' The brief facts of the case are that Mukhtar Ahmad was ascused of accepting a sum of Rs, 25 as illegal gratification from one Mohammad Pervaiz for making a favourable report in respect of the building plan of Mohammad Pervaiz. The petitioner at that time, i. e. In July. 1967 was posted as a Building Inspector, Municipal Committee. Lyallpur (now Faisalabad). The Anti-Corruption, Establishment after investigation recommended that the petitioner should be dealt with departmentally, but the District Anti-Corruption Committee decided that the petitioner should be prosecuted in a Court of Law. The Chairman, Municipal Committee, Lyallpur who was the competent authority, however, refused to gran sanction for prosecution. These orders of the competent authority were conveyed to the Anti-Corruption Establishment. Subsequently the Anti- , Corruption Establishment again moved the Chairman, Municipal Committee, Mr. Taqi-ud-Din Pal, who had succeeded Mr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, as Chairman of the Municipal Committee, Lyallpur.
He reviewed the orders of his predecessor and granted sanction for prosecution of the petitioner.
2. The present petition has been moved on the ground that the competent authority having once refused sanction, it was not open to him or to his successor to review that order and grant a flesh sanction. It has been urged that once a question of sanction has been decided upon, the power to grant or refuse sanction has been exhausted and it cannot be revised unless any new ground or fresh material has been discovered. It has been stated that in the present case Mr. Taqi-ud-Din Pal has reviewed the order of his predecessor without any such exigency.
3. A similar question came up before the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. K-31 and K-32 of 1969. State v. Mohammad Ismail and another (1). The Supreme Court applying the principle of locus poenitentiae came to the conclusion that since a decisive step had been taken in both imprisonment.
(1) 1980 SCMR 26$ ' the appeals, there was nothing left in the Government to revise the orders of refusing to grant sanction for prosecution. The principle applied by the Supreme Court in Appeals Nos. K-31 and K-32 of 1969 is attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the sanction for prosecution had been refused by the competent authority and had been conveyed to the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption, Establishment. Under these circumstances it was not open to the successor Mr. Taqi-ud-Din Pal to revise the earlier orders of his predecessor and to grant sanction.
4. In view of the above considerations, the prosecution of the petitioner is illegal. The petition is, therefore, allowed and the proceedings pending before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption are quashed.