' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---The petitioner/plaintiff, through the filling of the present revision petition, has called in question judgment and decree, dated 30-10-1994 whereby the learned Additional District Judge accepted respondents appeal, dismissed petitioner's suit and set aside the judgment and decree, dated, 30-7-1991 passed by the learned Civil Judge, through which, he decreed the suit for declaration, filed by the petitioner.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner's mother, namely, Mst. Saban daughter of Murad predeceased his father, Murad, who was owner of agricultural land in Mouza Lodhery and Mauza Thatha Fateh Ali, Tehsil Chiniot, District Jhang. After the opening of succession of Murad, although in mutation No,492 of Mauza Lodhery, attested on 7-12-1982 the petitioner was shown as one of the descendants of Murad Khan, yet in the mutation No,774, dated 23-2-1974 of Village Thatha Fateh Ali, he was not entered as one of the legal heirs of Murad Khan. On the strength of Mutation No,774, the land in question was further sold to respondents Nos.1 to 4 through sale-deeds and mutations etc. On attaining knowledge, the petitioner filed a suit for declaration, claiming' therein that he is owner in possession of the said land and defendants Nos.1 to 4 and 8 have no right qua the said land and also challenging subsequent various mutations and sale-deeds executed/entered in the revenue record in favour of the aforenoted respondents. The suit was contested by the respondent Nos. To 4 pleading therein that the suit is barred by time, the petitioner is estopped to sue that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice and that they have spent a huge amount on land in question, therefore, in the event of the decree, they are entitled for refund of the sale price and compensation.
' The learned trial Court framed necessary issues, recorded the evidence of the parties and ultimately decreed the suit favouring the petitioner, vide judgment and decree, dated 30-7-1991.
The respondents Nos.1 to 4 assailed the said judgment before the learned appellate forum and the learned Additional District Judge accepted their appeal, dismissed petitioner's suit and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, vide his judgment and decree, dated 30-10- 1994, hence the present petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that although the lower appellate Court has found that the petitioner is entitled to inherit the estate of Murad and the impugned mutation is declared to be illegal, yet the petitioner has been non-suited on the plea of limitation in complete ignorance of the fact that the petitioner, being co-sharer, always deemed to be in possession of the land in question. He has further submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from mis-reading and non-reading of evidence. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the impugned judgment, has submitted that as the judgment passed by the learned lower appellate Court is in accordance with the record of the case, therefore, ordinarily the judgment of the appellate Court is to be preferred.
4. Upon the examination of the impugned judgment, I find that the crucial issue, which persuaded the learned Additional District Judge, in reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, is issue No,1, which is to the effect, that whether the suit is barred by time. It is true that the learned appellate Court has held that the petitioner, being the son of Mst. Saban, the pre- deceased daughter of Murad Khan, is entitled to inherit the estate of Murad Khan and he is co- sharer along with Murad Khan, yet the fact remains that they remained co-sharers uptil the year, 1979, whereafter consolidation proceedings in that village were made. Even if it be taken that the petitioner, being the co-sharer, was deemed to be in possession of the land in question, the fact remains that with the execution of the first sale-deed, on 8-6-1978 the said status of the petitioner stood vanished and the names of other persons were entered in the revenue record, as the owner of the land in question. The learned appellant Court has rightly held that after the consolidation proceedings, which were done in the year 1979, the petitioner could have instituted the suit for declaration uptil 1985, while dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel, the learned lower appellate Court has held as under:--- "..Even if this may be considered for argument sake that the plaintiff could be deemed to be in possession of the suit land jointly as a co-sharer of Murad through his mother, this presumption stood displaced at least in the year, 1979,, because at that time the defendants Nos.1 to 4 had separate "Wanda" of land in their favour purchased by them from Mst. Jantan defendant No,8. This stands proved beyond any shadow of doubt on record that the plaintiff has never been in actual physical possession of the suit land. At least after the emergence of consolidation proceedings in the year, 1979, he' was put an alert, he could institute a suit for declaration as in the present case until 1985, under Article 120 of the Schedule of Limitation Act and this suit having been instituted on 1-10-1986 cannot be considered-within time. "
It has been proved on record, as rightly appreciated by the learned lower appellate Court, that petitioner never remained in actual physical possession of any part of the suit land. The impugned mutation was attested on 23-2-1974 but the said mutation was never challenged before filing the suit in hand. As noted above, despite the consolidation proceedings, the petitioner did not challenge the mutation even in the year 1979 and the suit was filed on 1-10-1986. In the above perspective, I am of the view that the suit, filed by the petitioner, was barred by time and the findings of the lower appellate Court on issue No,1 do not call for any interference by this Court, hence the same are maintained.
6. In addition to the above, I have examined the impugned judgment and find that the learned Additional District Judge has exhaustively embarked upon all the issues involved in the case, appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record in its true perspective and has reached to the proper conclusion, which, to my mind, are not open to exception. I have perused the evidence produced by the parties in juxtaposition with the findings given by the learned Additional District Judge and is of the view that the inferences drawn by the learned Additional District Judge are not only in accordance with the record of the case, but the same also in consonance with the law on the subject.
7. I have also examined the judgment rendered by the learned trial Court and find that the same is not sustainable in law and the said judgment, as compared to the learned lower appellant Court's judgment, suffers from grave legal errors, which have been rectified by the learned appellate Court, by reversing the findings of the learned trial Court and substituting its own findings, which are supported by reasons. I am not inclined to restore the judgment of the learned trial Court, which has rightly been upset by the learned lower appellate Court.
8. Although the learned counsel has contended that the impugned judgment suffers from mis- reading and non-reading of evidence, yet when asked to explain as to which portion of evidence has either been mis-read or non-read, the learned counsel, despite his best efforts could not point out any pieces of evidence, which has either been mis-read or non-read by the learned appellate Court.
9. In my view as the impugned judgment is neither contrary to the evidence on record nor in violation of the principle E of administration of justice, thus, the judgment of the learned appellate Court should ordinarily be preferred. If any case is needed, judgments reported as Mir Muhammad alias Miral v. Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1996 Kar. 202, Ilamuddin through legal heirs v. Syed Sarfraz Hussain through legal heirs and 5 others 1999 CLC 312 and AASA v. Ibrahim 2000 CLC 500 can be referred.
10. In the above perspective, I am of the considered view that the impugned judgment is legal, un- exceptionable and does not call for any interference by this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, thus, the same is maintained.
11. In view of the above reasons and findings, the present revision petition is devoid of merits, thus, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.