' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.--- This appeal by leave of the Court, has been directed against the judgment dated 6-12-2006 passed by Federal Service Tribunal by virtue of which Service Appeal bearing No,1081(R)(C.S.) of 2004 filed by respondent No,1 challenging the order passed by the departmental authority whereby he was awarded punishment of dismissal from service, was partly allowed and the penalty of dismissal from service was converted into reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale for a period of two years with direction of reinstatement in service.
2. The facts of the case in small compass, leading to the filing of this appeal are that Shafiq Muhammad respondent herein an Additional Commissioner in Income Tax Department, was sent on a foreign training in U.S.A. For a period of about three years from 24-8-1992 to 31-12-1995 and on completion of the training, he applied for ex-Pakistan leave, which was granted to him for 731 days from 1-1-1996 to 31-12-1997 vide notification dated 2-5-1996. The respondent on expiry of the leave, applied for further leave which was declined vide order dated 5-1-1998 and he was directed to resume the duty. In consequence to the failure of the respondent to report for the duty, he was proceeded against for departmental action under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and was served with a show-cause notice through Embassy of Pakistan, Washington. The respondent submitted his reply to the show-cause notice and competent authority having considered the circumstances explained by him in the reply which genuinely prevented him to return to Pakistan, allowed him ex-Pakistan leave for another period of 365 days from the date of expiry of earlier leave vide notification dated 9-7-1998. Consequently, the show- cause notice was withdrawn and departmental action against him was dropped. However, before expiry of the extended period of ex-Pakistan leave, the respondent on 15-12-1998 again sent an application for further extension of leave whereupon the department instead of acceding the request of respondent issued a fresh show notice to him on 23-2-1999. The respondent in reply to the show cause notice having given reasons for not resuming the duty, again requested for grant of ex-Pakistan leave. The competent authority after dispensing with the requirement of regular inquiry and completing formalities of law, concluded the departmental proceedings against the respondent with passing of the order of his dismissal from service vide notification dated 4-8-1999 which was conveyed to him on 18-8-1999 through usual channel of the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, whereupon he filed a departmental appeal on 10-9-1999 which was rejected and on receipt of order rejection of the appeal, he preferred an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad which was dismissed as time barred. This order was challenged by the respondent before this Court and ultimately this Court remanded the case to the Tribunal for decision of the appeal afresh on merits including the question of limitation. In post remand proceedings, the Tribunal partly allowed. The appeal of respondent vide impugned judgment whereby his dismissal from service was converted into reduction of pay by two stage in the time scale for a period of two years and he was reinstated in service with direction that period during which he remained out of service, would be treated as leave of the kind due, if any, at his credit and the remaining period as extraordinary leave without pay. The C.B.R. Feeling dissatisfied with the order of Tribunal filed the present appeal before this Court in which leave was granted vide order dated 7-2-2007 as under:- - "Leave to appeal was granted to examine as to whether the Tribunal had condoned the delay of 4 years for justifiable reason and also to examine whether the Tribunal was justified to take the view that the absence of the respondent from the office of petitioner for 5 years can be condoned when the department on having taken into consideration the facts found that he was absent from service for about 12 years out of which 7 years' absence was properly explained but there was no ground to justify the absence for another 5 years which finding of the department dated 10-9-1999 was upheld by the Appellate Authority when his departmental appeal was dismissed on 15-3- 2000."
3. Initially the appeal filed by the respondent before the Service Tribunal was dismissed in limine on the question of limitation and this Court vide judgment dated 27-7-2006 passed in Civil Petition No,1422 of 2005 remanded the case to the Tribunal for decision of the appeal afresh after obtaining reply from the department on appeal as well as on miscellaneous application containing explanation for condonation of delay. In post remand proceedings, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of respondent vide impugned judgment.
