1. Ch. Muhammad Alam, now survived by appellants, herein, brought a suit for perpetual injunction and specific performance of an agreement-to-sell executed on 8.11.1987, in respect of House No, 1- C, Sector C-1 Mirpur, against Defendant No, 1 (hereinafter shall be reference as vendor) in the Court of District Judge, Mirpur on 13.3.1993. The plaint was amended later on 20.9.2004. After the death of the said plaintiff, present appellants have been impleaded as plaintiffs. It is alleged that House No, 1-C situated at Sector C/1 Mirpur was initially constructed by WAPDA during construction of Mangla.
2. Dam. The said house was transferred to Govt. and vendor who was a refugee occupied the same with permission of the Govt. At a later stage Govt. decided to allot some other houses, including this one, to their occupants on payment of Rs, 10,00,000/- each as is evident from the letter dated 18.11.1986. After the aforesaid decision, vendor executed an agreement to-sell for transfer of the said house in favour of Ch. Muhammad Alam, father of the appellants herein on 8.11.1987 for a consideration of Rs, 15,00,000/-. It was alleged that at the time of execution, of agreement Rs, 1,50, 000/- were received by the vendor as earnest amount. On 29.2.1988, he further received Rs, 25,000/- and executed another `Iqrar-nama' acknowledging receipt of part payment. It was claimed that defendant showed no interest for obtaining the proprietary rights from the Government in order to execute the sale-deed as agreed between the parties on 8.11.1987 whereupon father of the appellants filed a suit for specific performance in the competent Court but plaint was rejected for want of cause of action under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. The order was vacated on appeal by this Court but reversed by the apex Court. It was also claimed that the plaintiffs are still prepared to perform their part of the agreement but it is defendant who has not taken any step for fulfilling his contractual obligations. The plaintiffs also stated that they asked the vendor that if some additional amount is required for obtaining the proprietary rights of the house, the same can be provided so that the sale-deed could be got executed but he did not take demand as serious whereupon the instant suit was filed.
3. The defendant/vendor firstly filed written statement which was amended later on. He raised several objections regarding the maintainability of the suit. He pleaded that plaintiffs earlier filed a suit for specific performance of above agreement-to-sell on 22.2.1989 which was rejected by the trial Court on 29.11.1992, and the judgment was upheld by the apex Court, thus, the matter stood finally concluded and present suit is barred by principle of res judicata as well as Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also pleaded that the suit is also time barred and is not maintainable as at the relevant time answering defendant was not owner of the house, hence, legally cannot execute an agreement-to-sell. It was also claimed that the suit is premature, hence, decree for specific performance cannot be granted and the plaintiffs at the most can file a suit for damages. In parawise reply defendant has admitted the possession of the house, however, he submitted that his sister Mst. Madina Begum and brother Zafar Ahmed Inqalabi are also in possession of the house and claiming title in house due to the this dispute proprietary rights could not be obtained. Moreover it was stated that defendant is owner of 1/3rd in the disputed house. In para No, 4 of the written statement execution of agreements and receipt of part payment, was admitted, however, it was repeated that agreement was not legal as the defendant was not owner of the land at the relevant time and in case of grant of proprietary rights he would be owner up to 1/3rd and to that extent he is ready to execute sale-deed.
4. The learned trial Court framed issues in light of the respective pleadings of the parties. After providing an opportunity of leading evidence the suit was dismissed vide its judgment dated 30.6.2007. Appellants, herein, felt aggrieved from the impugned judgment of the trial Court have filed this first appeal.
5. M/s. Abdul Majeed Malik, Muhammad Azam Khan and Ch. Reaz Alam, the learned Advocates for the appellants made following submissions:--
(1) That the agreement-to-sell dated 8.11.1987 was a contingent contract and specific performance whereof was dependent upon the grant of proprietary rights of the house to defendant who acquired the same vide Notification dated 14.6.2001. After obtaining the proprietary rights it was enjoined upon him to fulfil his contractual obligation by executing sale-deed in favour of the appellants but he transferred the house to his cousin in order to frustrate the agreement.
