MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--- The petitioner/plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction, against the respondents, inter alia, pleading that the petitioner passed matriculation examination under Roll No,788, Registration No.62-rgs-75, Spring 79 and also qualified intermediate examination under Roll No.17752, Spring 1981; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha issued certificates accordingly; respondents Nos.1 to 3, subsequently, cancelled the said certificates and declared the same as forged, with mala fide intentions and without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Thus, it was prayed that petitioner's matriculation and intermediate certificates are correct, validly issued and order, dated 24-10-2000 passed by the respondents Nos.1 to 3 be set aside. Respondents Nos.1 to 3 filed the application under Order VII.
Rule 11, C.P.C., seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction in the matter and no cause of action did accrue to the petitioner, who resisted the said application.
The learned trial Court, after coming to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to disclose any cause of action and the suit is barred by law, proceeded to reject the plaint in petitioner's suit, vide judgment and decree, dated 11-1-2005. Petitioner's appeal against the said decree was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 16-11-2005 hence the present revision petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has got cause of action, as his matriculation and intermediate certificates were cancelled with mala fide intention and without affording any opportunity of hearing to him and thus the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the suit. He has relied upon Mr. Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi PLD 1965 SC 698. Conversely, the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3, while referring to section 29 of West Pakistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (Sargodha) Ordinance VII of 1968, submits with vehemence that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the acts done, or orders passed, or proceedings taken by a Board in pursuance of the provisions of this Ordinance and thus the impugned judgments were legally and validly passed. Answering to a Court's question, learned counsel states that the only remedy available to the petitioner is to file an appeal before the competent Board authorities. He has relied upon the cases reported as Samar Pervaiz v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another PLD 1971 SC 838, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha and another v. Muhammad Rafique PLD 1991 SC 231, Muhammad Baran and others v. Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation) Board of Revenue Punjab and others PLD 1991 SC 691, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and others v. Ch. Anjum Pervaiz and another 1989 CLC 64, Amjad Yasin v. University of Engineering and Technology through Vice Chancellor and 3 others 1999 SCM R 2640, Mst. Jameela Kausar v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and others 2003 SCM R 153 and Muhammad Rafiq v. The Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and others 1983 SCM R 1024. Learned Law Officer has adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.1 to 3.
3. I have heard the learned counsel and examined the available record. The petitioner, in his plaint, has specifically pleaded that the action of respondents Nos.1 to 3 is mala fide and that they, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, declared both the certificates of the petitioner as forged and cancelled, inasmuch as respondents Nos.4 and 5 were directed to initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioner. Respondents Nos.1 to 3 did not file the written statement and instead thereof instituted the application for rejection of plaint. Thus the aforenoted pleas of the petitioner have not been specifically denied by the said respondents till date. Qazi Mohyud Din, Advocate also states that the impugned action/order was passed against the petitioner at his back, as he despite notice did not appear before the authority. However, he could not refer to any of the documents from the record in order to show that in fact notices were issued to the petitioner and those were served or returned back with refusal report. Main plank of petitioner's learned counsel arguments is that the petitioner was granted matriculation and intermediate certificates as far back as in the year 1979 and 1981, respectively, and the same were cancelled by respondents Board on 24-10-2000 with mala fide intentions and without affording any opportunity to him.
4. To my mind, the crucial question, which arises in the present case and on the basis of which both the Courts have non-situated the petitioner, is as to whether the civil Court in view of bar of jurisdiction still has jurisdiction to try the suit. Section 29 of the Ordinance VII of 1968, heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3, is reproduced below:--- "Section 29. Bar of suit.--- No acts done, orders passed or proceedings taken by a Board in pursuance of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court by a suit or otherwise"
Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mr. Muhammad Jameel Asghar, ibid, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has held that civil Court's jurisdiction with respect to mala fide can never be taken away. Here it appears appropriate to refer to here another judgment reported as Hamid Hussain v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1974 SCM R 356, rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that civil Courts being the Courts of ultimate jurisdiction have jurisdiction to examine the acts of the forum, to see if they are in accordance with law or illegal or mala fide. For ready reference, relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:--- "It is a well-established principle that even where the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred and conferred upon special tribunals, Civil Courts being Courts of ultimate jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to examine the acts of such forums to see whether their acts are in accordance with law or are illegal or even mala fide."
