' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--- The petitioners/defendants, through these two petitions, C.P. No,2285-L of 2004 arising out of Civil Revision No,927 of 2002 and C.P. No,2286-L of 2004 arising out of Civil Revision No,928 of 2002, seek leave to appeal against the single judgment dated 20-4-2004, whereby the learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court Lahore allowed the revision petitions Civil Revision Nos.927 and 928 of 2002, judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts were set aside and the two suits filed by the respondents were decreed, subject to deposit of certain amounts. During the pendency of the said petitions, the petitioners, filed two applications (C.M.As.
964-L of 2006 in Civil Petition No,2285-L of 2004 and C.M.A. 965 of 2006 in Civil Petition No,2286 of 2004) (hereinafter mentioned as 'applications') praying that in case petitions for leave to appeal are found to be incompetent, the same may be treated as direct appeals. We through this single judgment propose to decide both the 'petitions' and 'applications', as these are between the same parties and arose out of a common judgment rendered by the Lahore High Court, Lahore.
2. Facts of the case as capitulated in the judgment of the High Court are reproduced below:--- "(2) The facts are common except that in the matter of Civil Revision No,927 of 2002 the suit land was purchased by the respondents for a sum of Rs,90,000 vide Mutation No,634 attested on 18-7- 1996 while in the matter of Civil Revision No,928 of 2002 the suit land was purchased by the respondents vide Mutation No,403 attested on 18-7-1996. The consideration noted in the first case is Rs,90,000, while in the second case it is Rs,50,000. Both the suits were filed on 7-10-1996. The petitioner claimed to be co-sharer, owner of adjacent land and sharing common means of irrigation. Talbs were pleaded. The respondents while denying the said allegations pleaded that in fact the petitioner had first entered into an agreement with the vendor for sale of the said land but later he could not perform his part of agreement and then the land was purchased by the respondents. Issues were framed. Evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned trial Court found that the petitioner has a superior right of pre-emption, that the said amount in the mutations were in fact paid by the respondents as price to the vendor. However, it was found that the Talbs had not been performed in the manner prescribed and on the basis of the same findings it was held that the petitioner is estopped from filing the suits. Both the suits were accordingly dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 21-7-1999. The first appeals filed by the petitioner were dismissed by a learned Additional District Judge, Bhalwal, on 10-4-2002."
' The respondents filed two revision petitions Civil Revisions Nos.927 and 928 of 2002 challenging the afore-noted decrees passed by both the Courts below before the Lahore High Court, Lahore and the learned Single Judge accepted both the revision petitions, reversed the judgments and decrees and decreed respondent's suits for possession through preemption, subject to deposit of a sum of Rs,95,410 and Rs,53,010 respectively, vide single judgment and decree dated 20-5-2004, hence the present petitions.
3. The petitioners' two petitions for leave, as noted above, were fixed before this Court on 18-4-2006, when the learned counsel representing the respondents objected to the competency of the petitions on the ground that the decrees of the Courts below were modified and varied by the High Court, therefore, direct appeals under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan were maintainable, which were not filed. Thereupon the learned counsel for the petitioners sought an adjournment to file appropriate applications, which were filed with the prayer noted above.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while referring to the plaints in both the suits, stated that since valuation of the suits for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, fixed by the respondent/ plaintiff, was less than Rs,50,000, therefore, the cases of the petitioners were not covered under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution and the only remedy available to the petitioners was to file the petitions, which they did. He has next .Contended that in any case if the petitions are found to be incompetent, in order to avoid any controversy the same may be treated as direct appeals. He has relied upon Sardar Abdur Rauf Khan and others v. The Land Acquisition Collector/Deputy Commissioner Abbottabad and others 1991 SCM R 2164. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the 'applications' and submitted that value of the subject- matter in both the suits is the sale price, which is Rs,90,000 and Rs,50,000, respectively and it is only the subject-niatter and not the valuation of a suit for purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction, which determines as to whether an appeal or petition should be filed. He has added that by not filing appeals within the prescribed period of limitation, valuable rights accrued in favour of the respondents, which could not be defeated, moreso, when the decrees had already been executed.
He has relied upon Zafar Iqbal Hameed Khan v. Ashiq Hussain and 2 others 2005 SCM R 1371.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and minutely perused the available material on record. After examining the cases of Sardar Abdur Rauf Khan and others and Zafar Iqbal Hameed Khan (ibid), and the other judicial pronouncements made by this Court, on the subject, we are of the view that this Court in appropriate cases and in exercise of it discretion has ample powers to condone delay caused in filing an appeal or to allow conversion of the petition into appeal, provided sufficient and reasonable cause, within the parameters of law, has been shown for condonation of delay in filing direct appeal.