(2) 'That findings of the learned District Judge on Issue No, 2 are illegal, erroneous and against the record. The execution of the agreement and conditions stipulated therein were admitted by the vendor and the stand taken by him in the Court statement was against his pleadings, hence, was liable to be ignored and the learned District Judge was bound to grant the decree for specific performance of the contract.
(3) That the learned District Judge also fell in error in holding that the subsequent, transferees were necessary party. As the house, was transferred during pendency of the suit and in presence of a prohibitory order of the Court, therefore subsequent transferees were neither necessary nor proper party for decision of this case.
(4) That Section 20 of the Contract Act was not attracted in the present case as both the parties have executed the contract with open eyes after agreeing to its terms and conditions. Similarly Section 21 or Section 28 of the said Act was also not placing any restriction on the grant of decree for specific performance of the contract.
(5) That the impugned judgment badly suffers from misreading and non-reading of the record and conclusion reached at by the learned District Judge is erroneous.
(6) That the learned District Judge has illegally struck down the remaining issues which were necessary for disposal of the appeal.
6. In support of their submissions the learned Advocates placed reliance on the following cases:--
(i) Shivshankareppa Mahadevappa Parakanhatti v. Shivappa Parappa Kupati and others [AIR 1943 Bambay 27] ;
(ii) Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Sukur Mohammed and others [AIR 1948 PC 147] ;
(iii) Muhammad Mubeen u. Messrs Long Life Builders and others [PLJ 2006 Kar. 333];
(iv) Muhammad Amin u. Muhammad Yunus [1994 SCR 162];
(v) Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Ilyas and 23 others [1999 SCR 362];
(vi) The Pan Islamic Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Messrs General Imports and Exports Ltd. [PLD 1959 Kar.
7. 750] ;
(vii) Muhammad Amin v. Muhammad Hameed and 2 others [2000 SCR 537];
(viii) AJK Govt. and 4 others v. M/s. Spintex Limited [1998 SCR 167];
(ix) Ch. Abdul Karim and 5 others v. Raja Muhammad Nisar and another [1998 SCR 296]; Mr. Muhammad Reaz Tabassum, the learned counsel for the respondents, controverted the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and made the following submissions:--
(1) That agreement has not been proved in accordance with law as not a single marginal witness has been produced by the plaintiffs, therefore, no specific performance of contract can be granted.
(2) That at the time of agreement the property was in ownership of the Government and vendor was not in possession of any transferable interest, hence, was not entitled to execute the agreement.
(3) That the suit is barred by res judicata as well under Order II Rule 2 of the C.P.C. because the earlier suit in respect of the same cause of action was dismissed by the trial Court and the judgment was approved by the apex Court, therefore, on the same cause of action, subsequent suit could not be filed.
(4) That the suit was premature as even otherwise the same could have been filed after the grant of proprietary rights in favour of the vendor, thus, no decree could be passed in such a suit.
(5) That the disputed house has been transferred to different persons who have not been impleaded in the line of defendants, therefore, no suit could be decreed in their absence.
(6) That it has been proved through cogent evidence that the predecessor of appellants refused to purchase the house, therefore, no question arises for performance of the agreement. In support, of his submissions the learned Advocate placed reliance on the following cases:--
(i) Faqir Muhammad etc. v. Abdul Momin, etc. [2004 SCJ 250];
(ii) Sher Muhammad (deceased) through Legal heirs v. Ghulam Muhammad, etc. [2004 AC 863]; (iii)Ravi Glass Mills Ltd. v. I.C.I. Pakistan Powergen Ltd. [2004 YLR 2503]; (iv)Salim ullah Faridi and 8 others v. Amjad Sharif Qazi and 7 others [2003 YLR 1112];
(v) Humayun Mirza v. Mrs. Shahida A Rajput and another [PLD 2007 Lah. 449]; (vi)Sh. Muhammad Shari and 2 others v. Sheikh Ala-udDin and others [2005 SCJ 699];
(vii) Mst. Amina Bibi v. Mudassar Aziz [2003 SCJ 518];
(viii) Ghulam Nabi and others v. Seth Muhammad Yaqub and others [PLD 1983 SC 344]; (ix)Mst. Amina (deceased) through legal heirs and others v. Mst. Jameela Begum and 3 others [2006 YLR 870];
(x) Ghulam Muhammad and 20 others v. Mst. Bagh Bhari and 11 others [1994 SCMR 1610]; (xi)Walayat Khan and another v. Muhammad Razzaq and others [Civil Appeal No,89 of 1998, decided by the Supreme Court on 23.4.1999].
