1. M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-By these ten petitions the applicant seek the review of our own orders. The Government Pleader has raised the preliminary objection that this Tribunal has no powers to review the orders passed by it, on merits. In this regard he relied upon the text of section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which is as follows:- "5.--(1) A Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, the order appealed against.
(2) A Tribunal shall vary or modify, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908) including the powers of-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents.
2. The learned Government Pleader contended that the power to review being a substantive power has to be conferred expressly and the proposition is too well established to need the support of any precedent. According to him section 5(2) reproduced above did not in terms confer any power of review and even did not extend the application of the Civil Procedure Code to this Tribunal in its entirety so as to make the provisions of section 114 read with Order XLVII of the Code applicable to the proceedings before this Tribunal. A reference was made in particular to the expression "for the purpose of deciding any appeal" occurring in section 5(2), above. In the submission of the learned Government Pleader, the Civil Procedure Code was applicable only to appeal proceedings after the conclusion of which the Tribunal became functus officio, and section 5 became inoperative. In this behalf, he cited the decision of the Service Tribunal (Central) reported as M. A. Iqbal v. Federation of Pakistan (1975 PLC (C. S. T.) 133), in which the Tribunal observed as under,- "The Tribunal is deemed to be a civil Court only for a particular purpose, i. e. To the end of deciding an appeal and Order XLVII, will have no application."
3. In that case, it was concluded by the Central Tribunal that Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code has no application and the Tribunal had jurisdic--tion to review its own decisions only to the extent specified in the relevant rules of the Tribunal. The learned Government Pleader thus argued that this Tribunal has a very limited jurisdiction to review its own decision as provided in rule 22 of the Punjab Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1975, framed under the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, which authorise the rectification of clerical errors and arithmetical mistakes only. The petitioners resisted the above contentions raised by the Government Pleader and argued that the proceedings before the Tribunal was admittedly of civil nature and the Tribunal while deciding the appeals before it, notwithstanding its limited nature of jurisdiction, i. e. With regard to service matters only, was a civil Court for all intents and purposes. The following observations by Mr. Justice Fakharuddin G. Ebrahim of Sind-Baluchistan High Court as reported in PLD 1976 Quetta 59, were cited- "On the other hand, the Tribunal, under section 5 of the said Act is deemed to be a civil Court for the purpose of deciding any appeal before it with all the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure."'
4. It was thus contended that the ratio decidendi of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Hussain Bakhsh v. The Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi (PLD 1970 SC 1), which related to the powers of review of the High Court against its decisions made in exercise of writ jurisdiction, was fully applicable. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that since section 117 of the C. P. C. Laid down that the provisions of the C. P. C. Including section 114, which provided for the powers of review, were applicable to the High Court, therefore, the High Court had the powers to review its orders passed in writ jurisdiction, although the Constitution of Pakistan unlike the Supreme Court did not make any provision for review by the High Court. But it was ruled that the powers to review had to be exercised in accordance with the provisions contained in Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance was also placed by the petitioners upon the decisions of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal reported as Azad Government of Jammu & Kashmir State v. Khawaja Ahmad Din (PLJ 1977 Tr. C (Service) 82), in which while interpreting section 5 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal Act, 1975, which was substantially the same as section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act held that "Section 5 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to review its own orders if that contains errors of mistakes on the face of the record".
5. AND "Section 5 of the Act made it amply clear that Service Tribunal is a civil Court with the same powers as vested in a civil Court under C. P. C. Therefore, for correcting errors on the face of the record, provisions of section 114, and Order XLVII, C. P. C. Are available to the Tribunal."
6. Reaching the conclusion above, the Azad Jammu 8i Kashmir Service Tribunal observed that as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan- "the nature of the proceedings did not necessarily depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court."
7. The Tribunal also relied upon certain observations of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore Bench, entitled Dr. Muhammad Fazil Zaheer and others v. Mst. Begum Jan and others (PLD 1966 Lah. 53), in which the High Court had held that it had the powers to review its own judgments delivered in appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance of 1959, against the order of Rent Controller. In the aforesaid judgment it was held that the provisions of section 114 of the C. P. C. Were applicable to the proceedings. By virtue of explanation to section 15(4) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, the appeals before the High Court were to be governed by Order XLI, and Order XLII of the Civil Procedure Code and thus the orders were subject to review in the light of the provisions contained in Order XLVII of the C. P. C. The decision of N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal Abdur Rashid v. Government of N. W. F. P. And others (PLJ 1976 Tr. C (Service) 338), was also relied upon who assumed the review jurisdiction with the following observations :- "We will however. To proceed to determine the position, on the assump--tion that there was no power to this Tribunal to consider the review of an order like the present one passed by its predecessors."