' Reference can be made to the case of Ghulam Muhammad and others v. Government of Balochistan and others 2007 SCM R 41. In such-like cases it should also be kept in view that no negligence and carelessness or even lethargy could be attributed to a litigant and his conduct in prosecuting the case is bona fide and above board. In order to examine conduct of a litigant, one has to see and overhaul the grounds stated in his application for condonation of delay. In this case in order to examine as to whether the petitioners, in their 'applications', have made out a `sufficient cause' for conversion of the petition into appeal, when it had already become barred by time, we adverted to petitioners' applications. In support of the 'applications', the petitioners agitated the following grounds:-
(3) That in view of the value of the subject-matter of the suit computed according to the relevant provision of law of court-fee, the titled Civil Petition was competently filed, as the petitioners were under the genuine impression that the direct appeal before this Honourable Court was not competent.
(4) That any how, in order to avoid any controversy in this regard, the instant application is being filed as a measure of abundant caution."
6. It flows from the above, that the only ground agitated in the `applications' is that as the value of the subject-matter of both the suits was. Less than Rs,50,000, therefore, the petitioners filed the petitions under genuine impression that the direct appeal would not be competent. It is true that the suits were valued for the purposes of the court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs,39,129 and Rs,37,813- 50, respectively, but is equally true that "valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction" and the "value of the subject-matter of the suit" are two distinct connotations not synonymous and conveys different meanings. According to the pleadings of the parties in one case the suit land was purchased for consideration of Rs,90,000, while in other suit the sale price was fixed at Rs,50,000.
This Court in the case of Zafar Iqbal Hameed Khan (supra), relied by the learned counsel for the respondent, has held that the subject-matter of the suit is the value of the suit land. According to Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution, it is the value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance that determines the remedy by way of appeal or petition and not the valuation of suit fixed by a plaintiff for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. Relevant portion of Article. 185(2)
(d) is reproduced below:--- "185(1).......................................................
(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence of a High Court---
(a) to (c) ..................................................................................................................
(d) If the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance was and also in dispute in appeal is, not less than fifty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below; or
(e) - and (0
(3) .................................................................... (Emphasis is ours) (sic)."
In the instant case in one suit disputed land was sold against consideration of Rs,90,000, while in the other suit it was for Rs,50,000. Thus, the subject-matter of dispute in both the suits was not less than Rs,50,000, the case of the petitioners was fully covered under sub-Article (2)(d) of Article 185 of the Constitution and, therefore, to our mind, from the very inception judgments of the High Court could only be challenged through appeals, which were though competent, yet were not filed within the limitation period. No ambiguity or misconception was pointed out by the learned counsel, which could lead to filing of these petitions. We feel that the conduct of the petitioners as well as their learned counsel was negligent, careless and was not up to the mark. There was no confusion in the case, which could lead a person of ordinary prudence to believe that the petitions were competent. Certainly, the petitioners and their learned counsel did not act in a prudent manner.
7. The petitioners are still insisting that the petitions are competent and they have halfheartedly asserted in para.4 of the 'application' as canvassed by their learned counsel before us, that in order to avoid any controversy, the 'applications' were filed with a prayer that if the petitions are found to be incompetent the same may be treated as direct appeals. It appears appropriate to reproduce the prayer made by the petitioners, which reads as follows:---- "Prayer.--- In view of above submissions, it is most respectfully prayed that in case the titled petition for Leave to Appeal is found to be incompetent, the same may very graciously be treated as direct appeal in the interest of justice."
8. Under the circumstances, we are convinced that neither the petitioners nor their counsel acted in good faith, while filing the petitions, and if the petitions are converted into appeals, at this stage, when limitation period for filing appeals under the law had expired long ago, the respondent would definitely be prejudiced as valuable rights accrued in his favour by afflux of time. To our mind, the petitioners have not been able to make out sufficient and good cause for conversion of these appeals. There is no justification in law for doing. It may be noted that both the petitions were filed after expiry of a period of thirty days after excluding the period spent on obtaining the certified copies. The 'applications' in hand are devoid of merits and thus, we are constrained to dismiss the both.
9. In the above perspective petitioners' 'applications' (C.M.A. No,964-L of 2006 in C.P.L.A. No,2285-L of 2004 and C.M.A. No,965-L of 2006 in C.P.L.A. No,2286-L of 2004) stand dismissed being meritless and consequently, both the Civil Petitions for leave to appeal (C.Ps. Nos.2285-L and 2286/L of 2004) are also dismissed being not competent in law.