1. M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-----This appeal by an ex-Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, is directed against the order of Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) dated 15-2-1971, and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sargodha Range, dated 16-7-1971, and the order of the Inspector-general of Police, Punjab, dated 13-11-1971 discharg--ing him from service and rejecting his appeal and revision, respectively. The appellant in the first instance, challenged the departmental orders by a Writ Petition No. 900/1972, before the Lahore High Court which was declared to have abated on 17-7-1974. The appellant preferred this appeal before this Tribunal on 10-12-19,'4 which appears to be barred by time. The learned Government Pleader has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, reported as PLD 1976 SC 195 to press horne his objection that the appeal abated automatically on the establishment of this Tribunal on 22-7-1974, and he was required to prefer his appeal within a period of ninety days which expired somewhere on the 19th of October, 1974. Thus the appeal was barred by time by more than seven weeks. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that he was entitled to the time spent in obtaining the copies. He submitted that he applied for the copies on the 19th of July, 1974 which were supplied to him on the 18th of October, 1974. Thus reckoning the prescribed period of 90 days thereafter, the appeal was in tune. He also argued that the order of discharge passed by the Superintendent of Police, was void ab initio inasmuch as under rule 12.8 of the Punjab Police Rules, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, was the competent Authority and not the S. P. As the services of the appellant wire dispensed with during the period of probation. The following provisions were relied upon:--- "A probationary Inspector shall be discharged by the Inspector-General and all other Upper Subordinates by Range Deputy Inspector-General, Assistant inspector-General, Government Railway Police, and Assistant Inspector-General Provincial Additional Police (designated as Com-- mandant), Provincial Additional Police. No appeal lies against an order of discharge."
2. Reliance was also placed in this behalf on the decision reported as PLD 1965 Kar. 100 to support the contention.
3. The appellant after the conclusion of hearing of the case also moved an application and the case was reheard on 6-12-1978, when the appellant argued that the case should have been processed under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, which at the relevant time, were applicable to the case of the appellant. He thus submitted that since no charge-sheet was served upon him and no enquiry was conducted, therefore, the proceedings held against the appellant were void ab initio, as the requirements of Efficiency and Discipline Rules, which were mandatory in nature, were not complied with. Reliance was also placed in this behalf on PLD 1970 Lah. 811 and also on 1978 NLR 105 and 157.
4. After hearing the parties, we find that the appeal merits to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
5. In the first instance, the appellant has not been able to explain the delay. As laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Authority cited above no abatement order was necessary as the abatement occurred by operation of law and thus the limitation prescribed under proviso to section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, expired on 19th of October, 1374. Even the copies of order of abatement were made available to the appellant before the expiry of the aforesaid period of limitation. These were ready on the 15th of October, 1974, for delivery. Thus, thereafter the appellant was required to avail of reasonable period and not a period of 90 days as a matter of right. We find that the appeal filed by the appellant was drafted and completed on the 30th of November, 1974, but even thereafter he too 10 days for which there was no explanation. Similarly, the arguments of the appellant based on the ground that S. P's. Order was void is equally untenable. Although the impugned order was worded as `discharged', but it was certainly not an order under Rule 12.8 of the Punjab Police Rules. The appellant was served with a show-cause notice on various counts seriously impugning upon his integrity, performance and conduct. In the circumstances, this was essentially an order ride which the services of a Probationer were terminated after complying with the requirements of law and principles of natural justice. In any case the appellant was heard in appeal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police who confirmed the order of S. P. Faisalabad. Thus the infirmity in the order of S. P. If any, stood validated as laid down in PLD 1972 Lah. 682. In re: Ismail v. S. A. M. Khan and others which was based upon the authority reported as PLD 1965 SC 399 and the following observations by the Lordship of the Supreme Court of Pakistan from the above case, may be reproduced with advantage :--- "By section 211 of the Act, the Board of Revenue possesses power to revise an order passed by any subordinate officer and questions of legality as well as propriety of such a decision would be open in revision before the Board. The order of the Board was passed after full hearing of both parties on the merits of the case. Even if, therefore, the intermediate appellate links were weak, the final order in revision, referable as it was to section 211 of the Act, could not be successfully assailed as illegal."
6. We respectfully follow the dictum of Supreme Court in the case above. In this case the appellate as well as the revising authorities confirmed the S. P's. Order. As regards the new contentions raised by the appellant that his case should have been processed under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules instead of Police Rules, we are of the view that the appellant was a. Probationer and he could be discharged from service during the period of probation without having recourse to the departmental proceedings. In fact the action against' the appellant appears to have been taken with reference to rule 13.17 of the Police Rules which provided as under: "Ordinarily the submission of two successive bad reports regarding the work and conduct of a Police Officer will result automatically in the institution of departmental proceedings against him of' such charge as the contents of the report may justify."
7. It is an established law that a Probationer if during the period of probation his work and conduct was found unsatisfactory, his services could be terminated. In this case, the appellant had been served with a show-cause notice thus the requirement of the law and principles of natural justice stood amply complied with.
8. The following extracts from the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad, dated 15- 2-1971, will amply support our findings above: "The appellant was served with a Show-Cause Notice for stinking reputation and persistent bad record of service. Since his temporary enlistment in the Police Force, his conduct was doubtful, performance inefficient and was thus not considered to be a good Police Officer in the long run.
9. There seems to have no change in him inspite of being dismissed from the service once. He was found to be mixing up with men of doubtful integrity and bad character and was also irregular in his work.
10. D. S. P., Toba Tek Singh (Supervising Officer) has not only given him a bad chit for his performance but has also brought to light the facts of his illicit intimacy with a daughter of a farmer residing in close proximity of the police station. His clandestine meeting with a village girl in the sugar-cane field has created a sort of commotion in the village which was controlled by his Supervising Officer with considerable efforts.
11. He was also found to have misappropriated an amount of T. A. Bills of Constables received at the police station for disbursement ; and Besides going into his record of service, I have provided full opportunity to explain his conduct and have arrived at a conclusion that be is a slur upon the Police Department. It will not be out of place to mention here that while he was called to appear in the orderly room today, from P. S. Chuttiana he left the Police Station on 14-2-1971 and was detected drunk in Chakla last night by the City Inspector. Suitable action has been taken against him on that count; but he is released on bail as the offence was bailable."
12. Even otherwise, we find that the appellant has not taken up this point at any stage of the proceedings and it was a belated attempt on the part of the appellant to raise this issue. Thus keeping in view the circumstances of the case, we do not feel persuaded to accept this contention of the appellant, Thus none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant had any force. In fact the only explanation given by the appellant for delay was that he did not come to know of the establishment of the Service Tribunal and that he was busy in collecting the documents for filing the appeal. The explanation had little force. Moreover, he did not explain the delay from 30th of November, 1974 to 10th of December, 1974, when the appeal was already complete and all the documents were ready with the appellant. Thus the appellant has failed to explain the delay. The appeal is accordingly dismissed as barred by time.