' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Messrs Aman Enterprises, petitioner/ plaintiff, through the filing of the present revision petition has called in question judgment and decree, dated 20-5-1990 whereby, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed petitioner's appeal and maintained the judgment and decree, dated 3-7-1989 passed by the learned Civil Judge, through which he dismissed the suit for declaration with consequential injunction in respect of plot No,46-B, Small Industrial Estate Sialkot.
2. Briefly stated, the facts forming the background of filing of the present petition are that the petitioner instituted a suit, against the respondents, for declaration, to the effect that the order of termination of lease deed, dated 31-3-1985 in respect of plot No,46-B, was opposed to the principle of natural justice and void on her rights as lessee with the injunction restraining the respondent No,3 from raising any construction over the plot and transferring it to any person in any mode. It was, inter alia, contended by the petitioner in its suit that it was allotted plot No,46-B on 99 years lease by the respondent corporation; previously the petitioner had entered into an agreement to sell with Raheem Industries for the purchase of proprietary rights in respect of plots No,47-A and 48-A; that the respondent corporation granted permission to purchase the said plots from Rahim Industries, which refused to perform their part of the contract and thus gave rise to certain litigation, which at the point of filing the revision petition was pending in this Court. (Needless to add that now the said litigation has culminated with the passing of the judgment by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Messrs Aman Enterprises, Sialkot v. Messrs Rahim Industries Pakistan Ltd., Sialkot and another (PLD 1993 SC 292)). It was further added in the plaint that the respondent corporation cancelled the plot in dispute from the name of the petitioner without any notice to the petitioner. In the above backdrop, the petitioner prayed for passing of decree for declaration with permanent injunction, as noted above. The suit was contested by the respondents, who filed separate written statements. It was, inter alia, pleaded by the respondent corporation that as the petitioner could not raise the construction of the building, as stipulated in the agreement, despite service of subsequent notice, therefore, the respondent corporation has rightly cancelled the lease in favour of the petitioner and the plot was re-leased to respondent No, 3, which has even been delivered the possession. It was also submitted that respondent No, 3 had raised the construction over the said plot.
3. Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed as many as eight issues, recorded the oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties and ultimately dismissed petitioner's suit, vide judgment and decree, dated 3-7-1989. The petitioner felt aggrieved and assailed the said judgment before the appellate forum, but without any success, as its appeal was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, vide judgment and decree, dated 20-5- 1990 hence the present revision petition.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, while referring to different clauses of the lease deed, dated 21-9-1980 (Exh.P.2), has submitted that the petitioner had been seeking advices from the respondent corporation, as it was bound to give such advices to the petitioner, as envisaged under clause 6(b). He has further submitted that the lease-deed was terminated without serving any show-cause notice to the petitioner. He has added that the learned lower appellate Court did not discuss the documents produced by the petitioner and that the construction was not raised with the consent of the respondent corporation, thus, the petitioner could not be blamed for the violation of the relevant clause of the lease deed. Conversely, the learned counsel representing the respondent corporation, while supporting both the judgments, has submitted that the lease, in favour of the petitioner, was terminated after serving requisite notice and after the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed, inasmuch as the petitioner could not construct the building, even after the expiry of stipulated period in the lease deed. The learned counsel representing respondent No,3, has submitted that after the cancellation of the lease deed, in the name of the petitioner, the possession of the plot was resumed on 31-3-1985, the same was delivered to respondent No,3 on 2-4-1985 and respondent No,3 is in possession of the same and had raised construction. He has further submitted that under section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease has been determined and as the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed, therefore, the same was rightly terminated and that the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by both the Courts are not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
5. Some of the admitted facts on record are that the disputed plot was leased to the petitioner for a period of 99 years w,e,f, 21-8-1980 and the lease deed, dated 21-9-1980 was duly executed between the parties; a copy whereof has been placed on record as Exh.P.2, the said lease was terminated on 31-3-1985 and the same was communicated to the petitioner, vide letter, dated 1-4- 985 (Exh. D .16) after withdrawing the permission. I have also examined various clauses of the lease-deed and find that under Clause 5, both the parties agreed that if the lessee (petitioner) shall commit default in the performance of any of the covenants on the part of the lessor and such default shall continue for a period of thirty days after notice in writing thereof, the lessor would be authorized to re-enter upon the demised premises and the terms there shall absolutely determine.
