' This appeal under section 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is directed against the order, dated 20th February, 1974, of the learned 1st Appellate Court whereby it dismissed the appeal of the appellant and upheld the order, dated 30th June, 1972, of the Rent Controller, allowing the rent application of the respondent and directing the ejectment of the appellant from the rented shop in his occupation. The brief facts of the case, relevant for the purposes of the present appeal, are that on 4th September, 1968, the appellant and the respondent entered into a rent agreement in respect of shop bearing No, 15/323, in the town of Shikarpur, of which the respondent is the owner and the landlord. According to the rent agreement, the shop in question was to be let out to the appellant for a period of 12 months commencing from 4th September, 1968 on monthly rental of Rs,
30. The rent deed further recited that in consideration of the execution of the rent deed the appellant had paid to the respondent a sum of Rs, 1,200, and after the expiry of 12 months, for which the rent deed was executed, a sum of Rs, 360 out of the aforesaid amount of Rs, 1,200 was to be adjusted towards the rent of the shop and the balance of Rs, 840 was to be returned to the appellant. But in case the balance of Rs, 840 was not paid by the respondent to the appellant, a sum of Rs, 30 per month would be adjusted by the respondent towards the rent of the shop and the appellant would not be ejected from the shop till the amount of Rs, 1,200 was exhausted.
2. It would appear that after the expiry of one year from the date of the execution of the rent agreement, the respondent did not return to the appellant the balance of Rs, 840 and accordingly the appellant continued to remain in occupation of the shop. The respondent, however, wanted the shop for his own use and accordingly, on 28th October, 1969, filed a rent application against the appellant which was rejected by the learned Rent Controller, vide his order passed on 17th February, 1971, on the ground that since the respondent had not paid the balance of the amount of Rs, 1,200 to the appellant, the latter was entitled to remain in occupation of the shop till the said balance was adjusted and accordingly took the view that the rent application was premature.
3. On 28th September, 1971, the respondent filed a second ejectment application against the appellant, though the period for which the amount of Rs, 1,200 was to be adjusted towards the rent of the shop had not expired and was due to expire on 4th January, 1972. In this application also the ground urged by the respondent was the requirement of the shop for personal use. The learned Rent Controller held that the requirement of personal use was bona fide and accordingly by his order passed on 30th June, 1972, ordered the ejectment of the appellant. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Court, which was heard by a learned District Judge, who concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant has now approached this Court in second appeal.
4. I have heard Mr. Maroof Ali Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Khalil-ur- Rehman, who appeared for the respondent, Mr. Maroof Ali Khan urged two grounds in support of his contention that the judgments of the two Courts below were legally unsustainable. They are ;
(a) That as the rent application, which has been allowed, was filed on 23th August, 1971, before the expiry of the period for which the amount of Rs, 1,200 was to be adjusted towards the rent of the shop, the application was premature and neither it should have been entertained by the Rent Controller nor was he competent to pass an ejectment order on the basis thereof ; and ' That there was no adequate material before the two lower Courts that the respondent required the shop bona fide for his own use.
5. No doubt, on 28th September, 1971, when the second rent application was filed by the respondent, the period for which the deposited amount of Rs, 12,00 was to be adjusted towards the rent of the shop, had not expired, but this circumstance, in my view, does not vitiate the orders of the two learned lower Courts. As already pointed out, the order of the ejectment of the petitioner was passed by the Rent Controller on 30th June, 1972, long after 4th January, 1972, and the 1st Appellate Court decided the matter almost 2 years later on 20th June, 1974. Therefore, at the time when the learned Rent Controller and the 1st. Appellate Court decided the rent application, the period for which the appellant was entitled to stay under the rent agreement, had long since expired and he could not, on the basis of the rent agreement, continue to occupy the shop.
