' Muhammad Hussain petitioner is facing a trial in the Court of Mr. Ishtiaq Ali, Section 30, Magistrate, Lahore Cantonment. He had been appearing in Court for more than two years and was throughout represented by a counsel. The learned trial Court vide orders dated 18th January, 1979, exempted the personal appearance of the petitioner and permitted him to be represented by a counsel who has been throughout appearing on his behalf.
' The aforesaid order was impugned in revision by the complainant (respondent in this Court) which revision was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, vide orders dated 22nd April, 1979 and the order dated 18th January 1979 was set aside.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The main argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the original order, i. e. Order dated 18th January 1979 passed by the learned trial Court was not a speaking order as he had written only the word "allowed" and that he was bound under the law to record his reasons for allowing so. The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that exemption could be given only if the petitioner/accused was incapable of remaining before the Court.
3. The order impugned before me and subject-matter of discussion is the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and not the original order. The failure to record reasons by the learned trial Court in his] order dated 18th January, 1979, in my opinion, is covered by the pro-A visions of section 537, Cr. P. C. And in any case, the learned counsel for the complainant/respondent was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge at the time of the hearing of the revision which revision was allowed. I do not think if any objection can be taken at this stage on that ground.
' I would interpret section 540-A, Cr. P. C. Benevolently and say that the words "incapable of remaining before the Court", would cover the case of a person on bail whose presence for judgment can be ensured, and who has to go abroad for any personal work or even for a pleasure trip or to resume his employment abroad, during , the course of a trial, B particularly when he has faced the trial for more than two and a half years and the conclusion of the trial is nowhere near in sight. If it was; to be interpreted in any other manner, it would mean that a person once( brought to a Court on trumping up any accusation, could be detained or confined indefinitely in a city and his entire pursuits in life crippled even before he is found or proved guilty. This certainly is not the intention of law. The intention is to ensure a free and fair trial, and if the presence of an accused at the time of judgment can be ensured, the ends of justice, And requirements of law are well met.
' I am also of the view that if an accused on bail prays for a permission to be represented through a counsel the request should be generously granted, as there is no compelling legal necessity to force an accused to attend, in person instead of being represented through a counsel. By granting' such a permission, unnecessary overcrowding in Court, humiliation and the forced companionship of hardened criminals, leading to many sufferings, can be conveniently prevented.
' In this view of the matter, I allow this revision and set aside the impugned order. However, the petitioner shall attend the Court as and when directed by the learned trial Court to do so, and the learned trial Court is expected to direct personal appearance only when it is absolutely necessary, and not at the whimsical requests of the complainant which may be calculated to frustrate the order of exemption.