.11.2004 the petitioner was suspended in terms of Section 4 of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 with immediate effect till further order by the Director Schools which suspension order has been assailed by the' petitioner through this writ petition on the ground that he was suspended 'till further orders' ,which could continue more, than the prescribed period
2. In response to the process issued by this Court, the respondents have furnished report and para-wise comments, denying averments of the writ petitioner, stating that the petitioner was directed to stop functioning as President of so-called Federal Government College Teacher Association because he was indulging in unlawful activities against the administration of F.D.E. And wanted to, disrupt peaceful functioning of educational system.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner is being proceeded under the said Ordinance male fidely for the reasons that he has challenged the authority of D.G.
4. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for Federation and Director (Admn.) have vehemently opposed arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and pray that the instant writ petition be dismissed.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the record.
6. The petitioner has challenged the notification, suspending him from service wherein, no period of suspension is mentioned. This proposition had been dealt with by a Division Bench of Karachi High Court in case of Mushtaq Ahmad Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan (2002 Law Notes 961). Paragraph 16 of this judgment is reproduced as under for further ready reference and guidance:--- "16. Reading the afore-said Section 4 in the context of the entire scheme of the Ordinance it needs to be highlighted that the substantive power of the Government to take action and the rights of the accused employee are not very different from those available under the rules made under the Civil Servants Act. A significant difference however is that unlike the ordinary rule this statute is designed at taking prompt action. The preamble itself states that "it is necessary to provide for speedy disposal of such cases and for matters connected therewith ...." The proviso to Section 3 fixes a mandatory limit of 15 days within which 'a person proceeded against is to within which a person proceeded against is to reply to show-cause notice. Section 5, unlike the E&D Rules requires an inquiry committee to make its recommendations within 30 days. Section 9 requires that a representation or even a review petition before the Chief Executive against an order of punishment under Section 3 should be decided within 60 days and apparently because of this time limit an appeal against an original order to the Service Tribunal has not been provided for. Construing Section 4 harmoniously with the above provisions and nothing that the legislature has imposed certain time limit which are not prescribed by the ordinary rules dealing with disciplinary action against civil servant, we have reached the irresistible conclusion that suspension for an indefinite duration was never envisaged by the Ordinance and that continued suspension of the petitioners without any further steps being taken for the purpose of taking action under Section 3 is patently ultra vires the power conferred by Section 4 and the scheme of the Ordinance. On the contrary we are constrained to observe that it defiles the very purpose of the Ordinance. We may further add that even otherwise all public power is visited with a duty to act reasonably and justly and even when no time limit is prescribed a public functionary is required by law to perform his duty- within a reasonable time. One may refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Chairman, RTA v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance Company (PLD 1991 SC 14). Therefore, the continued suspension of the petitioners for more than 8 months without proceeding with action under Section 3 cannot be justified on any principle."
7. The operation of the impugned notification had been suspended by this Court vide order dated 3.12.2004. Since that day, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. The Court had not restrained the respondents from proceedings further in accordance with law. Uptill now, no action has been taken. The suspension order was not a bar for the same. The only proposition to be dealt with by this Court is that in the Notification for suspension of the petitioner, no period was prescribed. On following the principle laid down in case of Chairman RTA (supra) the Hon'ble D.B. Of Karachi High Court has held that continued suspension of the petitioner for more than 8 months without proceeding with action under Section 3 cannot be justified on any principle.
8. As observed in the preceding paragraphs in this case, from the date of suspension of the petitioner i.e. 8.11.2004 more than 8 months have passed and further proceedings have not been initiated, therefore, suspension of the petitioner would not be justified. Learned Standing Counsel for the Federation and the Director Admn. When confronted with the above-referred situation, could not respond.
9:The law requires that a Government servant against whom proceedings on account of corruption, misconduct: etc. Are contemplated can be suspended and a person it Identified as corrupt in the public eye the moment an order of suspension is passed and his self-respect and dignity grossly impaired and this by itself is a sufficient' reason to indicate that indefinite suspension was never contemplated by the Ordinance and was permissible only, when it was necessary for the purpose of completing the inquiry. In the instant case, the only allegation against the petitioner was that he was called for his explanation that he participated in a press conference and reportedly instigated the teaching community against the lawful authority of Federal Directorate of Education and further he was created resentment and disturbance in the smooth functioning of Education system in Islamabad Capital Territory. If any action was to be initiated against him that could have been completed uptill now but no effort has been made so far, .Therefore, it would not be possible for the Court to uphold the impugned notification of suspension of the petitioner indefinitely.
10. For the foregoing reasons. This writ petition is accepted and the impugned notification dated 8.11.2004 suspending the petitioner indefinitely is declared to have been passed illegally and without lawful authority, hence, set aside .