' SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- On 13-12-2003, the petitioner was appointed as Manager, Government Polytechnic Institute (Glass and Ceramics) Shandara, Lahore on contract basis initially for a period of one year. He continued as such till 17-6-2006 when was "terminated with immediate effect on account of misconduct, in accordance with Condition No,5 Of the terms and conditions of the appointment". This is petition. Under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for declaring the same as illegal and of no legal effect and for reinstatement with all benefits.
2. The learned counsel contends that since no inquiry was held against him, he could not be removed in such a manner by attributing misconduct to him. It is contended that regular inquiry was necessary in view of Muhammad Siddiq Javaid Chaudhry v. The Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1974 SC 393, Government of Pakistan v. Aquil Ahmed PLD 1969 Dacca 930, Abdul Majid Sheikh v. Mushaffe Ahmed, Section Officer, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence, Karachi and another PLD 1965 SC 208, Riaz Ali Khan v. Pakistan PLD 1967 Lah. 491 and Noorul Hassan and others v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1956 SC (Pak.) 331. It is further contended that the show-cause notice was issued by the Secretary, Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority who was not the Appointing Authority or competent to initiate such proceedings.
3. The learned Law Officer while opposing the petition contends that since the appointment of the petitioner was on contract basis, the petitioner was proceeded against .Strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment and that the writ petition does not lie in view of judgments in Writ Petition No,4506 of 2004 (Multan) and Writ. Petition No,103 of 2006 (BWP).
4. The petitioner along with one Jawad Ali Shah had made a complaint against Tanvir Akhtar Cheema, District Manager, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority, Lahore for a probe into his conduct. In the inquiry held therein the allegations were not proved and it was recommended that 'complainants may either be warned or any punitive action may be exercised to avoid from such practices". Afterwards on 7-4-2006, the petitioner was called upon by Secretary, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority to show cause as to why his services may not be terminated "on account of misconduct arising out of making false allegations against a senior officer". The said notice does not state or evince the approval of competent authority i,e, Chairman. It was replied by the petitioner urging to withdraw the same and that he may be given proper chance of defence. Eventually order, dated 17-6-2006 referred to above was passed. It may be noted at this juncture that Jawad Ali Shah was also proceeded against but proceedings were ,later dropped against him. In Writ Petition No,4506 of 2004 (Multan), a District Manager of Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority had filed writ petition assailing his termination made on the ground of misconduct and it was observed that such a termination on the ground of misconduct was in violation of the contract of his appointment. Relief was, however, declined that the appointment being on contract basis, the same could not be enforced in constitutional jurisdiction. It was observed that the petitioner could file a suit for appropriate relief.
The said judgment was followed in Writ Petition No,103 of 2006 (BWP). In the instant case there are few apparent infirmities in the proceedings initiated and ultimate action against the petitioner. The petitioner though was issued show-cause notice yet it was by an authority not competent to proceed against him. His Appointing Authority was Chairman, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority and not Secretary, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority. Even no inquiry was held despite his demand to this effect. The facts of the precedent cases relied by the respondents and of the instant case are distinct. Another important aspect about existence of Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, was also not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The action in the present case was initiated and taken .Against the petitioner in the year 2006 when Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000(repealed later by the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2005) was in force having overriding effect, which applied to "persons in Government service" and "Corporation service". Clause (c) of section 2 defines the "person in corporation service" as"every person" in the service of corporation, corporate body, authority, statutory body or other organization or institution set up, established, owned, managed or controlled by the Punjab Government, or under any law for the time being in force or a body or organization in which the Punjab Government has a controlling share or interest and includes the Chairman and the Managing Director, and the holder of any other office therein". Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) is creation of, Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Ordinance, 1999 (Ordinance XXIV of 1999). By virtue of subsection (2) of section 2, it is an Authority, body corporate having perpetual succession, the constitution whereof is dependant upon the appointments made by the Government of Punjab. The petitioner admittedly is an employee of the said Authority, though his status is being described as one of contractual employee. Even if it be so assumed, the same will not make any difference so far as applicability of the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 is concerned. The phrase "every person" is of extensive scope and brings within its ambit all persons covered by clause (c) of section 2 of the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. Such a phrase "every person" was considered in Mobarik Ali Ahmad v. The State of Bombay PLD 1958 SC (Ind.) 115 as follows "The plain meaning of the phrase "every person" is that it comprehends all persons without limitation and irrespective of nationality, allegiance, rank, status, caste, colour or creed". According to Black's Law Dictionary Six Edition 555 "every" means, each one of all; all the separate individuals who constitute the whole, regarded one by one. The term is sometimes equivalent to "all"; and sometimes to "each". It is so extensive and comprehensive that the petitioner was covered by the same. If at all any action was warranted against him, the provisions of Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 were to be invoked. It appears that oblivious of the legal position, the respondent proceeded against the petitioner and terminated him on the ground of misconduct without even holding proper inquiry. In Muzaffar Hussain v. The Superintendent of Police, District Sialkot 2002 PLC (C.S.) 442, the Full Bench of this Court explored the implications of Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. Paragraph 54 of the judgment may be reproduced for ready reference:-- "54. A perusal, of Ordinance No,IV shows that it applied to persons in Government service (which includes a civil servant) and a person in Corporation service by virtue respectively of clauses (d) and (c) of section 2 of the Ordinance. To our reading this in fact is a beneficial provision for the employees of the Corporations because in case of the petitioners before us i,e, employees of WAPDA, FDA or the Social Security Institute their services are not governed by any statutory rules and in case any action was taken against them, they could not invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction because their services are governed by the rule of master and servant. In fact the remedy provided under Ordinance IV of 2000 is in the nature of an inroad in the foresaid principle."
' Had the respondent proceeded against the petitioner under the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, (Ordinance IV of 2000), he could have availed the remedy of appeal provided by the said law. It is settled law that if the authority concerned acts under misconception and under a wrong law, the proceedings are liable to be declared as the one not sustainable in law. Reference in this context may be made to Azizullah Memon v. Province of Sindh and another 2007 SCMR 229.
' In the case of Azizullah Memon (supra), the conclusion drawn by the Honourable Supreme Court was "in the presence of express and specific language employed in the Ordinance neither the departmental authorities nor the Tribunal bothered to notice that after the date of promulgation of the Ordinance all disciplinary proceedings should have been initiated under Ordinance rather than the old Rules enforced in 1973. This Court has already ruled in a number of judgments that this Ordinance has the overriding effect over all other laws on the subject except in case of proceedings, which were already pending before promulgation of the Ordinance. Since the impugned action was initiated and taken to its logical conclusion under a misconception of law and under a wrong law, it has vitiated the entire proceedings including the final order, which cannot be sustained under the law. The proceedings as well as final order is, therefore, liable to be set aside".
5. Though initially in the pleadings of the parties this aspect was not highlighted, yet at the time of admitting the case to regular hearing this aspect was noted and the learned counsel for the parties have also addressed arguments. Thus, this Court has only noticed and applied a law then in force, which was ignored or overlooked by respondent No,
1. Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance IV of 2000) undoubtedly was a special law, the provisions of which required to be followed before termination of the petitioner. I am respectfully obliged to follow the law declared by the apex Court and to declare the order, dated 17-6-2006 as illegal and of no legal effect. As a result the petitioner will be reinstated into service. This, however, as observed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in above cited case, will not debar the respondent from initiating proceedings in accordance with law and the question of award of back- benefits to him would certainly depend on the outcome of fresh enquiry, if any.
' As a result of the above, the petition is accepted to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.