' This appeal is directed against the acquittal of respondents Nos.1 to 3-who were tried along with their co-accused Tariq Mehmood by the Special Court established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, Faisalabad, for offence under section 302 read with section 34, P.P.C. At the conclusion of the trial accused Tariq Mehmood was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. And sentenced to death whereas respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were acquitted.
Through the instant appeal, the appellant, has challenged the acquittal of the respondents.
2. We have heard the learned counsel and have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial Court.
3. The question which needs determination by us relates to the very maintainability of the appeal.
The Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1975) was promulgated and was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, dated 3rd February, 1975 with a view to provide for speedy trial of offences committed in furtherance of or in connection with acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism. The offence triable under the Act by the Special Court constituted under sections 3 and 4 of the Act are duly mentioned in the schedule appended with the Act, the provision for appeal from the judgment of the trial Court is provided under section 7 of the Act which reads as under:-- "Appeal from sentence imposed by Special Court etc.---(1) A person sentenced by a Special Court shall have a right of appeal to High Court within whose jurisdiction the sentence has been passed "
(and the Provincial Government may direct any person appointed by it for the purpose to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal passed by a Special Court)" but save as aforesaid and notwithstanding the provisions of the Code or of any other law for the time being in force or of any thing having the force of law by whatsoever authority made or done, no Court shall have authority to revise such sentence or to transfer any case from a Special Court or to make any order under section 426 or section 491 or section 498 of the Code or have any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings of Special Court.
(2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be preferred to the High Court within 30 days of the passing of the sentence or order of acquittal as the case may be and shall be heard and decided by a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court within three months.
(3) Chapter XXIX of the Code shall apply to the suspension, remission and commutation of sentences passed by a Special Court."
4. The right of appeal has been conferred on the convict in case of conviction and the Provincial Government from an order of acquittal by a Special Court. No such right has been conferred on the complainant which implies that the legislature in its wisdom did not deem it appropriate to extend the right of appeal on a private complainant. It is noteworthy that section 7 of the Act at the time of its enactment did not contemplate a right of appeal to any one except the convict. On realization that there was no provision of the Act to check acquittals, right of appeal was conferred on the Provincial Government by special amendment introduced through Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act (Special Courts Amendment) Act 1976. The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing is that whenever the legislature intended to extend the right of appeal, it did so by positive legislation. The argument that keeping in line with the provisions of Section 417(2), Cr.P.C.
Such a right should have been granted to the complainant under the Act is devoid of any substance as a right nor conferred by the legislature can neither be read into an enactment nor can the same be supplemented by implications.
5. In the light of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the appeal is incompetent and therefore, not maintainable at law. Consequently it is dismissed.