1. ' MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J.---Being aggrieved with the judgment in F.R.A. No,34 of 2001 passed on 24-4-2004 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner declining his right of personal use, this constitutional petition has been preferred.
2. ' Case of the petitioners is that they had rented out the Premises bearing No,ST-2 measuring 2000 sq. Yds in Sector 39-A, Korangi Township, Karachi to respondent No,1 for a period of 20 years commencing from 1-1-1973 at the rent of Rs,1750 per month. At the time of entering into rent agreement the lease of the plot was not issued by KDA. Petitioners applied for conversion of the status of plot from commercial to residential/commercial , which was accepted on 14-9-1993 and lease deed was registered in favour of the petitioners as commercial/residential land.
3. ' As the period of 20 years was to ex parte on 31-12-1992, therefore, on 8-11-1992 petitioners wrote a letter to respondent No,1 for handing over vacant possession of the premises. As possession was not handed over to the petitioners by respondent No,1, therefore, they filed a Rent Application bearing No,175 of 1994 on the ground of personal use, sub-letting and use of the land for the purpose other than it was leased out. The ejectment application was rejected. Against the rejection order, petitioners filed an appeal, which too was dismissed, hence this constitutional petition.
4. ' According to learned counsel for the petitioners after the expiry of tenancy period, respondent No,1 had to vacate the premises in question and they did so on 28-9-2007 by making a statement in his letter dated 28-9-2007 issued to dealer Mst. Hameeda Bano, the respondent No,2. Perusal of this letter reveals that respondent No,1 in detail has explained to the respondent No,2 that after the expiry of lease period, landlords have explicitly refused to renew lease of the sub-plot in favour of P.S.O. As such it has no other option, but to vacate the premises and terminate/revoke the Dealership Licence with him of P.S.O., under clause 12(b) VII of Dealership Licence Agreement.
5. Proceeding further, by this very letter of 28-9-2007, respondent No,2 has been served with notice of termination of licence and they have been advised to take necessary action for winding up business activities for handing over vacant possession. In reply to the legal notice dated 17-10-2007 issued by respondent No,2 to respondent No,1 it is again reminded that P.S.O. Being a licensor is fully entitled and empowered to withdraw its licence without seeking any consent from your clientess.
6. So far as the claim of investment stated by respondent No,2 on the subject plot for running the business, it is further clarified in para. 6 of letter dated 17-10-2007 that:-- ' "your client being the dealer has not made any investment on the said retail outlet, as it is a "Company Finance" site and the entire superstructure, equipment, and machinery is owned by P.S.O., to which your client has no concern, interest, title, entitlement, claim and or issue whatsoever."
7. ' In the end, respondent No,1 again advised and reminded respondent No,2 to surrender the site to P.S.O. Or on or before 27-10-2007 with all equipment and machineries in good working condition, which are owned by P.S.O. And also desist from taking any illegal action. In spite of both these letters and conceding intention of the respondent No,1 to hand over vacant possession and the statement made at Bar by learned counsel for respondent No,1 during the proceedings of this case that he has no objection if the petition is allowed, now it is only the respondent No,2, who is opposing the grant of this petition.
8. ' It is argued by learned counsel for respondent No, 2 that in terms of section 2(j) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 they being in continuous possession of the premises hold the status of tenant and cannot be ejected from the demised premises without due process of law. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for respondent No,2 does not seem to have any reason therein as the term `tenant' defined in the Ordinance of 1979 means any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession of occupation of any premises by him or by any other person on his behalf whereas admittedly there is no undertaking in between respondent No,2 and the petitioner nor by any agreement respondent No,2 is bound to pay rent of the premises in his occupation to the petitioner. Admittedly he is in occupation of the premises through respondent No,1 as his dealer and if the tenant concedes to hand over vacant possession of the premises, any person in occupation under the shadow of the main tenant has to go along with him. Any further assistance is required Pakistan Sate Oil Company Ltd. v. Pirjee Muhammad Naqi (2001 SCM R 1140) and Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Shafi (1986 SCM R 1638) be looked into.
9. ' According to learned counsel for respondent No,2, he has filed a Suit bearing No,1398 of 2007 for declaration and injunction before this Courts and interim order has been granted in his favour. We have gone through the prayer made by the respondent No,2 in Suit No,1398 of 2007. Therein he has challenged the termination of Dealership Licence Agreement executed in between him and respondent No,1 and had also prayed that respondent No,1 P.S.O. Be restrained from dispossessing the respondent No,2 from the premises of petrol pump or disturb his business without due process of law. Now controversial fact is that the status of respondent No,2 is only of licensee, therefore, even obtaining of any interim order by placing incorrect facts will not save him and he has to quit the premises along with respondent No,
1. So any proceedings initiated against respondent No,2 in the present constitutional petition cannot be termed as a step without process of law.
10. ' Referring to clause 4(a) of the Agreement executed in between the petitioner and the respondent No,1 in the year 1973, it is argued by learned counsel for respondent No,2, that the respondent No,1 was authorized to let out the demised premises or any part thereof to any dealer or agent for use for all or any of the purposes aforesaid without any consent of landlord, therefore, now it can be objected by the petitioners. No doubt clause 4(a) authorized respondent No,1 to put in possession any person in the premises as dealer to run the business, but within the required time. After the expiry of 20 years, respondent No,2 being a licensor and sublettee of the premises is not entitled to retain the premises, because with the termination of tenancy the sub-lease, if any, granted in favour of any person under clause 4(a) also comes to an end. As no person can be allowed to authorize o delegate the powers, which he does not possess after expiry of stipulated period.
11. ' Learned counsel for petitioners referring to section 111 clauses (a) and (c) of the Transfer of Property Act titled as `determination of lease' argued that it provides different modes of the determination of lease in respect of an immovable property.
12. ' Clause (1) of section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act specifies that the lease granted for a particular period ceased to end with the termination and it does not give any right to the lessee to import any right of renewal at his own imagination. Clause (c) further provides that a person cannot grant to another a larger interest in property than he himself possesses. So when by statement in writing as well as verbally respondent No,1 has conceded to hand over vacant possession of the premises F to the petitioner, respondent No,2 being in possession as dealer/sub- lettee cannot retain the premises any more.
13. ' Learned counsel for petitioners further argued that the ground of personal use taken up by the petitioner has nowhere been controverted by respondents and thus will impliedly deemed to have been conceded by the respondents.
14. ' For the foregoing reasons, the instant constitutional petition was allowed by a short order dated 12-5-2008. These are the reasons for the said short order.