' JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.--- The petitioners-defendants impugn the appellant judgment and decree dated 8-12-1997, whereby the decree of the learned trial Court dated 18-12-1995 was reversed and a suit filed by the respondent seeking specific performance of agreements to sell dated 26-1-1978 and 24-4-1978 was decreed.
2. The facts of the case have been elaborately set out, in the appellant judgment and need and therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
3. The petitioners-defendants had denied execution of the agreement of the agreements. The learned Appellate Court, however, noted that the execution of the agreement had been duly proved. Furthermore, there was uncontrovertible evidence that the petitioners had executed a power-of-attorney in favour of the brother of the respondent-plaintiff on 26-4-1978, which was then cancelled through abtalnama executed eight years later on 22-11-1986. Learned counsel for the petitioners acknowledged that the respondent and his brother were not, in any manner, related to the petitioners. He was unable to explain as to why a power-of-attorney was then executed in favour of the respondent's brother. This circumstance has rightly been given weight by the learned Appellant Court for holding that the agreements in question were, in fact, executed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff after receipt of the total consideration and delivery of the disputed property to the respondent.
4. In addition to the above, learned counsel for the respondent adverted to the written statement submitted on behalf of the petitioners wherein they asserted that the respondent was their tenant on the basis of a written rent agreement. No such agreement was produced in evidence.
Furthermore, when the petitioner appeared in Court, he changed his position by stating that there was no rent agreement.
5. In the foregoing circumstances. I find the impugned appellate decree to be unexceptionable being consistent with the record. Furthermore, learned counsel for the petitioners was unable to advert to any such jurisdictional error or other legal infirmity in the impugned judgment, which would justify interference therein while exercising revisional jurisdiction in these circumstance, I find no merit in this petition, which is therefore, dismissed.