8. The petitioners also argued that the provision after' the words including and onwards as occurred in subsection 5(2) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, was meant for extending the scope of the principal clause. The proposition was sought to be supported by relying upon PLD 1976 Lah. 111 and 515. One of the petitioners also relied upon Aslam v. Khurshid Begum (PLD 1972 Lah. 603), to canvass for the existence of powers of review with this Tribunal.
9. After hearing both the parties and considering the respective contentions raised by the parties, we are clearly of the view that this Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to review its own orders on merits. In our view, the jurisdiction of this Tribunal was restricted to the extent specified in rule 2 of the Punjab Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1975, which permitted the rectification of clerical errors and arithmatical mistakes only, and it may also include grave clerical errors and mistakes committed by the Tribunal himself. In the first instance, we find that there is an apparent distinction in the scope of the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to the High Court as provided under section 117 and to this Tribunal vide section 5(2) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act.
10. We are unable to hold that the expression "for the purpose of deciding any appeal" has been used by the Legislature as a mere surplusage. According to the well-known principles of construction no part of the statute could be rendered redundant unless the conclusion was inescapable. Nothing was suggested before us to warrant such a view. The rule laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in PLD 1970 SC 1 would only apply in this case if the C. P. C. Was applicable to all the proceedings and for all purposes and not to appeal proceedings only. However, we find that section 5(2) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act is not pari materia with the provisions of section 117 of the C. P. C. Thus the provisions of the C. P. C. Have been applied to the proceedings before the B Service Tribunal for the limited "purpose of deciding any appeal only. The scope of similar expression as used in section 36 of the Industrial Rela--tions Ordinance No. XXIII of 1969 came up for consideration before the Sind-Baluchistan High Court, Karachi Bench as Brook Bond (Pakistan)
11. Ltd. v. Sind Labour Court, Karachi (PLD 1973 Kar. 189), wherein late Mr. Justice Tufail Ali A. Rehman who headed the Division Bench, made the following observations- "I am, therefore, of the view that subsection (2) does not confer upon a Labour Court while deciding and determining the industrial dispute the powers of a civil Court under the C. P. C., but only such of them as may be described as procedural, i. e. Such as are required `for the purpose' of adjudication and determination."
12. The provisions of section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance read as follows: "A Labour court shall for the purpose of adjudication and determining any industrial dispute be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under C. P.
13. C., 1908 (Act V of 1908) including the powers of-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him one oath;
(b) compelling the production of the documents and material objects; and
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of the witnesses or docu--ments."
14. In our opinion, the above authority is on all fours with the case in hand. We respectfully follow the same and hold that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review its own orders on merits. So far as the rulings cited by the Petitioners are concerned, all of them are distinguishable. The N: W. F. P. Service Tribunal has given no reasons for assuming the jurisdiction. Thus it cannot be said to have decided the issue at all. So far as the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal is concerned, it also proceeds on the assump--tion that C. P. C. Is applicable in its entirety to all the proceedings before the Service Tribunal irrespective of the nature of the proceedings, i. e. Whether it is an appeal or review.
15. With respect and regret we may venture to differ the decision of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal an they have failed to address themselves to this aspect of the case. In our view the decision on the issue of the powers of review by the Service Tribunal was dependent on the extent of the application of the Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings before them. In our view, the scope of the application of the C. P. C. As laid down in section 117 of the aforesaid Code and section 5(2) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, was not identical and was rather substantially different. We are, therefore, not inclined to endorse the decision of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal. For the reasons above, it is difficult to hold that the ratio of the Supreme Court decision referred to above is attracted to the review proceedings before this Tribunal. Even the decision reported as PLD 1966 Lah. 53 as relied upon by the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Tribunal was distinguished on facts as held in Agha Muhammad Hassan v. Mehra Din (PLD 1973 Lah. 95), in an appeal against the Rent Controller in which Mr. Justice Aftab Hussain followed the view laid down in PLD 1970 SC 1 and PLD 1968 Lah. 478 came to the conclusion that the powers of review was not available to the District Judge against the order of Rent Controller, hearing the appeals under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The similar view was expressed in PLD 1968 Lab. 639 and PLD 1968 Kar. 321. Thus the aforesaid decision was clearly distinguishable on facts. Similarly, the decision reported as PLD 1972 Lab. 603 was clearly distinguishable as the issue involved in that case was as to whether ex parte order could be set aside on the ground that the same was without jurisdiction. As such the question involved in that case was clearly different and did not strictly involve the question of review. In view of our findings above, we hold that this Tribunal has no powers to review its own order on merits and the provisions of Order XLVII, C. P. C. Were inapplicable and the powers to review was limited to the extent specified above. Before parting with the judgment, we are constrained to observe that in service disputes the Service Tribunals being the only and the last Court of appeal on the disputed questions of facts, the desirability of conferring the powers of review co-extensive with Order XLVII of C. P. C. Hardly needs to emphasised.
16. Consequently all the Review Petitions are dismissed. However, in view of the complexity of the issue involved in this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.