4. The main ground of assailing the judgment of Tribunal before us in this appeal, relates to the question of condonation of delay in appeal before the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended firstly that the Tribunal after coming to the conclusion that the explanation offered by the respondent for condonation of delay was not sufficient, could have no justification to exercise discretion in favour of condonation of such a long delay and secondly that the long absence of respondent from duty without leave, was not deniable therefore, notwithstanding the principle of law that in the cases involving contfoversial question of fact regular inquiry as envisaged under the rules is necessary, the dispensation of such inquiry in the present case was not against the law and competent authority in exercise of powers under section 5(1)(iii) of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, rightly while dispensing with the regular inquiry, passed the final order. Lastly, learned counsel argued that under section 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 a civil servant on expiry of 90 days from the date of filing the departmental appeal, is not supposed to further wait for decision of appeal and must file appeal within next 30 days, failing which the appeal would be out of time and in support thereof, has placed reliance on Nawab Khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 222 and Secretary, Government of the Punjab v. Riaz ul Haq 1997 SCM R 1552.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, with reference to the judgments of this Court in Basharat Ali v. Director Excise and Taxation 1997 SCM R 1543, Managing Director, S.S.G.C. Ltd. v. Ghulam Abbas PLD 2003 SC 724 and Chief Engineer (North) v. Saifullah Khan Khalid 1995 SCM R 776 without denying the position of law that if a departmental appeal/representation is not decided within a period of 90 days, the civil servant without waiting for the result of appeal/representation, can file an appeal before the Tribunal within next 30 days, submitted that an appeal filed before the Tribunal beyond 120 days from the date of order passed by the competent authority cannot be dismissed as barred by time for the reasons that the original order is merged in the order of the appellate authority, passed in appeal and without challenging the appellate order, an appeal against an original order may not competently succeed, therefore, the limitation of 30 days of filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal in a case in which the remedy of departmental representation/appeal is provided under the rules, would start from the date of communication of the order passed by the appellate authority. Learned counsel submitted that a civil servant without being aware of the reason of rejection of his appeal/representation may not be able to set up his case in appeal before the Tribunal and would not get a fair treatment in law.
6. Learned counsel argued that the Tribunal taking into consideration the extraordinary and abnormal situation leading to the absence of respondent from duty in the light of the facts of case in totality has rightly exercised discretion in favour of condonation of delay which was not unreasonable, unjust or unfair to be questioned before this Court. Learned counsel added that absence of respondent from duty without leave was not wilful rather it was due to the circumstances beyond his control and this fact was also acknowledged by the department by treating his case as that of hardship case, granted him ex-Pakistan leave for another period of one year. Learned counsel while summoning up his arguments, submitted that in view of the factual position in the background and plausible explanation of respondent for absence from duty, the condonation of delay by the Tribunal in its discretionary jurisdiction, was not contrary to law to be questioned.
7. The peculiar circumstances of the case in the background would give rise to the essential question for determination as to whether absence of respondent was wilful and he intentionally avoided to report for duty or he was prevented by the unavoidable circumstances to resume the duty. In the light of explanation of respondent that he under the compelled circumstances, prolonged his stay abroad, on the face of it, would suggest that his absence was not wilful, therefore, a contrary presumption would not be drawn without recording evidence and holding regular inquiry as the controversial question of fact whether absence was wilful or not, could not be decided on the basis of mere show-cause notice and its reply, therefore, the presumption of wilful absence raised by the competent authority for imposing major penalty of dismissal from service was not legal without providing a fair and proper opportunity of hearing to the respondent who was condemned unheard. Learned counsel lastly argued that the Tribunal in exercise of power 'wider section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, in the light of the facts of case, may modify the quantum of punishment and unless this discretionary jurisdiction is found to have been exercised beyond the scope of law, it may not call for interference of this Court.
8. Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, provides that Tribunal may confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against in an appropriate manner. The careful examination of this provision would show that only limitation on the power of the Service Tribunal is to satisfy the test of reasonableness. Section 5 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, provides as under:-- "5. Power to Tribunals.--- (1) A Tribunal may, on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
(2) A Tribunal shall, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), including the powers of---
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents;
(c) issuing Commission for the examination of witnesses and documents."
