' The only question in this case is about the meaning of the word `fortnight' used in the order dated 1-10-1979, passed in R. S. A. No, 231/79. The said appeal was filed by the petitioner and was allowed.
The matter was remanded to the first appellate Court to determine certain other questions.
However, a proviso was added to the following effect:- "The appellants shall make up the deficiency in this Court as well as in the lower appellate Court within a period of a fortnight, failing which the appeal shall stand dismissed."
2. The respondent later submitted an application before the High Court bearing No, C. M. 5870/C- 79 on 27-10-79 complaining that the petitioners had not complied with the said order and had not deposited the court-fee within the time fixed. This application was dismissed on the ground that it was open to the learned first appellate Court to decide the question raised in that application. The learned lower appellate Court held that the word 'fortnight' meant 14 days only and as such the court-fee stamp papers should have been filed in Court by the 15th of October, 1979. Since they were actually filed on the 16th, a day later, the second appeal stood dismissed and, consequently, there was no remand order existing.
3. Hence this revision.
4. The learned counsel submitted that the word 'fortnight' has been used in English-Urdu dictionary as meaning pandhrwara which means fifteen days. This argument is without force as we have to see standard dictionaries to determine the exact sense in the word 'fortnight' is used. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "fortnight's" notice was held to mean 14 clear days. Reference in this behalf is made to Labouchere v. Wharncliffe (1). A In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'fortnight' is shown to mean 14 nights with reference to ancient German method of reckoning by nights.
However, it is further explained that this expression also means two weeks.
5. The learned counsel argued that a day is to be excluded while calculating the 14 days. Similarly, a night also should be excluded for calculating 14 nights. This argument is without force. The order having been passed on the 1st October, 1979 during day time, there can be no such exclusion because whole of the forthcoming night was given to the petitioner as the first night. Looked at from this point of view, it is clear that the period of a fortnight came to an end on the 15th. The petitioner was duty bound to make the deposit of court-fee by the 15th at the latest. The finding of the learned first Appellate Court is, therefore, unexceptionable.
6. The learned counsel further submitted that it is open to this Court to extend the time. In my view no extension is possible. The petitioner has already been given sufficent extension although, once it was held that the court-fee paid on more appeal was deficient, he could be thrown out of Court on the basis of bar of limitation. But the Court allowed him an opportunity to make the deposit. The language used by the Court in the ultimate order left on any jurisdiction with the Court to give a further extension. It is clearly stated in that order that if the deposit is not made within a fortnight, the appeal shall stand dismissed. In view of the languge used in the order, the Court has become functus officio and cannot extend the period. Even otherwise, it is not open to this Court to extend the time while exescising revisional jurisdiction against B the order of a District Judge since the Court's function is limite3 to deciding whether the case is covered by either of the three clauses given in section 115, C. P. C. Any extension of the period would be beyond the ambit of the grounds given in section 115, C. P. C. And would be extraneous. The petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine.
(1) 13 Ch. D 353