1. ' DORAB PATEL, J--The appellant was "selected by the Committee for the appointment of teacher in the M. C. High School, Leiah". This was by an order dated 8th March, 1975. Next, by an order dated 12th March, 1975, in pursuance of this recommendation of the Recruiting Committee of the Municipal Committee, Leiah, the Administrator appointed the appellant as a Junior English Teacher, in the Municipal High School, whilst the first respondent, who was a Junior English Teacher in the school, was promoted to the post of Senior English Teacher. As the appellant was aggrieved by this order, he challenged it in an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh on 4th April, 1975. And, this appeal was allowed on 1st January, 1976. As municipal schools had meanwhile been nationalised, the appellant should have filed a copy of his appeal and the order allowing it. Be that as it may, learned counsel for the appellant stated that the appeal had been filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh, under section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, because the Deputy Commissioner, being the Controlling Authority for the Municipalities of the District of Muzaffargarh, was the appellate Authority for hearing appeals against the orders of the Administrator of Municipalities in the District.
2. ' We will presently examine the question whether the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh, was competent under section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 to entertain an appeal against an order of the Administrator of a Municipality. But, even if it is assumed that he had this power, how could he remain the appellate Authority after the nationalization of schools ?
3. Maulvi Sirajul Haq was not able to assist us on this aspect of the law, and it is not surprisng that the first respondent challenged the Deputy Commissioner's order of 1st January, 1976, on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. But, as this was by an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act, 1974, the appellant challenged it on the obvious ground that the Punjab Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent's appeal, because that respondent and the appellant were not civil servants at the relevant time. However, by its order dated 6th June, 1977, the Punjab Administrative Tribunal rejected this contention and held that the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh had no power to entertain the appellant's appeal, therefore, it set aside the Deputy Commissioner's order of 6th June, 1977.
4. ' The appellant, therefore, challenged the order of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal in a petition under Article 212 of the Constitution, and leave was granted to examine his contention that the Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction over disputes between employees of Municipalities. The submission is correct, because the jurisdiction of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal under the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act is limited to disputes between civil servants. But, Mr. Siddique, who appeared for the first respondent, relied on the nationalization of schools including municipal schools, and as the Leiah Municipal School had been nationalized, with effect from 1st July, 1975, Mr. Siddique submitted that the Tribunal had merely decided an appeal between civil servants. But, the appellant and the first respondent were municipal employees in March, 1975, when the dispute between them arose, and as the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act is not intended to have retrospective effect, it is clear that the Punjab Administrative Tribunal was not competent to entertain a dispute between municipal employees.
5. ' Mr. Siddique then submitted that the Administrator's order of 12th March, 1975 was in accordance with the Recruiting Committee's decision of 8th March, 1975, because the Recruiting Committee had only selected the appellant "for the appointment of teacher in the M. C. High School, Leiah".
6. However, because the post of Senior English Teacher had become .Acant and had been advertised, Maulvi Sirajul Haq submitted that the words in the order of 8th March, 1975 "for the appointment of teacher in the M. C. High School, Leiah," should be read as "for the. Appointment of Senior English Teacher in the M. C. High School, Leiah." We cannot read into the Recruiting Committee's order words which are not contained in it. However, even if we were to arrogate to ourselves the power to modify this order, the further question which requires examination is whether the Administrator's order appointing the appellant as a teacher was appealable before the Deputy Commissioner, and Mr. Siddique submitted that it was not. Now, section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, on which the appellant relies, states that any person "aggrieved by an order passed by a Municipal Committee was or its Chairman ..May appeal to such authority in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed." According to clause (32) of section 3 of the Ordinance, the word "prescribed" in the Ordinance means "prescribed by rules made under this Ordinance." Therefore, Mr. Siddique referred us to rule 1 of the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Appeals) Rules, 1960 which had been framed by the Governor of West Pakistan in exercise of the powers conferred under section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance on which the appellant relies, and submitted that the appellant's appeal was hit by this rule. This rule reads - "Short title, commencement and application.- (1) These rules may be called the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Appeals) Rules, 1960.
(2) They shall come into force at once.
(3) They shall apply to all appeals preferred against orders passed under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, except appeals by servants of Municipal Committees in matter relating to their service."