8. I have heard the learned Advocates for the parties and have given my anxious thought to the record of the case and precedents referred to and relied upon by them.
9. The first question which needs resolution is as to whether the agreement dated 8.11.1987 was a contingent contract, as has been claimed by the learned Advocates for the appellants?
10. The contingent contract has been defined in Section 31 of the Contract Act, 1872 as follows: "31. A contingent contract is a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract does or does not happen."
11. Illustration appended to the above Section clarifies the scope of the contract as under:-- "A contracts to pay B Rs,10,000 if B's house is burnt. This is a contingent contract."
12. In The Contract Act, 1872 (Edition 1973) Professor Dr. M.A. Mannan, while explaining the scope of a 'contingent' contract says that:- "A contingent, or a conditional promise differs from an absolute promise in this that in the case of contingent contracts the performance of the contract becomes due only on the happening of a condition or contingency, so it is not due immediately on the making of the contract. A contingent agreement is not enforcible till the event on which it was to depend has arisen; but when that event has occurred, the contract, for all purposes, rests on the same footing if it had been made positively and without reference to any contingency. If the event do not happen, no contract arises, so no liability can accrue to either party. "
13. Again at page 305, under the heading of "condition precedent and condition subsequent' the learned author says that:-- "A distinction is drawn in law between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent. Where a certain act has to be performed or a certain event is to happen before the contractual obligation can be fixed, this act or event is a condition precedent. Such is an undertaking in a contract of lease that the lessor shall build a new warehouse and put an old warehouse in repair. So, where a railway company purchases land for the proposed railroad, there may be a condition precedent that the railway shall be made. Where, on the other hand, a valid contract is formed in the first instance, but in is stipulated that the contract shall be annulled if a certain act be not performed or a certain event do not happen, that is a condition subsequent, the non-fulfilment of which discharges the contract."
14. Now I would like to refer some case law on the subject. In a case titled Mrs. Chandnee Widya Yati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial and others [AIR 1964 SC 978] the plaintiffs therein entered into contract of sale of a house belonging to the defendant on the plot granted by the Government. One of the terms of the contract was that the vendor shall obtain necessary permission of the Government for the sale within 2 months of the agreement and if the needful was not done within the stipulated period a right was given to the vendees to extend the date or treat the agreement as cancelled.
15. The vendor applied for permission but later on request was withdrawn. The vendees filed suit for specific performance of the contract. Similar plea was raised by the defendants/vendors but the same was repelled on the ground that the contract was not contingent contract and the parties had agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. Relevant observation of the apex Court of India is recorded in Para Nos, 4 and 5 of the report which are as under:-- "4. The main ground of attack on this appeal is that the contract is not enforceable being of a contingent nature and the contingency not having been fulfilled. In our opinion there is no substance in this contention. So far as the parties to the contract are concerned, they have agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. Under that document it was for the defendant vendor to make the necessary application for the permission to the Chief Commissioner. She had as a matter of fact made such an application but for reasons of her own decided to withdraw the same. On the findings that the plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and that it was the defendant who wilfully refused to perform her part of the contract, and that time was not of the essence of the contract, the Court has got to enforce the terms of the contract and to enjoin upon the defendant-appellant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner. It will be for the Chief Commissioner to decide whether or not to grant the necessary sanction.
(5) In this view of the matter, the High Court was entirely correct in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. The High Court should have further directed defendant to make the necessary application for permission to the Chief Commissioner, which was implied in the contract between the parties. As the defendant vendor, without any sufficient reasons, withdrew the application already made to the Chief Commissioner, the decree to be prepared by this Court will add the clause that the defendant, within one month from today shall make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner or to such other competent authority as may have been empowered to grant the necessary sanction to transfers like the one in question, and further that within one month of the receipt of that sanction she shall convey to the plaintiffs the property in suit. In the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to the damages as decreed by the High Court. The appellant sought to raise certain other pleas which had not been raised in the High Court; for example that this was not a fit case in which specific performance of the contract should be enforced by the Court. This plea was not specifically raised in the High.