9. In the present case, it appears that Tribunal having considered the question of law and facts raised in the appeal formed an opinion that the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was not in consonance with the nature and gravity of charge of absence from duty without leave and while exercising power under section 5 ibid, converted major penalty of dismissal from service into stoppage of two increments for a period of two years and careful perusal of the record would not suggest that discretion was exercised beyond the scope of law. The learned counsel for the appellant also has not been able to satisfy us that the Tribunal has committed any wrong in exercising the jurisdiction on the basis of test of reasonableness or settled principle of law on the subject, which may be treated a jurisdictional error calling for the interference of this Court. The scope of interference of the Supreme Court in a case under Article 212(3) of the Constitution is confined to the extent of satisfaction of the court regarding involvement of substantial question of law of public importance, therefore, unless the order passed by the Tribunal unless is found to have been passed without jurisdiction, or coram non judice, mala fide or illegal, in respect of substantial question of law, this Court may not interfere in the matter in exercise of its powers under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. In the present case, it appears that Tribunal firstly exercised discretion in favour of condonation of delay for the consideration that absence without leave may not be deliberate and intentional rather it was due to the abnormal situation which prevented the respondent to return Pakistan and secondly, keeping in view the nature of charge and the circumstances under which respondent could not resume duty, it exercised discretion in favour of lesser penalty in the interest of substantial justice. The law authorizes the Tribunal to make a decision on the question of penalty awarded to a civil servant by the departmental authority and substitute the quantum of punishment in an appropriate manner in a suitable case in its discretion within the statutory command and this is settled law that a judicial power exercised in discretionary jurisdiction, is not supposed to be interfered by a higher judicial forum for collateral consequence in its discretion.
10. It is clear that Tribunal has to follow the limitations and restrictions of law in exercise of discretion in a manner, which may not offend the spirit of law. The concept of discretion in judicial power is to advance the cause of justice and exercise of this power in a judicious manner in aid of justice and not to perpetuate injustice whereas the executive authorities have different considerations for exercise of such power. The judicial norms do not permit to encourage continuation of exercise of jurisdiction by a State functionary to deprive a. Person from his legitimate rights. It would be highly unlikely that Supreme Court imbue the discretionary action of a public functionary if the same was done in violation of the recognized principles of exercise of discretionary power. The distinction in the recognition of an action of a person and governmental authorization of public officer can be demonstrated by the test of determination whether deprivation of a right was the result of such an action of individual or the breach of law by a public authority. The deprivation of some right or privilege is caused in consequence to an official act and the party charged with the deprivation is a person who acted as public functionary, therefore, the judicial powers necessarily E have to be exercised in aid of protecting the rights and must not be exercised in aid of injustice. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in condoning the delay as well as disposal of appeal with reduction of punishment without remand of case to the departmental authority for holding inquiry was quite in accordance with the concept of substantial justice in such a case of hardship.
