' KHURSHID ANWAR BHINDER, J.---Through this single judgment I intend to dispose of Writ Petition No,11567 of 2006 and Writ Petition No,646 of 2007 as both of them arise from the same suit and involve common questions of law and facts.
2. Through the present constitutional petitions, Muhammad Arif petitioner has called in question the order dated 23-1-2006 passed by respondent No,3 whereby the right of petitioner for cross- examination of the P.Ws. Has been struck off, order dated 23-5-2006, whereby he dismissed the application filed by the petitioner for recalling the order dated 23-1-2006 and the order dated 12- 10-2006 closing evidence of the petitioner.
3. Briefly the facts leading to the filing of these constitutional petitions are that respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance against the petitioner. The petitioner contested the suit and out of the divergent pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court framed issues whereafter respondents produced Ghulam Anwar whose statement was recorded on 14-3- 2005 as P.W.1. The respondents produced witnesses on many dates but the petitioner's counsel sought adjournments for cross-examining them. So constrained with the situation, the learned trial Court struck off the right of petitioner for cross-examination vide order dated 23-1-2006. The petitioner filed an application for recalling the aforesaid order which too was dismissed by the learned trial court vide order dated 23-5-2006. Thereafter the petitioner failed to produce his evidence and his evidence was closed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 12-10-2006, hence the present constitutional petitions.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders passed by respondent No,3 are illegal, void, arbitrary, perverse, nullity in the eyes of law and are contrary to the facts on record.
He further submits that the learned Judge Family Court should have proceeded ex parte against the petitioner instead of striking his defence and closing his evidence by invoking the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Which provisions of law are inapplicable in the family suit.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned orders.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the available record. The petitioner was afforded a number of opportunities for cross-examining the witnesses of the respondents and for producing his evidence but he failed to cross-examine the witnesses of the respondents and producing his evidence, as such, the learned trial Court had left with no option but to struck off the right of the petitioner for cross-examining the witnesses of the respondents and to closed his evidence. The impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court are just, fair and calls for no interference by this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction.
7. As far as the contention of them learned counsel for the petitioner that the orders by which the petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses was struck off and the petitioner's evidence was closed are without jurisdiction is concerned, it is true that there was no provision in the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964 authorizing the Family Court to close the evidence of a party before it but there is also no provision to the effect that a party's evidence, shall not be closed even if that party fails to produce evidence, without sufficient cause, despite having availed of several opportunities to do so. Here the question arises that if a Family Court adjourns a case for hundred times with a view to enabling a party to lead evidence but even then that party does not produce evidence, without any reason whatsoever, will the Family Court not be able to refuse any more opportunity to the party at fault and proceed to close the evidence, as such, the learned trial Court was justified in closing the evidence of the petitioner.
8. There is yet another aspect of the case that no doubt the impugned orders are interlocutory orders in the sense that they do not dispose of the whole gamut of dispute between the parties.
Final decision on the suit would be open to appeal by virtue of section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and, therefore, if the petitioner fails before the learned Family Court he will be able to assail before the appellate Court, the orders now being challenged by him. To my mind the orders which have been assailed by means of these constitutional petitions, being orders of interlocutory nature, cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. Reference can be made to Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary S&GAD, Karachi and others (1996 SCM R 1165).
9. For what has been discussed above, I hold that the instant constitutional petitions are not competent, therefore, both" the writ petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.