' MUHAMMAD FARRUKH MAHMUD, J.--- Muhammad Saeed petitioner is younger while Ghulam Sarwar respondent is elder son of Muhammad Siddique (late) who was Lambardar of Chak No,572/GB Bhagoor Tehsil Nankana Sahib. On 8-5-2004 Muhammad Siddique moved an application that he had gone very old and could not continue with his duties as Lambardar so his son Muhammad Saeed petitioner be appointed as Lambardar. The Deputy District. Officer (Revenue) Nankana Sahib on the same date directed the Tehsildar for a detailed report.
Consequently, on that very date i.e, 8-5-2004 statements of Chaudhry Muhammad Siddique (the then Lambardar) and his son Muhammad Saeed petitioner were recorded. After submission of report on the same date following order was passed:- "He is appointed as the "{{URDU TEXT}}". Meantime file for Lambardar may be prepared."
2. Pursuant to the order, proceedings were initiated for appointment of Lambardar. The petitioner and respondent Ghulam Sarwar both along with .Others expressed their desire for consideration for the post of Lambardar through applications. On 8-4-2006 District Officer (Revenue)/District Collector, Kasur considered the merit of the candidates in the light of the criteria laid down in Rule 17 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 and appointed respondent Ghulam Sarwar Lambardar. The order dated 8-4-2006 reveals that Ghulam Sarwar was preferred to the other candidates for the following reasons:--- "(i) He was a matriculate while Muhammad Saeed was not.
(ii) The other candidates except Saeed withdrew in favour of Ghulam Sarwar.
(iii) That Muhammad Saeed petitioner had not moved any application for appointment as Lambardar within the specified period and the only application available on record did not bear any date. Even the stamp fixed on the application did not bear any date.
(iv) That Muhammad Saeed petitioner succeeded in becoming temporary Lambardar/Tehvildar by obtaining reports on the very date the application on that behalf was allegedly moved by Muhammad Siddique."
3. Muhammad Saeed petitioner, feeling aggrieved, filed appeal which was allowed by the Executive District Officer (Revenue) on 3-7-2006. Thereafter Ghulam Sarwar respondent filed revision which was dismissed by the Member (Judicial-I) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore vide order dated 9-1- 2007. Ghulam Sarwar respondent did not loose hope and filed writ petition which was heard by the learned Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court, Lahore on 18-12-2007. The learned Judge in Chambers vide order of even date allowed the writ petition and set aside the orders dated 9-1- 2007 and 3-7-2006 passed by the learned Member (Judicial-I), Board of Revenue and the Executive District Officer (Revenue) respectively . By the same order, the order dated 8-4-2006 of District Officer (Revenue) whereby the respondent was appointed Lambardar was restored. Hence this petition.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the impugned judgment it was wrongly held that the petitioner was illiterate as the petitioner was middle pass. He has referred to the school leaving certificate available on the record. The learned counsel has further argued that the appointment of Lambardar lay with the domain of revenue officers and no one had an inherent right to be appointed as Lambardar; that the learned High Court should not have interfered in the matter which was within the domain of the revenue authorities and in any case the learned High Court should have remanded the case back to the revenue authorities for reconsideration. The learned counsel relied upon the following cases:-
(1) Muhammad Warrayam v. Member Board of Revenue, Punjab Lahore and 3 others 1972 SCM R 354 (2) Ghulam Hussain v. Ghulam Muhammad and another 1976 SCM R 75.
5. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the learned counsel could not point out any infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, Lahore; that the respondent was elder brother of the petitioner and was senior to him and that the order passed by the District Officer (Revenue) was based on reasons and the Appellate Authority interfered with it without any justification. The learned counsel lastly argued that the learned High Court had the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to look into the validity of the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire record.
Perusal of order dated 8-4-2006 passed by the District Officer (Revenue), whereby the respondent was appointed as Lambardar, reveals that it was well reasoned order based on the available record of the case. On the other hand, the order dated 3-7-2006 passed by the Appellate Authority in favour of the petitioner does not reveal any cogent ground as to why the order of the Appointing Authority was set aside. The fact which found favour with appellate authority was that the record revealed that father of the petitioner has submitted an application for appointment of Lambardar in favour of Muhammad Saeed petitioner. That could not be valid reason for appointment of Lambardar as the criteria has already been laid down in Rule 17 referred to above. We have also gone through the order dated 9-1-2007 handed down by the Member (Judicial-I) Board of Revenue, Punjab whereby the revision of the respondent was dismissed for the reasons that the inhabitants of the Chak had no objection on the appointment of Muhammad Saeed as Lambardar and that during the life time of the deceased Lambardar, Muhammad Saeed had been working as temporary Lambardar. The learned Member Board of Revenue even did not discuss the reasons advanced by the appointing authority (D.O. (R)) while passing the order and failed to note that the Lambardar was to be appointed in accordance with the criteria given in the Land Revenue Rules and it was not the property which could be gifted by a father to the son. The argument Qf the learned counsel that the High Court could not interfere with the order passed by the Revenue Authorities under its writ jurisdiction, is devoid of any force. The point stands settled by this Court in the case of Haji Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member Board of Revenue, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 4 others PLD 1991 SC 531 at page 538 wherein it was held as under:- "The Board of Revenue at the apex of the Revenue hierarchy is charged with the statutory duty of interpreting the law, of applying it to individual cases coming up before it and laying down the law for the subordinates in the hierarchy to follow. Any error on its part in understanding the law, in applying it or in laying down the law can and must be corrected in the constitutional jurisdiction. If it is left uncorrected, it will result in subverting the rule of law."
Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 3 others 1993 SCM R 2044. We may point out here that the learned Judge in Chambers after going through the record of the case only restored the order of the Appointing Authority which belonged to the revenue department.
7. In our opinion, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity and needs no interference. This petition is dismissed. Leave refused.