11. The respondent proceeded abroad with the permission of department and was also subsequently allowed ex-Pakistan leave on humanitarian ground, therefore, the element of wilful absence is not present in view of repeated explanation of respondent regarding his difficulty, sought extension in ex-Pakistan leave. The department at the first instance treating it a hardship case allowed ex-Pakistan leave and subsequently without change of circumstances, taking a harsh view, initiated departmental proceedings against him and ultimately awarded him extreme penalty of dismissal from service and in these circumstances, the remand of the case to the department would be futile. The regular inquiry in the departmental proceedings is a rule and dispensation is an exception depending on the facts of a case, therefore, the question whether regular inquiry in a case is necessary or not, it is to be kept in mind as to whether an adverse inference drawn without making probe into the facts in the light of explanation of a civil servant, would not amount to condemn a person unheard. The courts must not ignore cardinal principle that the hearing simpliciter does not mean providing of opportunity of written explanation to the show-cause notice rather in the facts of each case, it must be seen that the enquiry is just, proper and fair, therefore, no general rule can be laid down for dispensation of regular inquiry. The departmental proceeding on the charge of misconduct is a sort of semi-criminal proceeding in which initial burden is on the department to prove the charge and if the allegations are denied by the accused official the charge cannot be proved without producing evidence. In the present case, the stand of respondent, right from beginning, was that his absence was not wilful rather due to unavoidable circumstances, he was prevented from resuming duty. In view thereof, the procedure of dispensation of inquiry adopted by the department, was contrary to the law laid down by this Court and consequently, the finding of the Tribunal in the peculiar facts arA4 circumstances of the present case, that regular inquiry was essential to ascertain as to whether the question of wilful absence and dispensation of such an inquiry was not in accordance with the spirit of law in the given facts, was unexceptional. In view thereof, the major penalty of dismissal from service without regular inquiry was not justified. The F contention that the Tribunal should have remanded the case instead of disposal of appeal on merits was not raised before the Tribunal and now it is too late to undertake such a futile exercise of remanding the case at this stage.
12. In the light of general principle, appeal before the Tribunal appeared to be time barred but in view of circumstances pleaded therein, no exception could be taken to the condonation of delay by the Tribunal as the objection could conveniently be overruled in view of the fact that the order of dismissal of appeal was conveyed to the respondent vide letter, dated 15-3-2000 and he immediately thereafter filed the appeal, therefore, in view of his bona fide, the objection of limitation, may have no significance. This Court in Haji Kadir Bux v. Province of Sindh 1982 SCMR 583 in similar circumstances, held that a civil servant could wait till communication of decision of departmental appeal and would not be non-suited on technical grounds.
13. In the light of above discussion, we are of the considered view that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in condoning the delay and disposal of appeal on merits with conversion of penalty of dismissal from service into stoppage of increment, was not illegal or improper exercise of jurisdiction. The departmental proceedings were initiated against the respondent in the year 1998 which continued for a period of about 10 years and the impugned judgment having been already given effect, H respondent was performing his duty and in view thereof, it is not proper for this Court to interfere in the judgment of the Tribunal at this stage on technical grounds. Learned counsel has not been able to convince us that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal in respect of condonation of delay and conversion of penalty was arbitrary, illegal or un-reasonable to attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution.
14. The upshot of above discussion is that the instant appeal has no merit and same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs by majority of two to one.
(Sd.) Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, J (Sd.) Ijaz-ul-Hassan Khan, J I add my separate judgment.
(Sd.) Mian Hamid Farooq, J ' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment authored by my learned brother Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi J, for whom I have great regard and whose legal acumen I have always admired, however, I find myself unable to agree with his views, findings and conclusions, thus I propose to write dissenting judgment.
2. The appeal in hand, by leave of the Court, proceeds against the judgment dated 6-12-2006, whereby, Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter called as Tribunal) partially accepted respondent's appeal in the following terms:- "(10) In view of the above discussion both in favour and against the appellant, we convert the punishment of major dismissal to that of major penalty of reduction of his pay by two stages in the time scale for a period of two years in which he was working at the time when dismissal from service was imposed. He shall accordingly be reinstated in service. The period during which the appellant remained out of service will be treated as leave of the kind due to him if any at his credit and the remaining as extraordinary leave without pay.
(11) The appeal is partly accepted as above with no orders as to costs. Parties be informed."
