The petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007 seeking revocation of the proceedings of superdari dated 31.1.2007 and resumption of the land by Respondents No, 1 and 2, was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge through order dated 8.2.2007. This order was challenged by the petitioner in revision which was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge Bhakkar through order dated 28.3.2007 upholding the Civil Judge's order terming the application to be premature. Hence the present constitutional petition.
2. Limine notice was issued to Respondents No, 1 and 2. In response thereto, the learned A.A.G. has appeared alongwith Muhammad Aslam, Tehsildar Bhakkar. Respondents No, 5 to 16 were the co- plaintiffs with the petitioner. As such, they are only the performa respondents.
3. Both the sides addressed their full arguments from which it emerged that the petitioner sought decision of his application dated 6.2.2007 for cancellation of proceedings dated 31.1.2007 for superdari and resumption of land on merits. Instead the learned subordinate Courts held the application to be premature.
4. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.A.G appearing for Respondents No, I and 2, I find that the decision of the present constitutional petition is dependent upon the meaning of the word `premature' and also on the question as to whether the learned subordinate Courts exercised their jurisdiction in accordance with the law by dismissing the petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007 as premature instead of deciding the same on merits.
5. Through the impugned orders, the petitioner's application was held to be premature by the learned Courts assuming the pending proceedings on petitioner's application seeking action against Respondents No, 1 and 2 for disobedience of injunction, as sufficient because, per the learned Judges, the factual and legal questions in both the applications were identical.
6. I am afraid, the approach adopted by the learned Courts below for summary dismissal of the petitioner's above referred application dated 6.2.2007 was without lawful authority and also without jurisdiction. The petitioner challenged proceedings dated 31.1.2007 by Respondents No, 1 and 2 for superdari of the crops and resumption of land as illegal and also being against the injunctive orders claimed to be in currency. And that from this fact emerged the petitioner's request for cancellation of the proceedings dated 31.1.2007. The learned Courts below were thus obligated to consider and decide as to whether any injunctive orders were violated by Respondents No, 1 and 2 and as to whether the status quo order dated 31.1.2007 passed in the presence of ADA was effective on being so passed or not and what was its legal efficacy, effect and consequence (also in relation to the suit). The learned subordinate Courts instead cryptically held the petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007 to be "premature."
7. Black's Law Dictionary by Bryan A. Garner (17th Edition) provides a guideline as to the meaning of the word `prematurly' by 11 defining the word 'prematurity ' as a stage "when the facts underlying a plaintiff's complaint do not yet create a live claim."
To the mind of this Court, the above elaboration of the term indicates that a claim could only be termed as premature, if the fact, cause or effect thereto had not come into existence or had not happened or ripened to give rise to a legal injury upon which a legally enforceable claim could be formulated by an applicant.
8. In the present case, the proceedings dated 31.1.2007 had been carried out in execution of some orders passed by Respondents No, 1 and superdari of the petitioner's crops was handed over to the superdari and the suit land was resumed. At the minimum, under the orders of Respondents No, 1 and 2, the petitioner's possession over the suit land was interfered with and the petitioner was deprived of the yield of the crops sown by him. The learned A.A.G. and Muhammad Aslam, Tehsildar Bhakkar do not dispute these facts. The petitioner questioned the above actions of Respondents No, 1 and 2 as illegal and in violation of the stay orders. Vires of these actions became the litigated facts and questions in the petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007. The grievance or the cause to agitate thereagainst had thus unarguably matured. When cumulatively read, the above referred facts actions gave rise to as many causes as the facts. It is thus quizzical as to how the learned District Courts could term the petitioner's application as "premature". They appear to have adopted a course to bypass the decision on merits of a mature cause.
9. The learned A.A.G. wishes this Court to consider that the learned Courts pended the petitioner's application seeking proceedings for disobedience of the interim orders to decide the same on merits because the subject-matter of the two applications was the same.
Be that as it may, the facts of the two applications may be the same or similar or identical but such facts gave rise to the separate actionable causes as well as the reliefs under the law. The two applications were thus considerably distinct and independent in their scope and legal consequences. In view thereof, the learned District Courts unjustly declined to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the law by holding the petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007 as premature. The impugned order are thus held to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
10. This constitutional petition a accepted. The impugned orders having been declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect, the petitioner's application dated 6.2.2007 shall be re- decided by the learned trial Court in accordance with the law. This application shall be decided expeditiously in view of the risk of destruction and loss to the crops. The parties shall appear before the learned trial Court on 23.5.2007. The petitioner shall produce the certified copy of this order before the learned trial Judge.