' ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA, J.---The necessary facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner is an accused person in case F.I.R. No.388 registered at Police Station Sadar Kamalia, District Toba Tek Singh on 20-12-2003 for offences under sections 395/ 353/324/186/148/149, P.P.C.
And section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The said criminal case is presently being tried by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad. An application had been submitted by the petitioner under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 seeking transfer of the petitioner's case to a Court of ordinary jurisdiction but that application was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order, dated 22-6-2004. The said order has been assailed by the petitioner before this Court through the present writ petition.
2.In support of this petition it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the allegations contained in the F.I.R. Do not .Manifest the necessary 'design' or 'purpose' contemplated by the provisions of section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 so as to bring the case against the petitioner within the ambit of the said Act and, therefore, the petitioner's case cannot be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court. It has also been argued by him that the injuries allegedly sustained by the complainant party were not 'serious' as defined in section 2(w) of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 and even on this score the case in hand is liable to be tried by a Court of ordinary jurisdiction and not by an Anti-Terrorism Court. As against that the learned Assistant Advocate-General appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed this petition and has maintained that if the allegations levelled in the F.I.R. Are considered in the context of the provisions of section 6(2)(m) and (n) and section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 then the same quite clearly attract the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court and, therefore, the learned Judge, Anti- Terrorism Court, Faisalabad was quite justified in dismissing the petitioner's application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
3.After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record of this case with their assistance we have straightaway observed that according to the allegations levelled in the F.I.R. The petitioner and his co-accused had launched an assault upon members of the police force and some revenue officials so as to deter them from performing their official duties and had caused injuries to as many as seven police officers. If such allegations are accepted as correct at their face value then the actus reus attributed to the petitioner and his co-accused prima facie attracts the provisions of section 6(2)(m) and (n) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The alleged assault Mounted by 35/40 persons on members of the police force and revenue officials performing their official duties was apparently 'designed' to intimidate and overawe the Government so as to attract the mens rea contemplated by the provisions of section 6(1)(b) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
4. The record of investigation of this case shows that according to the prosecution's case as many as seven police officers had sustained eighteen injuries at the hands of the accused party and three of such injured police officers had received injuries on their heads as due to those injuries on their heads their bones had been exposed. Sustaining of such injuries on a person's head can apparently be termed as 'dangerous to life' so as to attract the definition of 'serious' provided by the provisions of section 2(w) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. It shall now be for the doctor examining such injured victims to explain the nature of the injuries during his examination-in-chief and cross-examination before the learned trial Court. At this stage we can prima facie observe that such injuries have appeared to us to be nothing but 'dangerous to life' and, thus, 'serious' within the meanings of section 2(w) read with section 6(2)(m) and (n) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. It, however, goes without saying that if during the trial the doctor deposes that the relevant injuries were not 'dangerous to life' then the petitioner may again seek transfer of his case to a Court of ordinary jurisdiction, if so advised.
5. For what has been discussed above we have found no occasion at this stage for interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad on 22-6- 2004 and this petition is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
6. Before parting with this judgment it may be clarified that the observation made in the present judgment shall be treated as tentative in nature and the same shall not prejudice the learned trial Court during the trial in any manner.