16. Court and the necessary facts were not pleaded in the pleadings. It is manifest that this Court should not allow such a plea to be raised here for the first time."
17. Same view was taken by Dacca High Court in Muhammad Sama Mondal's case [PLD 1963 Dacca 816]. In that case agreement to execute a deed for sale of the land was executed between the parties and one of the conditions was that deed for sale would be executed after securing permission from the Collector. It was concluded by the learned Court that the condition of securing permission from the Collector is not collateral to the agreement but is a part of the consideration of the contract. Relevant observation is recorded in Para No, 11 which is as under:-- "11. As to the first point, contention of the learned Advocate for appellant is that according to the terms of the agreement, the execution of the document was dependent on the permission from the Collector and that as permission was not obtained, the contract cannot be enforced. Section 31 of the Contract Act which defines contingent contract is as follows:-- "A 'contingent contract' is a contract to do or not to do something if some event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen." A contingent contract is not enforcible till the event on which it depends has occurred. But the uncertain event on the happening of which the contract is conditional must be collateral to the contract. This means that it must not form part of the consideration of the contract but must be independent of it. The illustration to Section 31 of the Contract Act is as follows:-- "A contracts to pay B Rs,10,000 if B's house is burnt. This is a contingent contract." The consideration of the promise to pay Rs,10,000/- is the payment by B, but the contract to pay Rs,10,000/- will be enforcible only on the happening of an uncertain event, namely B's house being burnt down, an event which is independent of the consideration, in the present case, the term in the deed of agreement is to the effect that on registration of the document after taking permission, the defendants would take the balance Rs,1,300/- from the plaintiffs and that plaintiffs would pay this amount at that time. So the condition to take permission is not collateral to the contract, but forms part of the consideration of the contract. In the present case, the contract cannot be regarded as a contingent one."
18. After perusal of Section 31 of the Contract Act, in light of the above precedents, I am of the considered view that the test to determine as to whether a contract is 'contingent' or 'absolute' is that if there is mere stipulation in the agreement-to-sell that the sale-deed would be executed after obtaining permission from any public functionary then such a condition is not collateral to the contract and the contract cannot be construed as a 'contingent' contract because the condition was forming the part of the consideration. However, where vendor is not in possession of the absolute title and execution of the sale-deed depends upon the grant of proprietary rights by the Government then such a contract could be declared as 'conditional' or 'contingent', as has been opined in the Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. The Union of India [AIR 1970 SC 540]. In the case in hand the agreement was executed between the parties on 8.11.1987 and its execution was dependent upon the condition that the vendor will execute the sale-deed after obtaining the proprietary rights.
19. Had the proprietary rights would have not been granted to him by the Government for failure to deposit the sale price mentioned in letter dated 18.11.1986 or for any other reason only in that eventuality it could have been said that the agreement stood frustrated and its execution has become impossible. As stated above, during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract, vendor/defendant herein acquired proprietary rights vide Notification dated 14.6.2001.
20. Thus, the contract is absolute and has become enforceable. Findings of the learned District Judge that the parties were under some mistake and the contract was liable to be ignored under Section 20 of the Contract Act, could not be approved because Section 20 is not attracted in the present case. Section 20 of the said Act comes into play only when both the parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement only in that case the agreement becomes void. The explanation appended to Section makes it further clear that an erroneous opinion as to the value of the thing which forms the subject-matter of the agreement is not to be deemed a mistake as to a matter of fact. In the present case the Government has decided to sell the house to the plaintiff and decision was conveyed to the occupants vide letter dated 18.11.1986.
21. Mere fact that the Government soled the house later on at a higher price cannot frustrate the agreement. Similarly observation of the learned District Judge that agreement is not specifically enforceable in view of Section 28 of the Contract Act was also erroneous, baseless and has no nexus with the record of the case.