6. A somewhat similar argument was canvassed before the Supreme Court in the case of Abdullah Bhai v. Ahmed Din (1). In that case, one Muhammad Siddik was rented out a shop by Abdullah Bhai but subsequently the latter submitted an application to the Rent Controller for ejectment of Muhammad Siddik on the ground that the latter had sub-let the premises without permission and further that the shop was required by Abdullah Bhai for his own use. During the pendency of the proceedings, a compromise application was entered into between the parties, whereby Muhammad Siddik was allowed to occupy the PLD 1964 SC 106 shop as a licensee till 31st December, 1959 and to pay certain amount to Abdullah Bhai as monthly compensation for the use of the shop. Disputes having arisen between the parties as to the payment of compensation by Muhammad Siddik, Abdullah Bhai on 17th January, 1958 filed a civil suit for the ejectment of Muhammad Siddik. The plea raised before the Supreme Court was that since Muhammad Siddik was entitled to remain in occupation of the shop at least till 31st December, 1959, the suit was premature and therefore should be dismissed as such. Repelling this argument, Kaikaus, J., who wrote the judgment on behalf of the Supreme Court, observed as follows :- "An argument had been addressed to us that the suit was premature and should have been dismissed on that ground. The suit had been filed on 17th January, 1958 that is long before 31st December, 1959 on which date the period of the licence was to terminate. The trial Court had dismissed the suit. The Additional District Judge on appeal had decreed it on a date when the period of the licence had expired and the appellants had a right to possession. It was open to the appellate Court to have decreed a suit which was premature when it was filed but the cause of action respecting which had arisen during the pendency of the suit. We would not be prepared at this stage to dismiss the suit on this technical ground and to direct the appellants to file a fresh suit. It is also urged that even in respect of a licence there should be a notice of its termination. We are unable to entertain this plea for two reasons. In the first place even the filing of a suit was sufficient termination of a licence and in the second place this plea had not been raised by the respondent though the suit was based on a licence."
7. I may also refer to the decision of the Peshawar High Court reported as Wahabuddin & Sons v.
Controller of Rents. In that case also, the contention that as the ejectment application filed under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, was premature and accordingly should be dismissed, was rejected on the ground that before the impugned order of ejectment was passed, the prescribed period had elapsed. Reliance in this decision was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdullah Bhai's case referred to above.
8. The above two decisions are clear authorities for the view that though a suit or an application may be premature at the time when it is filed or instituted, if the cause of action matures by the time when the decision is given, the same is not to be interfered with on that ground. Respectfully following the above two decisions, I would reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that since the ejectment application was premature, therefore, it should have been rejected. As already pointed out, when the decision on the rent application was given, the period for which the appellant was entitled to occupy the shop in question had long since expired.
9. There is another ground for repelling the aforesaid contention of Mr. Maroof Ali Khan. As already pointed out, the rent agreement was for 12 months, after the expiry of which the respondent/landlord was entitled to vacant possession of the shop on refunding the balance amount paid to him by the appellant/tenant. It appears that on 5th March, l971, the respondent had sent a notice to the appellant offering to refund the balance of the amount still due to the appellant out of the original amount of Rs, 1,200 and requiring the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the shop to the respondent, but the appellant neither accepted this offer nor delivered the possession of the shop to the respondent. This notice was sent to the appellant by registered post, acknowledgement due, and the relevant postal receipts and copy of the notice were produced by the respondent in his evidence. As such, after the aforesaid offer was made by the respondent to the appellant, the appellant was no longer entitled under the terms of the rent agreement to continue to be in occupation of the shop.
10. On the question of bona fide requirement of the shop by the respondent for his personal use, the learned lower Courts have relied upon the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses Mahtab and, Ishaque who have supported the respondent's evidence that the latter has no shop of his own and is selling goods on the pavement. The evidence; of these witnesses was relied upon by the lower Courts and I see no reason for differing from the view taken by them. It may be pointed out that even the appellant's witness, Ghulam Qadir, was not able to specifically deny that the respondent required the shop for his own business or that the respondent was doing business on the pavement.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Mr. Khalilur Rehman stated that his client would have no objection if the appellant is allowed to remain in occupation of the shop in question for a period of 4 months from today. Order accordingly.