1. This is an appeal under section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 against an order of dismissal from service.
2. The appellant was appointed as Civil Judge in 1971. He served at various places including Ghotki.
3. There were allegations of corruption and illegalities against him. On 15-4-1976 he was served with a memo. Of allega--tions by the Registrar of High Court wherein it was alleged that he had been passing illegal orders is criminal cases for which complaints had been received. The District & Sessions Judge, Sukkur was directed to pay surprise visit. He went to Ghotki and sent the report pointing out the illegalities which had been committed by the appellant. All those cases in which the illegalities were committed, were forwarded to the High Court. A list of the cases was supplied to the appellant who then submitted his explanation as required by the High Court. He maintained that he had passed the orders in good faith and were justified.
4. On 11-1-1973 while the appellant was posted at Karachi he was served with a show-cause notice under rule 5(3) of the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 requiring the appellant to show cause why a major penalty should not be imposed upon him for malpractices, lapses and abuse of official powers which amounted to inefficiency, misconduct and corruption.
5. The appellant submitted the explanation denying the allegations and requested for personal hearing. The acting Chief Justice granted the interview to the appellant and heard him. Since his Lordship was not satisfied with the explanation and the personal hearing he sent a recommenda-- tion to the Chief Secretary for dismissal of the appellant from service. The recommendation was accepted by the Chief Secretary and the appellant was dismissed from service as per notification dated 22-1-1978. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Martial Law Administrator, Zore `C' who was exercising the powers of the Chief Minister but his appeal was dismissed without granting personal hearing in spite of the request that was made. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the present appeal was filed.
6. On perusal of the record and proceedings and hearing the arguments we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. There is enough evidence to lend to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of misconduct inasmuch as he passed illegal orders and exceeded his powers for extraneous considerations. The learned Acting Chief Justice who was the Authorised Officer had given elaborate reasons in coming to the conclusion and we fully agree with hip Lordship. There are 62 cases in which the orders had been passed. The list of those cases was also supplied to the appellant. To state briefly, the appellant had granted basis in committal cases although his powers to grant bail in those cases limited and controlled under section 497, Cr. P. C. Not only this but he even granted bails when the Police had applied for remand and no notice was issued to the Law Officer of the Government. Such action is rather very unusual and tends to show that extraneous considerations prevailed upon the appellant for acting in the manner in which he acted.
7. Turning to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel of the appel--lant it was urged that reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the appellant to defend himself'. In this connection he had elaborated that neither the applications which had been received by the High Court were shown to him nor the was allowed to lead any evidence. In our view this was unnecessary: for the simple reason that the list of cases which were collected by the District and Sessions Judge, apparently showed the illegalities which had been com--mitted by the appellant. When a civil servant indulges in corruption and malpractices, it is the reputation that travels far and wide and direct evidence is hardly possible. The litigants who pay the illegal gratification and get their work done are not expected to come forward to give evidence. A general reputation is enough to take action. Moreover, in the present case, a large number of cases were secured by the District and Sessions Judge which fully supported the charge and the conclusion which was reached. In this situation the direct evidence was neither necessary nor feasible.
8. The second argument that was advanced by the learned counsel of the appellant was that judicial orders which were passed by the appellant were, made subject to the administrative order. We find nothing wrong in this; regard if judicial orders are passed illegally and for extraneous consideration.
9. The administrative machinery of the Government. Must promptly act to check. Further deterioration in the service structure and the administration of justice. No Judicial (officer can be said to be immune from administrative action if he misconducts himself in judicial matters. It is also not necessary that whether the orders which have been passed have been challenged by way of appeal- or not. In this connection it may also be noted that it is rare that in serious cases bail is granted specially when police applies for remand. It seems that the Law Officer was either not aware of those orders as no notice was issued to him before the grant of bail car he disregarded his own responsi--bility by his connivance or otherwise and thereby did not approach the Sessions Court for the cancellation of the bail.
10. It was also asserted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the allegations were based on presumptions only as there was no direct evidence and no opportunity for defence was afforded. It ha; already been pointed out that hardly direct evidence is expected to be available in cases of corruption and one has to assess the conduct of a civil servant, specially a Judicial Officer, in relation to the orders which have been passed by him and the reputation enjoyed by him. In the present case the appellant exceeded his powers in disregarding the provisions of section 49 7, Cr.
11. P. C. And, therefore, there was, no question of any direct evidence to be adduced or holding of any further enquiry. Even otherwise the enquiry was held. In the first place the learned Sessions Judge had visited the Court of the appellant and secured fit cases in which illegalities had been committed anal list of these cases was also supplied to the appellant. Show-cause notice was issued and personal hearing was granted by the acting Chief Justice. In our view com--pliance was made, with all the legal requirements and the regular enquiry was rightly di5perrsed with.
12. It was also urged that those cases were examined by late Mr. Justice Jamaluddin and a favourable report was made by him. In this connection the learned Assistant Advocate-General stated that there was nothing on record to suggest that any enquiry was held by late Mr. Justice Jamaluddin and furthermore even otherwise the allegation which formed the basis of the present action were not based on the cases which were alleged to be examines by the late learned Judge. The learned counsel for the appellant has neither placed before us any such report nor he had moved this Tribunal to send for that report. In the absence of any evidence, the bare word of the appellant cannot be accepted and it must be presumed that no such report is available or was made by the late learned Judge.
13. In the end, it may be mentioned that no request was made on behalf of the appellant to send for tire cases. Forming the basis of the action for our examination and scrutiny in order to see whether the bails which were granted were justified on merits or not.
14. In result the appeal is dismissed.