' This second appeal is directed against the order dated 28-2-1979 passed by Additional District Judge, Lahore whereby the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed and the ejectment order passed by the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 6-11-1978 Was affirmed.
2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that property in dispute was originally transferred to Messrs Naseer Iqbal and others under the Settlement Laws and was subsequently purchased by the respondent through a registered sale-deed on 2-5-1975. Subsequently respondent filed an ejectment petition against the present appellant on the basis of default, damage and personal use before the Rent Controller, Lahore on 4-7-1975. The appellant contested the petition by raising legal and factual objections including that of non-compliance of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Ultimately the learned Rent Controller accepted the application with costs and ordered the eviction of the appellant vide order dated 6-11-1978. An appeal against the aforesaid order of the learned Rent Controller was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore on 28-2-1979. The appellant has come in second appeal to this Court.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the original record carefully. The only point which calls determination in this appeal is whether notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehablitation) Act, 1958 was a prerequisite in the instant case. The learned Rent Controller as well as the learned appellate authority repelled this objection due to the following reasons :
(1) Undoubtedly property in question was evacuee and was purchased by the present respondent after the repeal' of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehablitation) Act, 1958. Therefore seeking ejectment on the ground of personal requirement, service of notice under section 30 of Act No, 28 of 1958 is not a condition precedent.
(2) That Act No, 28 of 1958 itself had been repealed and therefore, section 30 of the aforesaid repealed Act does not hold the field and has died its natural death.
' The above-noted reasons adopted by the learned Rent Controller and Appellate Authority are not based upon correct appreciation on the subject of law. It is well settled-principle of law that the repeal of a statute does not deprive a person of the right already accrued to him under the repealed law. For the correct appreciation of this controversial point which is covered by issue No, 1 in the instant case, it would be advantageous to make a reference to section 6 of the General Clauses Act which may be reproduced as under :- "6. Effect of repeal.-Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect ; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed ; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
4. Under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 even the respect of an enactment does not, inter cilia affect any right, privilege, obligation o liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment so repealed. Therefore, the protection provided by section 30 of Act No, 28 of 1958 ha been accrued to the appellant and the rights so accrued still subsist an continue the repeal of the aforefaid Act. In the instant case no requisite noti under section 30 has ever been served on the appellant (tenant) by the transferee within one month of such transfer by Registered Post (acknowledgment due). Proviso (b) of subsection (1) of section 30 fixes the date from which the statutory tenancy is to commence. According to subsection (2) of section 30 of the Act No, XXVIII of 1958 where no such requisite notice is served, the tenancy shall commence from the date of receipt of such notice by the tenant. The service of the notice is therefore, designed to fix the terminus a quo of the period of protection. In the present case as no notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 has been served on the appellant either by the original transferee or his successor-in-interest the present respondent, therefore the statutory period secured by that section is yet to commence from the date of receipt of a valid notice under section 3 of the Act , by the appellant and no question of the loss of such statutor protection arises. According to subsection (4) of the said section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation (Act, 1958 it is on the expiry of the period of statutory protection or on the contravention of any a of the provisions of subsection (3) which ever is earlier, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee and the tenant shall be regulated in accordance with the provision of West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 as amended upto date. I am firmly of this view that ejectment petition was ab initio incompetent as the same was instituted in clear violation of the mandatory provision of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The impugned orders clearly suffer from patent error of law and as such are liable to be interfered with in this appeal. In view of what has been stated above, I have no option but to accept the appeal and set aside the impugned orders. I therefore, quash the impugned orders and accept the present appeal with costs throughout.