3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent No,1 (respondent) was working as Additional Commissioner in Income Tax Department, when, he was deputed for foreign training in the U.S.A. By the Government of Pakistan with effect from 24-8-1992 to be completed on 31-12-1995; on the said date, the respondent applied for ex-Pakistan leave and he was granted 731 days ex-Pakistan leave from 1-1-1996 to 31-12-1997 vide information dated 2-5-1996; subsequently, further ex-Pakistan leave for 365 days with effect from 1-1-1998 was granted to the respondent vide notification dated 9-7-1998; the respondent filed yet another application seeking further extension of ex-Pakistan leave, but the department refused to grant the same and issued him a show-cause notice dated 23-2-1999, which was replied by the respondent explaining the reasons for not assuming duty. The reply to the show cause notice was found unsatisfactory by the department and thus major penalty of dismissal from service was imposed upon the respondent, vide notification dated 4-8- 1999. His departmental appeal, filed on 10-9-1999, was rejected on 15-3-2000. Respondent, on 27- 12-2004, filed grossly time barred appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed it as time barred, however this Court, on 27-7-2006, remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh decision of the appeal on merits including the question of limitation. In post remand proceedings, the Tribunal condoned the delay of almost five years and accepted the appeal, vide impugned judgment dated 6-12-2006 in the terms noted above. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the department filed the petition for leave to appeal (C.P.No,72 of 2007) and this Court, on 7-2-2007, granted leave to appeal in the following manner:--- "Leave to appeal is granted to examine as to whether the Tribunal had condoned the delay of 4 years for justified reason and also to examine whether the Tribunal was justified to take the view that the absence of the respondent from the office of petitioner for 5 years can be condoned when the department on having taken into consideration the facts found that he was absent from service for about 12 years out of which 7 years absence was properly explained but there was no ground to justify the absence for another 5 years which finding of the department dated 10-9-1999 was upheld by the Appellate Authority when his departmental appeal was dismissed on 15-3- 2000."
4. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length and I have examined the available record.
Admittedly, respondent's appeal before the Tribunal was barred by almost 5 years. Straightforward undisputed facts, with regard to limitation, are that respondent's appeal, filed on 10-9-1999, was rejected by the department on 15-3-2000 and he filed the appeal before the Tribunal on 27-12- 2004, thus, his appeal, more precisely, was barred by 4 years 9 months and 11 days. Respondent did file the application for condonation of the delay before the Tribunal. The only ground agitated in the said application and canvassed by his learned counsel before the Tribunal as well as before this Court was that "no intimation about rejection of departmental appeal was communicated to the appellant in U,S.A, where he was staying in connection with the treatment of his ailing daughter" and after coming to Pakistan the respondent came to know about rejection of his appeal and thereupon he filed the appeal before the Tribunal and the time for filing the appeal would run from the date of knowledge. The said plea of the respondent was duly dealt with by the Tribunal in para.8 of the impugned judgment and the learned Tribunal after finding that the plea of the appellant does not appeal to reasons as all the communications addressed to the appellant through the Embassy of Pakistan were received by him and the claim that the decision about rejection of his appeal, which was routed through the same agency i.e, Embassy of Pakistan Washington D.C, was not received seemed to be doubtful, repelled the contention of the respondent. The learned Tribunal after rendering elaborate findings on the question of limitation and repelling the contention of the appellant, on which the delay was sought, however, strangely, condoned the inordinate delay on the unheard ground that "the penalty is extreme". It is appropriate to reproduce Para-8 of the impugned judgment, which reads as under:--- "(8) The point that needs to be examined at the preliminary stage is whether the appeal is barred by time and therefore hit by limitation. From the record of the case it is clear that the appellant was imposed upon the major penalty of dismissal from service vide impugned notification dated 4-8- 1999 which was received as stated by the appellant on 18-8-1999 through the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington. The appellant preferred a departmental appeal on 10-9-1999 which was rejected by the department on 15-3-2000. The appellant claims that he did not receive any intimation regarding the rejection of his departmental appeal and that it was only when he came to Pakistan in the year 2004, on his enquiry with the department regarding the fate of his departmental appeal that he was informed that the departmental appeal has been rejected. The contention of the appellant that he did not receive intimation regarding the rejection of his departmental appeal does not appeal to reason as all communications addressed to the appellant through the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington were admittedly received by the appellant and the that only the rejection of his departmental appeal which was also routed through the same agency i.e, the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C, was not received seems to be at the very least doubtful. It appears to be a convenient ploy on the part of the appellant to justify the lapse on his part in seeking timely redressal before a competent forum including this Tribunal. He remained silent for almost five years and only on return to Pakistan he chose to agitate his case before this Tribunal on the plea that he had not received intimation about the rejection of his departmental appeal. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the appellant that he did not receive the intimation regarding the rejection of his departmental appeal especially as he does not deny having received all other relevant communications through the same source i.e, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C. However, as the penalty is extreme i.e, dismissal from service we with some reluctance condone the delay."
