TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, J.--- Briefly the facts are that the suit land owned by one Sher Muhammad son-of Waryam. He alienated the same through a Court decree dated 4.9.1989 in favour of the respondents/defendants for a sale consideration of Rs. 7,000/-. The petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for pre-emption on 21.5.1990 on the basis of superior right of pre-emption claiming to be Shaafi- Shariek and Shaafi Khaleet in the Khata in question.
2. The respondents/defendants filed an application on 1.7.1990 for the dismissal of the suit on the ground that as during the interregnum 'between 31.7.1986 to 28.3.1990; there was no law governing pre-emption, no suit for enforcing such a right was competent in respect of a sale which took place during this period i.e. 4.9.1989.
3. The said application was resisted by the petitioner/plaintiff. The learned Trial Court dismissed the said application vide order dated 21.5.1991 and fixed the case for further proceedings.
4. The respondents filed the revision petition against and said order which was accepted vide judgment and decree dated 16.10.1991 with the result that the suit for pre-emption of the petitioner stood dismissed.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned revisional Court erred in exercising a jurisdiction which did not vest in it. In fact, during the interregnum, the Islamic Law of Pre-emption held the field after the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance V of 1990 on 21.5.1990 in respect of sale made on 4.91989 was competent. He further contended that the superior right of pre-emption urged by the petitioner was a valid and available ground recognized by 'the Islamic Law of Pre-emption as also by the subsequently promulgated codified law. It was submitted that the suit was within one year of the sale and was also within four months of the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance V of 1990 and was therefore, within time on both these courts. It is also submitted that Section 36 of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance XVIII of 1990 as well as Section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 protected the suit of the petitioner although the suit was filed after the interregnum.
6; On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no benefit of Section 36 of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance. 1990 or of Section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is available to the petitioner, it is contended that admittedly the suit was not filed within the interregnum. Even if the Islamic Law of Preemption was applicable during the interregnum, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have filed the suit within 4 months of the sale, as this is the period of limitation provided by the Islamic Law of Pre-emption and as promulgated in the Punjab Pre- emption Ordinance V of 1990 as well as Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. It is further submitted that on no account could the petitioner be allowed the benefit of limitation one year from the date of sale learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the case of Syed Humayun Arshad vs. Ghulam Rasool (2001 CLC 1291) in support of this contention.
7. Arguments have been heard and record perused.
8. Admittedly, the sale took place on 4.9.1989 before the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance V of 1990. As per the Islamic Law of Pre-emption in accordance with which the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990 and Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 were promulgated the limitation for such suits is four months from the date of sale. It is not apt for the petitioner to submit th,r he could exercise the right of pre-emption under the 61Pnid Law in respect of sales made during the inter regnumand Yet not observe the limitation of four months. Proviclectherefr. The suit was filed on 21.5.1990 which is beyond- ne period 35. Saving. "(1) Notwithstanding a's/thing in any other of four months from the date of sale. It is fuoer that no benefit of Section 35(2) of the Punjab pre_emron Act, 1991 can be derived by the petitioner. Section 35(1 8( 2) is reproduced as under:--- law for the time being in for all the decrees, judgments or orders dismissing the suits of preemption instituted or pehdincoetween the 1st day of August, 1986 and the 28th March,' 1990 (both days inclusive), in which the right of pre-emption was claimed as is available Jnder this Act shall be of no legal effect, and such Suit, on an application made by the aggrieved person., within sixty days of coming into force of this Act shall subject to sub-section (2), be decided afresh according to the provisions thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in Sections 13 and 30, in respect of the suits mentioned in subsection (1), the period of limitation shall be one year and it shall be sufficient if the pre-emptor establishes that he had made. "Tailb-i-Isshad" in the presence of two truthful witnesses."
9. It is obvious that only those suits are covered under Section 35(2) where were instituted or pending between 1.8.1986 and 28.3.1990. Reference to Section 35(2) would show that the period of limitation of one year was only reliable to such suits. As the suit of the petitioner was neither instituted nor pending during the interregnum, the petitioner cannot avail of the provision of Section 35(1 & 2). It is idle for the petitioner to urge that as his suit was within four months from the date of promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance V of 1990, the same was not liable to be dismissed as the period of four months has to be reckoned from the date of sale.
10. Assuming that there was no codified period of limitation during interregnum period, the suit should have been filed 4vithin a reasonable time after the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990. The period of limitation of one year which was specifically provided in the Punjab Pre-emotion 'Act, 1913 was struck down alongwith rest of the provis,'ons of Punjab Pre-emption Act ibid. Thus, this period of one ;'ear cannot be reckoned as a reasonable period of limitation from the date of sale. The only other yardstick for determining the reasonable period would be the period of limitation as provided in the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance V at 1990 which is 4 months. Thus Ordinance was promulgated on 3.1990. The suit was filed on 21.5.1990 which is after Almost 52 days of the promulgation of the Ordinance. As already noted, the sale was effected on 4.8.1989. The suit was thus flied after a lapse of about 9% months from the sale. The analogy of Section 36 of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990 and Section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1990 is not apt as at the time of the suit, none of these provisions was in the field Reliance can be placed upon the case of Syed Hamayun Arshad vs. Ghulam Rasool (2001 CLC 1291) in support of this proposition.
11. In view of the above there is no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed. .