7. ' On the plain language of this rule, no appeal could have been filed by the appellant against the Administrator's order of 12th March, 1975, therefore, Mr. Sirajul Haq submitted that the rules framed under section 119 could not curtail the right conferred by the section to appeal against all orders passed by a Municipal Committee or its Chairman. But, as submitted by Chaudhary Hamiduddin, who appeared as amicus curiae, the scheme of the Municipal Administration Ordinance as well as of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959 was that appeals in service matters should be restricted, and in support of this submission, Chaudhry Hamiduddin referred us to rule 40 of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963. This rule reads : "A municipal servant on whom a penalty has been imposed under rule 36, 37 or 38 may within ninety days of the order in question appeal to the appellate authority specified in rule 42." Now, the appellate Authority specified in rule 42 is the Controlling Authority, and presumably it was in view of this provision that the appellant had gone in an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, who was admittedly the Controlling Authority for the Municipality of Leiah during the period when the Municipal Administration Ordinance was in force. But the right of appealing to the Controlling Authority was limited by the rules to penalties imposed under rule 36, 37 or 38, and as it is not the appellant's case that his grievance fell under these rules, it is very clear that his appeal before the Deputy Commissioner as the Controlling Authority was totally misconceived, and so the Deputy Commissioner had acted without jurisdiction in allowing this misconceived appeal.
8. ' Additionally, although the appellant had obtained leave from this Court on the contention that the Municipal Administration Ordinance was in force at the relevant time, Maulvi Sirajul Haq was compelled to admit that this Ordinance had been repealed, before the date of the Administrator's order by which the appellant was aggrieved. Yet, neither he nor Mr. Siddique could inform us whether the Punjab Peoples Local Government Ordinance, 1972 had been extended to the Leiah Municipality, but it is not necessary to go into this question, because in any event, it is clear from section 229 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1975 (which was later repealed and substituted by the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975) that the Municipal Administration Ordinance was repealed on the 1st of February, 1975, when the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, to which we will refer as the said Ordinance, came into force, therefore, the appellant's grievance had to be decided under the said Ordinance. But, his learned counsel was not able to refer us to any provision in this Ordinance or in any rules framed under it, which permitted an appeal to a Deputy Commissioner against orders passed by a Municipal Committee or by the Administrator of a Municipality, because, as submitted by Chaudhry Hamiduddin, the said Ordinance did away with the concept of the Controlling Authority which was the creation of the repealed Ordinance. On this ground also, therefore, the appellant's appeal before the Deputy Commissioner was not maintainable.
9. ' Learned counsel for the appellant feebly submitted that the provision for an appeal before the Controlling Authority had been saved by section 230 of the said Ordinance. This submission is misconceived, but as submitted by Chaudhry Hamiduddin, section 4 of the said Ordinance has saved rules, regulations and bye-laws made under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, in so far as they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the said Ordinance. Therefore, Maulvi Sirajul Haq submitted that the right of an aggrieved party to challenge an order of a Municipality before the Deputy Commissioner of the District had been saved by this section. But, in the first place, he has not been able to refer us to any provision in the said Ordinance, which was consistent with the concept of the Controlling Authority which found a place in the Municipal Administration.
10. Ordinance. Secondly, as learned, counsel relied on the rules framed under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, he had to refer us to the rules framed under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, under which the appellant could have challenged the Administrator's order of 12th March, 1975 in an appeal before the Controlling Authority. But, as we pointed out earlier, the right of challenging an order of a Municipality in a service matter was confined to orders which fell under rule 40 of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963, and as the appellant's claim clearly did not fall under that rule, he could not have challenged the Administrator's order, even during the pendency of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 in an appeal before the Controlling Authority. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner's order of 1st January, 1976 in his favour was clearly illegal.
11. ' Maulvi Sirajul Haq then submitted that section 119 conferred a right of appeal against all orders passed by a Municipal Committee or by an Administrator of a Municipal Committee, and, therefore, the rules framed under this section could not curtail the right conferred by the section itself. The submission has force, but on the footing that the appellant had a cause of action, he had to prosecute it in the manner prescribed under the law. But, instead of doing so, he filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, whose jurisdiction was limited to the powers conferred on him by the rules, and as under the rules, the Deputy Commissioner as the Controlling Authority could only entertain an appeal which fell under rule 40 of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963 and as the appellant's grievance did not fall under rule 40, the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's grievance.
12. ' Maulvi Sirajul Haq's only other submission was that we should allow the appeal, because admittedly the Punjab Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent's grievance. It is true that this Tribunal had erred in entertaining the first respondent's appeal, but whatever be the position if the matter had rested here, the appellant had persuaded this Court to grant leave on the ground that his case was governed by the Municipal Administration Ordinance.
13. He should have known that this Ordinance had been repealed, therefore, to say the least, if we were to accept learned counsel's prayer, it would enable the appellant to take advantage of his own wrong in not giving proper assistance to the Court at the leave granting stage. Accordingly, although the Punjab Administrative Tribunal's order is illegal, we clarify that the Deputy Commissioner's order of 1-1-1976 is equally illegal. The appeal is disposed of accordingly, but without any Order as to costs. Finally, we thanks Chaudhary Hamiduddin for his able assistance.