5. It is evident from the above, that the Tribunal after refuting the only contention raised by the respondent, qua condonation of delay, surprisingly, condoned the delay only for the reason that "the penalty is extreme." I earnestly feel that this inordinate delay of almost 5 years could not be condoned on the conjectural ground that "the penalty is extreme". It is settled law that a litigant seeking condonation of delay has to explain delay of each and everyday for not filing lis within the prescribed period. In this case, the departmental appeal was rejected on 15-3-2000, (which order according to the finding of the Tribunal itself was received by him through the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C) and he filed the appeal after almost 5 years, therefore, there was no reasonable, legal and valid justification for condonation of the said inordinate delay. The Tribunal after rendering aforesaid findings and rejecting the plea of the respondent and coming to the conclusion that the appeal was barred by almost 5 years erroneously condoned the delay on the ground that the penalty is harsh incomplete oblivion of the fact that valuable rights had accrued in favour of the appellant, which could not be denied on flimsy ground. Here it appears appropriate to refer the case of Mst. Hajran v. Sardar Muhammad PLD 1970 SC 287, wherein it was held by this Court that the- involvement of valuable rights of the petitioner does not furnish proper ground for condonation of delay in a civil matter. In another case reported as Water and Power Development Authority v. Aurangzeb 1988 SCMR 1354, this Court while deciding the question of limitation upheld the finding of the Tribunal viz "it is well settled that after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, the door of justice is closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail unless the delay is properly explained and accounted for". A portion of para-5 of the judgment is reproduced bellows:--- "In such a context, however, the sole submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, injustice done to the petitioner shall be perpetuated and thereby he shall suffer an irreparable loss caused by the impugned order. Learned Tribunal held that the law on the point, however is well settled that after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, the door of justice is closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail unless the delay is properly explained and accounted for. For these reasons the application for condonation of delay was rejected and, consequently, the appeal was dismissed vide the impugned order.
' We have examined the submissions made by the learned counsel and find no substance in them.
The impugned order is unexceptionable. Leave refused and the petition is, consequently, dismissed.
(Underlining is mine).
6. Now dealing with the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent regarding exercise of discretion by the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, as noted above, after rejecting the plea of the respondent for condonation of delay, condoned the delay of 5 years simply on the ground that the penalty is harsh, thus to my mind, the learned Tribunal exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously and in a fanciful manner. It is true that the superior Courts normally do not interfere in the discretionary orders passed by the subordinate Courts, but it is equally true that when the discretion was exercised by them unreasonably, unjustly, arbitrarily and in a fanciful manner, of course, it is the duty of superior Courts to interfere in such-like orders. In this case, I feel that the Tribunal exercised discretion against all the recognized principles laid down by the superior Courts for exercise of discretion, therefore, this Court has ample powers to interfere in the discretion exercised by the Tribunal. Reference can be made to the cases of Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 and Nawaz Khan and another v.
Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1994 SC 222.
7. In the above perspective, I have examined the impugned judgment and find that the same is not sustainable in law and the respondent's appeal before the Tribunal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation as it grossly barred by time. The Tribunal acted illegally and in complete ignorance of law while condoning the delay and thus I am persuaded to reverse the judgment.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal in hand is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 6- 12-2006 passed by the Service Tribunal is set aside and the respondent's appeal stands dismissed on the ground of limitation. No order as to costs.