22. The next contention of the learned Advocates for the appellants that execution of the agreement was admitted by vendor, therefore, performance of the same could not be refused has a substance. In Para No,4 of the plaint the appellants have taken a categoric stand that defendant executed an agreement on 8.11.1987. They also pleaded in the same para that another agreement was executed in the shape of receipt on 29.2.1988. The defendant in his written statement has admitted the execution of these documents, therefore, requirement of further proof of these documents hardly arise. There is no substance in the argument of Mr. Reaz Tabassum, the learned Advocate for the vendor, that even then appellants were bound to produce at least two marginal witnesses of the agreement. By now it is well settled that an admitted fact needs not to be proved.
23. In his Court statement the vendor though has made some deviation from his earlier stand but the same is an afterthought and is a deliberate attempt to get rid of from his contractual obligations.
24. There is force in the contention of the learned Advocates for the appellants that subsequent transferees were not necessary party because the disputed property has been transferred during pendency of the suit and prohibitory order of the Court, is correct.
25. The objection of Mr. Muhammad Reaz Tabassum, the learned Advocate for the respondents, that subsequent transferees were necessary party because no decree can be passed without providing them a right of hearing in presence of the settled position of law has no substance. In order to meet the objections an application for amendment has also been made by the appellants during the course of arguments but I am of the considered view that subsequent transferees are not in any manner necessary party for the purpose of the decision of the appeal or the suit out of which the instant appeal has arisen. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, prohibits the transfer of the property during pendency of the proceedings in order to save the parties from multiplicity of the proceedings. Scope of Section 52 came under consideration before this Court in a case titled Abdul Karim v. Kala Khan and another [PLD 1987 AJK 139]. Facts of the case were that a suit for pre- emption was filed by Kala Khan against Abdul Karim. At some stage, the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution. An application for restoration was filed and during pendency of this application the suit land was transferred. It was concluded that as the transfer has been effected during pendency of the proceedings, therefore, is void. Relevant observation is recorded in Para No,6 which is as under:-- "6. Provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act constitute a rule resting on the spirit of principles of equity, justice and good conscience. The object is to prevent the course of de novo trial resulting in multiplicity of litigation due to subsequent transactions of immovable property, the subject to dispute; and to protect the right of party to the suit or proceeding likely to be eroded by subsequent transaction. The legislature quite wisely introduced the provisions, otherwise, in absence of these provisions, a defendant apprehending defect in a case, could easily defeat his rival plaintiff by transferring the property to a second person, and chain of such transactions during pendency of a suit or proceeding would not be brought to an end. It is, therefore, rightly laid down to control the action of a defendant from alienating property to- a third party during pendency of a suit or proceeding. The rule is applicable even in pre-emption cases. .A vendee, after institution of a suit for preemption, is, therefore, estopped from transferring or alienating the immovable property, the subject of dispute, to a third party"
26. The question as to whether the subsequent transferees can be regarded as necessary party was also considered by the apex Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Muhammad Sharif's case, referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocates for the appellants. Their lordships observed that a transferee during pendency of the suit cannot be regarded as a necessary party and decree passed against the transferor can be executed without impleading such transferee a party to the proceedings.
27. The contention of Mr. Muhammad Reaz Tabassum, the learned Advocate for the respondents, that at the time of agreement-to-sell the vendor was not owner of the disputed house, hence, cannot execute the agreement-to-sell, is devoid of any force. The vendor was admittedly occupying the house. The Government decided to transfer the disputed house and similar other houses to their occupants, as is evident from letter dated 18.11.1986. Therefore, it is concluded that the defendant has transferable interest in the house at the time of execution of the agreement-to-sell.
28. Be that as it may admitted position is that during pendency of the proceedings defendant acquired proprietary rights of the disputed house on 14.6.2001 and thereafter transferred the same to his cousin which has further been transferred to somebody else. Thus, where a title is acquired during pendency of the proceedings the specific performance of contract executed in respect of the said property cannot be avoided nor after the execution of the contract an executant can come with volta face that he was not competent to enter into a contract. Raja Muhammad Gul v.
