1. ' This is a second appeal by Muhammad Aziz Khan, one of the plaintiffs-appellants, against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for the land in suit claimed on the strength of adverse possession by way of prescription was dismissed and a decree for possession of the same was passed in favour of Abdul Hamid and some other respondents who had instituted two suits for possession of the lands in suit comprising survey No, 45, measuring 11 kanals and 5 marlas and Survey No, 46, measuring 13 kanals and 7 marlas situate in village Andra Seri, Hattian are the heirs of Muhammad Hussain deceased in whose (heirs) names now stands the lands in suit by way of inheritance. It was claimed by Muhammad Aziz Khan that the land in suit was orally purchased by his father from Muhammad Hussain Khan, during the Dogra regime and since then the possession of the same has come down to him as a purchaser through his father. The co-plaintiffs who are pro forma-respondents here, that is, other heirs of Muhammad Aziz Khan's father, do not assert their possession over the land in suit. They stand by Muhammad Aziz for his exclusive possession over the land in suit. The decree-holders, as defendants in the suit of Muhammad Aziz Khan and as plaintiffs in their suits for possession of the lands, say that Muhammad Aziz has been in possession of the lands in suit as a tenant-at-will.
2. ' The trial Court consolidated all the three suits and framed a number of issues out of which three issues; firstly, in respect of adverse possession of Muhammad Aziz, plaintiff-appellant by way of prescription, secondly, in respect of alleged improvements over the land in suit effected by the plaintiff-appellant; and thirdly, whether the suits for possession by the decree-holders were tenable, are the only issues stressed by the counsel for the appellant and some other issues whether Muhammad Aziz has been in possession of the land in suit as a tenant (at-will) on account of relationship etc., as a matter of fact, stand to be struck in rebuttal to issue of adverse possession. Therefore, it is first to be seen whether adverse possession of Muhammad Aziz, plaintiff- appellant over the lands in suit could be established by him or not. If it is answered in affirmative, the logical consequence would be that the suits of the defendants-decree-holders would be hit by the rule of adverse possession by way of prescription constituting a statutory period thereof and they would not thus be entitled to any decree.
3. ' The Courts below found that Muhammad Aziz could not establish his adverse possession by way of prescription.
4. ' The contention of the learned counsel for appellant is that the Courts below were unable to appreciate the evidence led by the parties, that is, there was misappreciation of evidence on the part of the Courts below.
5. ' I have gone through the judgments written by the learned Presiding Officers of the Courts below keeping in view the evidence of the parties. The trial Court has very well appreciated the evidence through the District Judge while appreciating the documentary evidence, has said something quite contrary to the record but that would not adversely affect the finding arrived at by the trial Court because otherwise he was able to agree with the finding of the trial Court. He was wrong to say that the property in suit has ever been the joint property of the appellant and his opponents. The property in suit has never been in possession of the plaintiff as one of the joint properties of the parties. It was exclusively owned by Muhammad Hussain deceased. Similarly, certified copies pertaining to revenue record were also wrongly read by him. He ought to have read them keeping in mind the statements of the revenue officials, namely, Munshi Ghulam Hussain Patwari and Khalid Mir.
6. ' A perusal of the revenue record brought on record of the trial Court shows that it was claimed by the plaintiff himself before the revenue officials while seeking correction of entries in revenue record in respect of his possession over the land in suit that he has been in possession of the same since 1947 but his possession in the revenue record is shown from 1967 vide a certified copy of the report 'CA' of Girdawar; Abdul Aziz.
7. ' The stand of the appellant was that the land was initially purchased by his father through an oral sale for Muhammad Hussain. His father died in 1995 Bk. Corresponding to the year 1938 AD., that is, 9 years before his claim of possession in the year 1947 which means that the oral purchase of land in suit by Muhammad Khan, father of the plaintiff-appellant does not ring true. There is nothing on record to show that there has ever been any dispute between the parties over the possession of the land in suit. Whatever period of possession of the plaintiff-appellant over the land in suit may be, it has been without being adverse from its start till the institution of the suit on 5-2-1976.
8. Therefore, on my own appreciation of the evidence, I find that the adverse possession could not be established by the plaintiff, as was alleged by him. Copies of the revenue record issued by the revenue officials were prepared with a trick to show that possession of the plaintiff over the land in suit along with other heirs of his father has been continuing since Dogra Regime but that is not the case as was disclosed and made clear by the revenue officials, appearing before the Courts as witnesses to depose to in respect of original entries of possession of the land in suit. . The entries start from 1967 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and his brothers etc. And not from 2002 Bk. As was tricked by the revenue officials who issued certified copies to the appellant. Therefore, issue No, 3 in respect of adverse possession which was decided against the plaintiff-appellant by the Courts below, stands affirmed.
9. ' Further, there is no evidence worth the name on record to prove the improvements allegedly effected over the land in suit. No house presently stands on the land in suit nor there is any tangible evidence to believe the plaintiff-appellant that there was ever effected any improvement worth consideration.
10. The learned Counsel for the appellant then urged that as two suits were brought by the decree- holders, the second suit was hit by Order II rule 2, C. P. C. According to him, land consisting, of two survey numbers was to be claimed by a single suit. This rule refers to cases where say a suit has been instituted and the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of a portion of the claim. The claim for a certain property should be as a whole but when the properties are different, the claim in respect of them may be mad separately if the cause of action is not the same. But here in these cases, the properties are different and the disputes are also not arising out of the same cause of action and so separate suits were filed to obtain their possession accordingly and at trial, they were even consolidated by the trial Court. Therefore, it would be construed that the claim of the decree-I holders was put together as if an amendment in the first suit was effected and1B both the suits were consolidated in one in answer to the suit of the plaintiff-, appellant; and thus stood amalgamated in each other. Again, if a person] sues his opponents only in respect of a cause of action; and pending this suit, that \person brings another suit against those very opponents for the remaining portion of the same cause of action, neither suit would be barred by either 86, long no decree is passed in either suit and the consolidation of the suits takes place well in time amounting to amendment in a way short of the applicability of the principle of preventing further litigation, for their trial and disposal together according to law. Here it was not shown at all that the two suits were filed on the same cause of action and so also it cannot be held that the suits for two different properties in dispute were hit by Order II, rule 2, C. P. C.
11. ' Therefore, for the reasons above, there being no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with costs.