The petitioner was promoted as Officer Grade I in the pay scale of 1500--75-1800/100-2500 with effect from 1st July, 1978, vide order dated 9th November, 1978. On 20th December, 1978, this promotion was confirmed and 1st January, 1979 was fixed as the date of next increment. A letter dated 23rd December, 1978 was also sent enhancing the rent ceiling while the same was further raised vide letter dated 5th February, 1979. The grant of next increment was also communicated vide letter dated 14th of January, 1979.
2. On 19th of March, 1979, the respondent No. 2 cancelled the previous order of promotion and directed the concerned Manager that as from March, 1979, the petitioner shall be given the sane pay as he was drawing on 30th of June, 1978.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition He was however, directed by this Court vide order dated 16th April, 1979 to move the Departmental Authority for the redress of his grievances or in any case get the reasons for the reversal of his promotion. It is stated by the learned counsel that his representation was rejected. The learned counsel for the respondents also confirms the same.
4. It is now contended by the learned counsel that as the petitioner had been promoted, by the competent authority in accordance with the rules and with full knowledge of fact without any misrepresentation having been made to it, the reversal of the order was unlawful. It is argued that, in any case, the reversal order could not be made, after the promotion order had not only been acted upon but effected, by passing other orders, conferring collateral benefits on the petitioner which he duly received and enjoyed.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents raised the following points :--
(i) No writ lies at Lahore, as the impugned order was passed at Karachi. Reliance was placed on .The Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan, Dacca v. Ataul Haq PLD 1965 SC 201.
(ii) In case of a statutory body, the employees, even if they were removed will have no right to file a writ petition, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in R. T. H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation PLD 1974 SC 146:
(iii) Promotion is not a right and the authority on finding that it was done illegally or unjustly had the right to rescind it.
The learned counsel supported the last argument to say that as the promotion was in violation of rule 10(2) read with 21(2) and as there was no express relaxation of it, the order of promotion was bad in law and had to be recalled without any further notice. He relied on Shahzad Gul and 9 others v. Govern--ment of N.-W. F. P. And another (PLD 1979 Pesh. 224) and Ahmad Ali v. Syed Panah Ali Shah and another (PLD 1973 Lah. 332).
6. As for the first point, the contention being raised by the learned counsel has no merit at all. The petitioner is working at Lahore in the promoted capacity and it was here that his rank and pay was sought to be reduced. The order Annex. `G', directing payment of reduced salary was also issued at Lahore. It was held in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commis--sioner, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1970 SC 1) that C. P. C. Applies to writ jurisdiction. According to section 20, C. P. C. The writ jurisdiction of the Court is available where the defendant carries on business as held in Havali Shah and another v. Khan Saheb Shaikh Painda Khan (AIR 1926 P C 88) or where the cause of action arises wholly or in part. Again Second Explanation to S. 20 is quite specific. It reads as under :- "A Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place."
The judgment of the Supreme Court in National Bank's case can be distinguished on the basis that the record prohibiting payment of the higher salary on promotion was to be called for from Lahore.
In this view of the matter, this Court has the jurisdiction to inquire from the respondents if the said act was being done with lawful authority.
7. As for the second point, the contention being raised is not correct. The judgment in R. T. H.
Janjua's case cited by the learned counsel was subsequently considered in the case of Salahuddin (PLD 1975 SC 244). According to the view taken therein, the respondent Bank is a person performing functions with regard to the affairs of the centre. Its actions are, therefore, liable to judicial scrutiny and correction, if the same are found to fall outside the power, conferred on the Bank or any of its functionaries.
8. As for the third point, the contention of the learned counsel, on the face of it is quite valid but is not relevant to the case in hand. In the present case, the promotion had not only been ordered and effected but also acted upon by the parties for about 8 months. Meanwhile, further orders were also issued conferring on the petitioner certain benefits which would attach to the post, to which he was promoted. There was no misrepresentation or fraud. The respondents acted with eyes open, available authority and clear mind. It was thefore fore, a transaction past and closed and final in all respects. In this view of the matter, the question is not of mere denying promotion but of the power of the respondent to rescind or withdraw the order at that late stage.
9. The Supreme Court had to consider a similar point in Mukhtar Ahmad and 37 others v.
Government of West Pakistan, through the Secretary, Food and Agriculture, Lahore and others (PLD 1971 SC 846). Similar action had been taken by the Government in that case for the reason that the Engineers who had been appointed did not fulfil the qualifications as laid down under the Rules. It was held by their Lordships that if a competent authority had passed an order which did dot conform to the Rules already made, then it shall be deemed that the Rules stood amended and the orders acted upon were found enforceable at law.
10. A similar rule was laid down in Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407). The civil servant in that case was allowed a starting salary of Rs. 1,000 by the President vide order dated 1st October, 1959. Subsequently, on 26th August, 1962, he withdrew his previous order. It was held that executive orders once they have taken legal effect and created rights, cannot be recalled. The plea that the President had not followed a particular procedure was not accepted. This Court in Dr. M. S. Quraishi v. West Pakistan Government and another (PLD 1966 Lah. 825) held that the confirmation of an employee against a particular post by a competent authority could not be recalled subsequently after it had been acted upon and is in effective operation. The Dacca High Court in Province of East Pakistan v. Dr. K. A. Mansur and others (PLD 1963 Dacca 211) held that where an authority could condone qualification or age for appointment to a post, the appointment was valid and decision not revisable.
11. The learned counsel for the respondents candidly conceded that the promotion of the petitioner had been ordered by the competent authority.
12. In view of what has been said above, it is quite clear that the petitioner had been validly promoted, by a competent authority, without any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of any one. The order had no only been acted upon but certain benefits were also conferred thereafter.
The whole thing was done consciously, under the orders of the competent authority, who under the Rules was competent even to relax the qualification of passing the Institute of Bankers' examination as laid down in rule 10(2) (b) of the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973. It shall, therefore, be presumed that the qualification had been duly relaxed by the competent authority under the proviso to rule 10(2) (b). Thus the promotion of the petitioner was perfectly valid and legal. It, therefore, could not have been recalled or rescinded by the respondents. The impugned order is, therefore, declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondents shall also pay the costs.