29. Muhammad Ashraf and 6 others [2000 YLR 1805] and Amanullah's case [2003 CLJ 641], can be referred in support of the proposition. It had been observed in the above cases that where a vendor who did not have title in the property agrees to sell the property through an agreement-to sell acquired title in the said property subsequently he would be bound to perform his contractual obligations and cannot avoid the contract on the ground that at the time of execution of an agreement-to-sell he was not in possession of a lawful title.
30. The contention of Mr. Muhammad Reaz Tabassum, the learned counsel for the respondents, that the suit is barred by res judicata as well as Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil. Procedure, is also devoid of any force. Admittedly the suit of the appellants was rejected under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. for want of cause of action. It is also a settled proposition of law that where a plaint is rejected under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. on any ground enumerated under the said rule, a fresh plaint on the same cause of action is not barred under Rule 13 of Order VII of the C.P.C. which says that the rejection of the plaint on any of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.
31. The rejection of the plaint cannot operate res judicata because the same is not a decision on merits. The next argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the suit was premature and should have been filed after the grant of proprietary rights either in 2001, in the circumstances of this case, is also misconceived. It is on the record that the agreement-to-sell was executed on 8.11.1987. The defendant took no steps for obtaining the proprietary rights for a pretty long period.
32. Apprehending the frustration of the contract, the appellants herein, filed a suit for perpetual injunction and sought a direction to the defendant/vendor for obtaining the proprietary rights. They also seek relief of specific performance of the contract. In view of the conduct of the defendant it cannot be said that the present suit was premature nor the appellants could split the cause of action.
33. I am also not impressed by the arguments of the learned Advocate for the respondents that the performance of the contract was refused by Ch. Muhammad Alam, predecessor of the appellants.
34. No cogent evidence is on the record in support of the aforesaid assertion of the learned Advocate for the vendor. The authorities referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents have distinguishable facts; therefore, need not to be discussed separately. The learned District Judge has also opined that suit was time barred. In my view this conclusion is also erroneous and against the law. A perusal of the agreement reveals that sale-deed would be executed after obtaining proprietary rights from the Government which were admittedly granted to the vendor on 14.6.2001. At that time the suit for specific performance of the contract was pending.
35. Earlier the suit filed on behalf of the plaintiffs was rejected by the apex Court on the ground that the cause of action, if any, will accrue after grant of the proprietary rights in favour of the defendant. As the defendant was not vigilant in obtaining the proprietary rights, therefore, the plaintiffs rightly filed the suit for perpetual injunction as well as specific performance. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the suit was time barred. In Muhammad Hussain's case [PLD 1995 Peshawar 98] in a suit for specific performance of the contract, the bar of limitation was raised almost in the similar circumstances. One of the terms of the agreement in that case was defendant therein would execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs therein after getting P.T.D. in his favour. The suit was filed within 3 years after issuing the P.T.D. and it was held that the same is within prescribed period of limitation.
36. Now coming to the prayer of the plaintiffs I am of the view that there is no need of passing the decree of perpetual injunction because the proprietary rights have already been granted. So far as the relief of specific performance of the contract is concerned, that has been proved by the plaintiffs. However, the defendant, in his Court statement, has mentioned various sales of the houses on a higher price though it cannot be a ground for enhancement of the consideration money that too, considering the conduct of the vendor herein, but the fact remains that the plaintiffs/appellants have not challenged the statement in cross-examination which means that they admitted his statement to that extent. Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellants, also half-heartedly admitted the increase in the price of the property, therefore, I am of the view that the interest of justice would be served if the consideration money is enhanced to Rs, 30,00,000/-. I order accordingly. This view lends support from a case titled Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Akram [2000 SCMR 533].
37. In view of above, accepting the appeal, it is directed that the appellants will deposit the balance/remaining amount in the Court of District Judge, Mirpur, within a period of two months.
38. The defendant is directed to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff failing Which the learned District Judge, Mirpur, shall arrange the execution of the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs in accordance with law. If the amount is not deposited within the stipulated period then the suit shall stand dismissed.