This Court in the case of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and others (ibid), incidentally relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3, has held that despite bar of jurisdiction suit could be filed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, mala fides and violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner in his plaint, as noted above, has specifically pleaded mala fide on the part of respondents Nos.1 to 3 and also asserted that he was condemned unheard as no opportunity of hearing was granted to him before canceling two certificates, issued in his favour. An aggrieved person cannot be debarred from knocking doors of the Courts set up under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan for redressal of his grievances on the ground that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is barred under some statute. The respondents board cannot be allowed to exercise omnipotent powers not amenable to the judicial review under the garb of section 29 (ibid) such embargo on the rights of the citizens is also violative of their fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. Since the action impugned in the suit was mala fide intentions and against the principle of natural justice, therefore, despite bar of jurisdiction, the civil Court still has the jurisdiction to try petitioner's suit. In the said perspective, it is thus held that civil Courts being the Courts of ultimate jurisdiction have the jurisdiction, even if barred by law, to examine the acts of the forums, to see if such are in accordance with law, or illegal or even mala fide and against the principle of natural justice.
5. Now coming to the judgments, relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3. In the case of Samar Pervaiz (ibid), the point involved in this case, i,e, jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, was neither raised before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan nor decided, thus, it does not advance the case of the petitioner. However, it would be advantageous to reproduce a portion of the judgment, which in fact helps the petitioner, and reads as follows:- "It is true that domestic Tribunals like a University or a Secondary Board of Education are free from the fetters and the formalities of a judicial trial, and while these can consistently with the demands of justice, be ignored, it does not, by any means, follow that privileges of an individual, can snatch them away on conjectural grounds, even though such grounds may ostensibly appear to be very plausible but without any valid proof of their tangibility "
So far as the cases of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha and another PLD 1991 SC 231, Muhammad Baran and others (ibid), Amjad Yasin (supra) and the case of Mst.
Jameela Kausar (ibid) are concerned, the principles of law laid down in the said judgments is of no avail to the respondents board, as the question of jurisdiction was, not decided by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in any of the above cited judgments. Thus, reliance of the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3 on these cases is misdirected.
6. As regards the case of Muhammad Rafique, decided by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan (Bench comprising of two Honourable Judges), suffice it to say that said case was decided mainly in view of section 31 of Ordinance VII of 1968, and not with reference to section 29 of the said Ordinance. It has only been held that it (section 29) ousts jurisdiction of Civil Courts when the action is in pursuance of the provisions of the Ordinance. It may be noted that the case of the respondents Board only hinges on section 29 of the Ordinance and section 31 of the Ordinance has not been referred. More over, earlier case of Mr. Muhammad Jameel Asghar (Bench comprising of Honourable the then Chief Justice and three other Judges), Hamid Hussain (Bench comprising of Honourable Chief Justice and two Judges) were not considered in the case of Muhammad Rafique (ibid). Additionally, the cases of Mr. Muhammad Jameel Asghar and Hamid Hussain were decided by the larger Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. Similarly, this Court while deciding the case of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and others 1989 CLC 64 did not consider the case of Muhammad Jameel Asghar, Hamid Hussain and Muhammad Rafique.
7. I have also examined the plaint and find that it, under the circumstances, did disclose cause of action, inasmuch as it was specifically pleaded that action taken and the impugned order was passed at the back of the petitioner with mala fide intentions. The petitioner challenged the action/order of the respondents Board on the ground of mala fide, illegally and against the principle of natural justice. The learned trial Court has erroneously held that the plaint does not disclose cause of action.
8. In the above perspective, I have examined both the judgments and find that both the Courts have erred in law in non-suiting the petitioner by rejecting the plaint, both the judgments were passed in complete oblivion of the facts of the case and law declared on the subject and, thus, this is a fit case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which I hereby do.
9. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, both the judgments and decrees are set aside with no order as to costs. Resultantly, petitioner's suit shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sargodha, who shall, himself, decide the suit, after recording evidence of the parties and of course in accordance with law within a period of four months from today, even if he has to undertake day to day proceedings.