It appears from the record that when the petitioner failed to fulfil the conditions specially regarding the construction of the building, for nearly 4-112 years, the respondent corporation, exercising its powers under the aforenoted clause, terminated the lease-deed. It has been proved on record that the lease-deed was cancelled after serving the notice upon the petitioner, which has thoroughly been discussed by both the Courts below, thus, it cannot be legitimately argued that the lease was cancelled without issuing any show-cause notice to the petitioner. The learned Additional District Judge has elaborately discussed the cancellation of a lease-deed in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment and came to the authoritative conclusion that despite providing adequate period, the petitioner could not carry out the construction of the proposed project. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment, which reads as follows:-- ' "The bare perusal of letters and notice referred above go a long way to show that the plaintiff-Firm was magnanimously shown indulgence by the defendant-Corporation to complete the construction and install the proposed project by giving grace period which the former had failed to carry out in span of four years. The letter dated 28-3-1983 by the plaintiff-Firm Exh.D.6 in reply to the final show-cause notice, the plaintiff-Firm committed to take chance to fore-go plot bearing No,46-B at actual costs. In addition thereto, letter Exh.P.13, Exh.P.15, P.17, P.18, P.21, P.24, P.25, P.26, P.27, P.28, P.29, P.30 and Exh.P.31 also reflect the mutual correspondence between the parties in regard to default committed by the plaintiff-Firm in violation of the terms of the lease and rejection of extension in time sought by her."
6. In view of the arguments of the learned counsel, I have examined both the impugned judgments and find that both the Courts have exhaustively embarked upon the issues involved in the case, properly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, in its true perspective and have reached to the proper conclusion, which, to my mind, is not open to exception. Both the Courts have, in detail, discussed each and every witness and documents on record and after believing/ disbelieving the same, came to conclusion that the lease-deed was rightly terminated by respondent corporation and the plot in question was re-leased to respondent No,3 in accordance with law. Although this Court is not called upon to re-appraise the evidence on record in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, yet I have perused the evidence produced by the parties in juxtaposition with the findings given by both the Courts below and am of ,the view that the inferences drawn by both the Courts below are in accordance with the record. The findings rendered by both the Courts are not only in accordance with the record of the case, but the same are in consonance with the law on the subject.
7. Another aspect of the case, which cannot be ignored is that the petitioner, time and again suggested to the respondent corporation That in case they are able to get plots Nos.47-A and 48- A, about whom the litigation between the petitioner and one Raheem Industries, is underway, in that case, they would relinquish the plot in question. When the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked, as to what is the result of the litigation between the petitioner and Rahim Industries, he apprised this Court that the same has been finalized with the passing of the judgment by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1993 SC 292 (supra). I have the advantage of perusing the said judgment and find that decree for specific performance, as prayed for by the petitioner, in respect of plots Nos.47-A and 48-A was passed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. With the passing of the said judgment, to my mind, the petitioner has been found entitled to get those plots by the apex Court of the country, whose decision, as per Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is binding on all the Courts. In view whereof, as the petitioner has been found entitled to get those plots therefore on this count too, they are bound to surrender/relinquish the plot in question. The petitioners are bound by their commitments and undertakings, given to the respondent corporation, about the relinquishment of the plot in question.
On this count too, I feel that the petitioners have got no case.
8. It is settled law that the findings on questions of fact or law recorded by the Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be interfered in revisional jurisdiction unless those findings suffer from jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularities. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Rafique v.
Aamer Shahzad and others 1999 YLR 610.
9. The concurrent findings of facts were recorded by both the Courts below which are based on proper appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, produced by the respective parties before the learned trial Court. No case of mis-reading and E non-reading of evidence has been made out, neither any legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel even during the arguments, nor illegal exercise of jurisdiction nor failure of exercise of jurisdiction by both the Courts below has been attributed.
10. It is settled law that concurrent findings of facts, based on evidence are not liable to be interfered in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Reliance is placed on Abdul Rahim and another v. Mst. Janatey Bibi and others 2000 SCM R 346, Anwar Zaman and 5 others v. Bahadur Sher and others 2000 SCM R 431, Aziz Ullah Khan and others v. Gul Muhammad Khan 2000 SCM R 1647, Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed and Abdul Majeed through legal heirs and another 2000 SCM R 314, Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani and 2 others 2000 SCM R 329, Haji Muhammad Din v. Malik Muhammad Abdullah PLD 1994 SC 291 and Muhammad Rashid v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2002 SC 293.
11. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present revision petition is devoid G of merits, thus, the same stands dismissed with no order as to costs.